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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the literary relationship between James Joyce and Victorian
nonsense, particularly Lewis Carroll. Tracing the defining characteristics of literary
nonsense beyond the Victorian period, it aims to assess what we mean by 'literary
nonsense', and to evaluate the terms of Joyce's nonsense inheritance. The thesis is
divided into four chapters:
Chapter One: "'A letters from a person to a place about a thing": The Nonsense
Letter.' This chapter looks at central nonsense themes of miscommunication, the
(mis)construction of meaning, textual play, and the inadequacies and absurdities of
epistolary conventions. My research draws on personal letters from Joyce, Carroll, and
Edward Lear, as well as examining the relationship between fictional letters and their
host texts, and delivering a detailed analysis of the Finnegans Wake letter in its various
guises.
Chapter Two: "'Mocked majesty": Games and Authority.' This chapter explores
the various forms of authority in nonsense, from autocratic monarchs to omniscient
authors, and from the parental or pedagogic authority of adults over children to the rigid
and unspoken rules of children's games and discourses. The various species of games
we find in the work of both Carroll and Joyce are analysed, from the tightly ordered
playworlds of chess, cards, and games with logic and language, to the rough-and-tumble
hijinks of the Finnegans Wake children's twilight street games.
Chapter Three: '''Jest jibberweek's joke": Comic Nonsense.' This chapter begins
by exploring the Kantian model of incongruous humour we find in the nonsense double
act, examining how both Joyce and Carroll emphasise and exploit the double nature of
the joke, using it to generate the vaudevillean dialogues and comic contrasts between
the many 'collateral and incompatible' pseudocouples who populate the nonsense
terrain. It goes on to address the dark underbelly of the comic, identifying a Hobbesian
meanness at the heart of nonsense humour. A treatise on the bad pun concludes the.
chapter, moving from Carroll's portmanteau words to the pun-infatuated jokescape of
Finnegans Wake.
Chapter Four: 'Nonsense and the Fall.' This chapter offers a unique reading of
literary nonsense asa philosophical answer to the FalLNonsense texts betray an almost
morbid obsession with falling; literal and symbolic falls are a central theme of both the
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Wake and the Alice books, and falls into language, madness, chaos, and forbidden
knowledge are staples of the nonsense condition. Ontological crisis and semantic
collapse are among this chapter's themes, as it investigates why it is a general and
necessary condition of literary nonsense to be always hovering on the edge of the abyss,
and forever toying with its own destruction.
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INTRODUCTION
Always sensitive to others' opinions of his work, James Joyce reported in a letter some
of the responses he had received from readers of his Work in Progress, the ever-
expanding draft of what would eventually be published as Finnegans Wake:
Another (or rather many) says he is imitating Lewis Carroll. I never
read him until Mrs. Nutting gave me a book, not Alice, a few weeks
ago - though, of course, I heard bits and scraps. But then I never read
Rabelais either though nobody will believe this. I will read them both
when I get back (L, 255).1
Joyce did not embark on the mastadonic project of Finnegans Wake with a thorough
knowledge of Carroll's oeuvre already in his head; any thematic or stylistic overlap
between Carroll's writing and the premise of the Wake is, he says, a mere coincidence.
It is never advisable to take Joyce entirely at his own word on the subject of his
influences (he was given to down-playing them, preferring to present to the world an
image of a devastatingly original, mercilessly modem writer, born fully-formed), and
some critics have contested his claim.' There seems in this case, however, little reason
to doubt him. It is hardly surprising that some of the books that would become
important presences within the Wake's intertextual tapestry were not all lined up and
ready to go from the beginning. The Alice books are important presences within
Finnegans Wake, but they are not a premise for it, as Homer's Odyssey was for Ulysses.
Joyce came late to Carroll, but in terms of the Wake's compositional history, his
discovery of Carroll's work took place relatively early on, in the sixth year of the
seventeen years it would take him to complete the Wake; there was plenty of time to
absorb Carroll's work and put it to good use.
I Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, 31 May 1927.
2 It has been suggested by John A. Rea that Joyce in fact had read some Carroll before he started writing
'Work in Progress', adapting Carroll's Mischmasch parody of Thomas Moore's Lalla Rookh in 'Circe'
(John A. Rea, l'A Bit of Lewis Carroll in Ulysses.' James Joyce Quarterly, Fall1977 (86-9». Rea's essay
does not provide watertight evidence of Joyce's pre- Wake reading of Carroll though, and certainly does
not, as Ann Buki has suggested, catch Joyce in the act of dishonesty about his influences, since Rea
makes no claims about Joyce having read Alice before 1927, and Joyce freely admits to knowing 'bits
and scraps,' of which the Lalla Rookh example could have been one (Ann M. Buki, 1982. 'Lewis Carroll
in Finnegans Wake' ,.in Lewis Carroll: A Celebration (ed, Edward Giuliano). New York: Clarkson N.
Potter, 154-66 (154).
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Much has now been written about the connections between Joyce and Carroll,
from general discussions of thematic overlaps to dutiful lists of everything we know
Joyce to have read by and about Carroll, when he read them, and where in the Wake he
inserted the references.' The existence of this body of groundwork obviates, to a large
degree, the need for further detective work of this kind. This is not to say that
discoveries are not still being made (1have some of my own), nor that such discoveries
are of reduced value; only that the laying of these foundations has freed future criticism
from its study carrel amongst the archives. Thanks to the scholarly sleuthing of the last
fifty years of Joyce studies, we are now in the position of knowing all we are ever likely
to know about Joyce's reading of Carroll, and it is from this privileged vantage point
that my own thesis can be launched.
As my title suggests, 1 do not mean to read Joyce's literary relationship to
Carroll in terms of influence but in terms of 'debt' or inheritance: a roomier, less
prescriptive term. 1do not argue for the presence of a conscious imitation of Carrollian
nonsense in Finnegans Wake, nor do 1suggest that Carroll's and Joyce's understanding
and use of nonsense are without some important differences." Instead, 1 contend that to
read Joyce through Carroll, and indeed Carroll through Joyce, is to achieve a fuller
understanding of both authors: that it is a mutually rewarding exchange. More than this,
though, my emphasis is not so much on what Carroll can teach us about Joyce (though
there is an element of this), but what Carroll and Joyce (and to some extent, Edward
Lear) can teach us about nonsense. There is something very crass, not to mention naive,
about the idea that nonsense is a genre defined by a brief moment in the spotlight of our
literary history; that it was suddenly invented by Carroll and Lear (independently of
each other), that nothing like it had ever been seen before, and that it died with the
Victorians, leaving as quickly and mysteriously as it came. In fact, as any reader of
Anglo-Saxon riddles knows, nonsense has been around roughly as long as English
3 Among these are James Atherton, 1959. Books at the Wake: A Study in Literary Allusions in James
Joyce's 'Finnegans Wake'. London: Faber and Faber; Ann Buki, op. cit.; Adaline Glasheen, 1956. A
Census of Finnegans Wake. London: Faber and Faber; Edvige Giunta, 1992. "'A Raven like a Writing-
desk": Lewis Carroll through James Joyce's Looking-glass' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of
Miami); Daphne Marie Shafer, 2001. '''Wanderlad beyond the Lokking-glass": the Dream Worlds of
Lewis Carroll and James Joyce' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Louisiana at Lafayette); and
James Williams, 2008. 'Nineteenth-Century Nonsense Writing and the Later Work of James Joyce'
(unpublished doctoral tbests, University of Cambridge).
4 As Michael Wood points out in the London Review of Books, in a review of Danis Rose's new edition of
Finnegans Wake, there are some important distinctions to be made between the nonsense we know from
Carroll and that whish we find in Joyce (Wood, 'Quashed Quotatoes' in London Review of Books, vo1.32,
no.24, 16 December 2010).
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literature itself.' Neither is it reasonable to assume that nonsense vanished with the
Victorians: there are powerful strains of nonsense not only in Joyce's work but in that of
T.S. Eliot, Samuel Beckett, Flann O'Brien, and Nabokov; and, more recently, in Donald
Barthelme, Thomas Pynchon, Stevie Smith, and Paul Muldoon. Nonsense was not
invented in the nineteenth century, it simply peaked then, finding its most distilled and
potent form in the work of Carroll and Lear.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, we must be as precise as possible
about the type of nonsense we are dealing with; we must, in the words of Wittgenstein,
'pay attention to our nonsense." This thesis deals specifically with the themes and
forms of Victorian, especially Carrollian nonsense; it possesses, as such, definite
characteristics and boundaries, and these should be established. Of course, a full
definition of what literary nonsense actually is would warrant another thesis to itself, so
it is in our interests here to be brief and to the point. 7 The first thing to say is that
nonsense is not, as its name would suggest, the opposite or absence of 'sense'. Rather, it
is a way of subjecting what we think of as 'sense' to a playful, yet internally logical and
self-sufficient, critique. Literary nonsense is hyper-alert to the complexities and
contradictions inherent within language, literature, and life, and it subjects them to a
fascinatingly detailed and conscientious scrutiny. As Susan Stewart notes in her study of
the subject, nonsense favours the order and internal logic of closed systems, such as
those we find in the rules of games." By means of play and parody, nonsense challenges
our received ideas, and invites us to see for ourselves the absurdity of the assumptions
that allow us our faith in our 'old words, old credentials' (to steal a line from Beckett);"
it is, essentially, intellectually distrustful. It is also eminently teasing; as Wim Tigges
explains, nonsense 'invites the reader to interpretation' while making sure to avoid
settling on anything we might think of as a 'deeper meaning.' 10 This is not to say that
there aren't 'deep meanings' within nonsense: there are plenty, to which the matter of
this thesis will I hope attest. But literary nonsense can be extremely coy about admitting
5 Elements of it are to be found in the comic reversals of Chaucer and Rabelais, through the endlessly
'quibbling' (or punning) Shakespeare, to the absurd, delightfully prolix formal experiments of Jonathan
Swift and Lawrence Sterne.
6 Wittgenstein, 1998. Culture and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 64.
7 For an impressively thorough and discerning literature review of the history of nonsense criticism, see
James Williams, op. clt., 8-32.
a Susan Stewart, 1989. Nonsense: Aspects of Inteneauality in Folklore and Literature. London and
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
9 Beckett, 1970. Watt. London: Calder & Boyers, 81.
10 Wim Tigges, 1987.'An Anatomy of Nonsense' inExplorations in the Field of Nonsense. Amsterdam:
Rodopi,47.
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to meaning something: its pattern of seeming to mean, denying that it means, and all the
while actively meaning is part of its play.
The most influential study of literary nonsense is by Elizabeth Sewell, and it
serves as an instructive primer for the terms of the nonsense analysed here, though she
can be overzealous in her efforts to isolate nonsense from the rest of literature and turn
it out in its own field of abstraction and its 'highly developed and complicated types of
play.' II Sewell is right that play is the most important element in nonsense (and it is
through their play that Carroll and Joyce have the most in common), but to cordon it off
from the rest of literature so decisively seems a little rash, especially given the
significant and symptomatic presence of literary parody and intertextuality within
nonsense. Sewell is nevertheless correct to stress the importance of order and logic in
the nonsense universe, and its tendency towards rules, boundaries, and over-
organisation. This is where Finnegans Wake might begin to look ill-suited to a
diagnosis of nonsense: isn't it true that, while Carrollian nonsense is organised and
finite, limiting itself to closed structures (such as the Looking-glass game of chess) and
strict rules of logic, Joyce's is all about extension, the accumulation of words and
meanings that tends towards infinity? Yes and no. It is true that the writing of Joyce and
Carroll differs in this regard, but false to assume that even though Finnegans Wake
looks at first glance like a 'puling sample jungle of woods' ((FW, 112.4) or a 'pure and
simple jumble of words'), it:
... is not a misaffectual whyacinthinous riots of blots and blurs and
bars and balls and hoops and wriggles and juxtaposed jottings
linked by spurts of speed: it only looks as like it as damn it (FW,
118.28-31).
In fact, the Wake is excessively, obsessively organised; a mere free-for-all would not
have taken Joyce almost two decades, and volumes of meticulously kept notes, to
complete. And while this over-organisation can look like (and sometimes spill into)
actual disorganisation, Carroll's nonsense is surprisingly apt to do this toO.12
The nonsense I describe in this thesis is the Sewellian nonsense of rules, order,
wordplay, puns, reversals, and logic. It is also the nonsense described by the linguistic
II Elizabeth Sewell, i952. The Field of Nonsense. London: Chatto & Windus, 25.
12 This is a problem I tackle in the final chapter of this thesis.
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philosopher and nonsense theorist Jean-Jacques Lecercle as 'conservative-
revolutionary' :
It is conservative because deeply respectful of authority in all its
forms: rules of grammar, maxims of conversation and of politeness,
the authority of the canonical author of the parodied text. [This] is
inextricably mixed with the opposite aspect, for which the genre is
justly famous, the liberated, light-fantastic, nonsensical aspect of
nonsense, where rules and maxims appear to be joyously
subverted."
Lecercle's thesis is that nonsense is structured around this and other forms of
contradiction; that it is essentially doubled, conflicted, standing at an oblique angle to
canonical literature but at odds with itself at the same time. This is a stance my thesis
shares and on which it will build, seeking not only to examine nonsense's both/and
condition, but to account for it inmy readings, and to try to penetrate the secret core of
the nonsense impulse.
Chapter One, "'A letters from a person to a place about a thing": The Nonsense
Letter,' studies the central nonsense theme of miscommunication through the prism of
the epistolary letter. I argue that the letter is an important textual form for the nonsense
to writer, offering him the ideal podium from which to launch his investigations into the
(mis)construction of meaning, and the inadequacies and absurdities of epistolary (and,
by extension, social) conventions. My research draws on personal letters from Joyce,
Carroll, and Edward Lear, as well as examining the relationship between fictional letters
and their host texts, exploring some of the ideas Carroll floated for improvements to
letter-writing customs, and delivering a detailed analysis of the Finnegans Wake letter
in its various guises. It ends with a study of the erotics of letters in Ulysses which, I
hope, shows how the notional problems of miscommunication we see in the nonsense
letter become practical quandaries in the lives of Joyce's characters.
Chapter Two, "'Mocked majesty": Games and Authority,' explores the various
forms of authority we find in nonsense, from autocratic monarchs to omniscient authors,
and from the parental or pedagogic authority of adults over children to the rigid and
unspoken rules of children's games and discourses. The various species of games we
find in the work of both Carroll and Joyce are analysed, from the tightly ordered
playworlds of chess, cards, and games with logic and language, to the rough-and-tumble
13 Lecercle, 1994. Philosophy of Nonsense. London: Routledge, 2-3.
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hijinks of the Finnegans Wake children's twilight street games. I advance a theory that
games in nonsense work against the oppressions and inequalities of the different kinds
of authority which nonsense upholds, creating tensions between the need to install rules
and hierarchies and the need to break them down through play and parody.
Chapter Three: "'Jest jibberweek's joke": Comic Nonsense,' offers a reading of
the types of humour we find in literary nonsense. It begins with a study of the Kantian
model of incongruous humour we find in the nonsense double act, examining how both
Joyce and Carroll emphasise and exploit the double nature of the joke, using it to
generate the vaudevillean dialogues and comic contrasts between the many 'collateral
and incompatible' pseudocouples who populate the nonsense terrain. It goes on to
address the dark underbelly of the comic, identifying a Hobbesian meanness at the heart
of nonsense humour. A treatise on the bad pun concludes the chapter, moving from
Carroll's portmanteau words to the pun-infatuated jokescape of Finnegans Wake, as it
asks whether nonsense humour is actually funny, and what exactly attracts nonsense to
the darker edge of humour, be it cringe-inducing puns, painful pratfalls, or bullying
gags at the expense victimised other.
Chapter Four: 'Nonsense and the Fall,' offers a unique reading of literary
nonsense as a philosophical answer to the Fall. It notes the morbid attention literary
nonsense often pays to the physical and figurative act of falling, and reads the Alice
books and Finnegans Wake in terms of their symbolic falls into the nonsense bugbears
of linguistic confusion, madness, chaos, and forbidden knowledge (the overarching
premise of Finnegans Wake is, after all, the Fall of Man, which caused all 'the
unhappitents of the earth have terreumbled from firmament unto fundament and from
tweedledeedumms down to twiddlededeedees' (FW, 258.22-4)). After a study of the
split personalities of Issy and her prototype, Alice (occasioned, I argue, by a pseudo-
moralistic fall from grace), and an account of Carroll's and Joyce's Babelian tendencies,
the chapter offers an explanation as to why it is a general and necessary condition of
literary nonsense to be always hovering on the edge of the abyss, and forever toying
with its own destruction.
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CHAPTER ONE
'A LETTERS FROM APERSON TO A PLACE ABOUT ATIDNG':
THE NONSENSE LETTER
All the world's in want and is writing letters. A letters from a person
to a place about a thing. And all the world's on wish to be carrying a
letters. A letters to a king about a treasure from a cat. When men want
to write a letters. Ten men, ton men, pen men, pun men, wont to rise a
ladder.
FW, 278.1320
In the straightforward style of a prep school primer, the 'Nightlessons' chapter of
Finnegans Wake informs us that 'a letters from a person to a place about a thing' (FW,
287.14-15). The phrase is poached from the language of grammar; through it we hear
the definition of a noun, as repeated by Molly Bloom in her meandering monologue: 'a
noun is the name of any person place or thing' (U, 728-9). It is no coincidence that
Joyce uses a part (the letter) to illustrate the definition of a whole (the category of
concrete nouns); for the Wakean letter, as a complex, multilayered and polymorphous
text with a confused compositional history and an uncertain audience, stands in
synecdochic relation to the Wake itself. As we come to understand the complexities of
the letter in the Wake, though, and of the use of the letter form in nonsense as a whole,
we recognise Joyce's borrowed definition, with its cocksure bluntness and rhythmic
chantability, to be a wittily ironic oversimplification. The status of the letter is in fact
fraught with tensions and contradictions; this is almost as true of the non-fictional
domestic letter as the Wake's own 'epiepistle' (FW, 108.24). Furthermore, the fictional
letter, such as we find subsumed in and dispersed throughout Wake, stages a number of
tantalizing paradoxes, and challenges our assumptions about textual authenticity,
materiality, and meaning. These various tensions and contradictions complicate our
reading of the fictional letter, and allow it to tease and resist our understanding in ways
altogether typical of literary nonsense. The letter form is a mode of communication
which, for all nonsense writers and for Joyce and Carroll in particular, provides fertile
soil for the phantoms of misunderstanding, error and uncertainty which haunt the point
of intersection between writer and reader, speaker and listener. Biographically too, the
fact that the letter form is private, not-for-publication, and so less beholden to the
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author's more performative public statements, makes it a unique platform for the
whimsical aesthetic, linguistic, and comedic experiments we see in the epistolary styles
of nonsense writers such as Carroll, Lear, and Joyce. All the japes and skits Joyce
invented and indulged in his letters cannot help but recall Carroll's, the verve and
variousness of whose epistolary creations is quite inimitable.14
Among the essay titles listed by the children of Finnegans Wake as they labour
at their homework is 'Advantages of the Penny Post' (FW, 307.1-2); while these
'advantages' are perhaps obvious - an inexpensive and efficient postal system is hard to
criticise - it remains true that many letter-writers and -collectors viewed the
introduction of the penny post as a damaging influence, threatening to demote the
substance of the letter from the thoughtful and witty to the merely functional, and
turning the world of letter-writing into a prattling 'gossipocracy' (FW, 476.4)_IS
Fortunately for today's readers, any epistolary negligence afforded by the advent of the
penny post did not, in fact, manage to quash the playfulness and ingenuity, inspired by
figures such as Charles Lamb and Jonathan Swift, of the dedicated epistolographer;
indeed, it appears to have made him all the more determined to break the patterns of the
formulaic, textbook letter, and to enliven and enhance it. Two prime examples are
Carroll and Lear, who reject the disenchanting ordinariness of the letter as mere social
currency, as described here in the 'mad' Gardener's song in Sylvie and Bruno:
"He thought he saw an Elephant,
That practised on afife:
He looked again, and found it was
A letter from his wife.
'At length I realise " he said,
The bitterness of Life!'"
"He thought he saw an Albatross
14 Carroll's best biographer, Morton N. Cohen, has compiled a formidable list of the 'new kinds of letters'
Carroll devised: 'rebus letters; circular pinwheel letters; looking-glass letters that must be held up to the
mirror to be read; back-to-front letters that must be read from the end to the beginning; letters with
riddles, hoaxes, and acrostics; fairy letters in tiny writing that require a magnifying glass to read, written
on letter paper the size of a postage stamp; letters in verse; verse letters written in prose (to see if the
recipient would detect the hidden meters and rhymes); letters with visual effects, with a beetle or a spider
crawling across the page. He poured the essence of himself into these letters and unwittingly earned a
~lace in the history of epistolary art' (Cohen, 176-181).
5 See George Saintsbury (ed.), 1922. A Letter Book. London: G. Bell and Sons, and Philip Wayne, The
Personal Art: An Anlkology of English Letters. For Saintsbury, the only thing that has 'done more to kill
letters than the penny post' is the newspaper (25).
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That fluttered round the lamp:
He looked again, and found it was
A Penny-Postage-Stamp.
'You'd best be getting home, r he said,
'The nights are very dampl '" (CLC, 294, 392).
It is the business of the nonsense writer to 'look again': to take received ideas, accepted
practices, conventions, traditions, and rules, and, by 'twiddling their eyes', as Bruno
would say (CLC, 478), to apply a nonsense logic to them, to 'make strange' and make
fun of them, and, perhaps most importantly of all, to draw out the absurdities that are
always already present within them. Ergo, the correspondent of a nonsense writer may
well find the events of the Gardener's song reversed, and instead of a humdrum letter,
receive the epistolary equivalent of a fife-playing elephant, just as a correspondent of
Edward Lear's might receive a letter-as-snail, and one of Carroll's a pictogram, puzzle,
or a letter from a fairy in minuscule handwriting.i"
Joyce's personal letters are similarly playful, if not quite as zoomorphic. His
letters include backwards or eccentric orthography: 'Dear Oigroig and Neleh', he writes
to his son and daughter in law (L, 352). (Backwards writing is a favourite trick of
Carroll's, too; a letter to his child-friend Agnes Hull, for example, begins 'My east-red
Aggie' and ends with '''evol'' to your sisters [from] your vin-log friend' (SLLC, 125-
6». In another example, Joyce writes of a hotel manager in Euston that, 'J met him
every morning and wished him a good kday, Mr. Knight. He is a very knice kman' (L,
239). Arguably, the epistolary-cum-alphabetic 'letters play' (FW, 237.19) to which both
Joyce and Carroll allow a privileged space in their own letters appeals to them as
nonsense writers because the link is at once so arbitrary (it is enabled bya basic pun)
and so significant: it forms a node where the possibility of communication meets its
root: the non-narrative alphabetic letter without which the narrative letter could not
exist. As the critic Talia Schaffer puts it, 'by using the epistle letter, Joyce frees himself
to deconstruct the alphabetic letter,' a correspondence which is established by 'the
mystic unity of the pun.,l7 Carroll's use of the occasion of an epistolary letter to play·
with alphabetic letters in names and objects is even more developed than Joyce's, at
least in his personal letters; indeed, the link seems so tightly knit into the fabric of
16 A letter to Evelyn Baring from Lear, dated 19 February 1864, takes the form of a drawing of a snail.
whose face bears an uncanny resemblance to Lear's own, and on whose shell is scratched a playful note;
this is literal snail-mail (SLEL, 194),
17 Talia Schaffer, 1994. 'Letters to Biddy: About That Original Hen' in James Joyce Quarterly 29, 623-42
(627),
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Carroll's letters that a caveat to his child-friend Charlotte Rix which warns that she is
'evidently getting confused between the two meanings of "Letters'" seems rather
hypocritical in light of his own epistolary-alphabetic games (SLLC, 156). While these
games are not quite as prominent in Joyce's personal letters, the conceptual overlap they
demonstrate is everywhere in Joyce's fiction, not least in the Wake's professorial
analysis of the letter in Book 1 Chapter 5, where the 'Tunc page of the Book of Kells'
(FW, 122.23) is invoked as a point of comparison with the Wakean letter, illustrating
their parallel purpose of drawing attention to 'the physical features and pictorial
embellishments of the (narrative) letter's literal components'v'f We see similar, ifrather
more understated, artistic conversions of alphabetic characters in Carroll's decorative
monograms, which he would offer to create from his child-friends' initials (SLLC, 48).
There is also a wonderful letter-poem, which hinges the two meanings of the 'letter' pun
perfectly:
I send you
A picture, which I hope will
B one that you will like to
C. If your Mamma should
D sire one like it, I could
E sily get her one (SLLC, 26).
Further nonsense features of Joyce's personal letters include breakfast table
farces in the style ofO.W. Holmes's Autocrat at the Breakfast Table (or 'autocart of the
bringfast cable' (FW, 434.31»; spontaneous children's stories (The Cat and the Devil
began life as a letter to his grandson (L, 386»; and Learesque 'nonsense recipes', in
which Joyce instructs Giorgio and Helen to take:
... a small cube of Maggi's Allerleigemuslisuppe [...] Leave it to boil
gently for an hour asking the local policeman to have an eye on it and
to stir it every five minutes with his truncheon. Then take off your
boots and stockings and put some soot over your face, and go out
carrying a large sack. Then go round to the back door of the convent of
S. Vincent de Paul and pull the bell which is marked Paupers. [...] Do
not forget to thank the policeman and allow him to dip his truncheon in
the soup and lick it. Remember to call him Policeman Esquire and not
Mr Policeman as people who have not been to a University sometimes
18 Laurent Milesi, 1998. 'The Poetics of 'The Purloined Letter' in Finnegans Wake' in A Collideorscape
of Joyce: Festschriftfor Fritz Senn (eds Ruth Frehner and Ursula Zeller). Dublin: Lilliput Press, 306-22
(307). Lucia Joyce' s own illuminations in her ABC of Chaucer provide a familial connection here.
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do. Then wash and dry yourselves and allow the soup to cool. Then
take a bowl of it and two spoons and eat it and the bread very slowly,
saying: Every little bimbo has a big babbo but no little bimbo has such
a good big babbo as our good big babbo (L, 348).
A final important connection is the one both Joyce and Carroll make between riddles
and letters, which will be explored later in the chapter.
This brief tour of the playful personal letters of Joyce and Carroll sets the tone
and theme of this chapter, which will now open to a more detailed analysis of some
aspects of the nonsense letter, including an examination of the methods by which
nonsense writers humorously deform and subvert the conventional letter form to make
their own points about meaning, communication, interpretation, and epistolary
convention. In the first section, I shall consider some of the ways in which the letter can
be seen as duplicitous and contradictory, and how the letter-writer, like the nonsense
writer, manipulates assumptions about meaning and identity in a way that makes the
letter the site of many crisscrossing, contradictory, or hidden messages, whose
meanings may inhabit several separate planes of meaning. Section two examines how
nonsense writers test the limits of the letter's spatial, structural, and social conventions,
before opening to an exploration of how the Wakean letter, specifically, inhabits a
complex metafictional space at once embedded in and set apart from the novel itself,
and what this tells us about the relationship between the fictional letter and its host text.
A final section studies the erotics of 'letters play', concetrating in particular on the
circulating letters of Ulysses and their Wakean successors. The main textual focus of
this chapter is the Wakean letter in its various guises, but a catalogue of letters from the
personal correspondence of Carroll and Lear, together with fictional letters from Ulysses
and from Carroll's prose works, playa vital supporting role in my arguments.
1. THE DOUBLE-EDGED LETTER
Of, the many contradictory qualities of the letter, perhaps the most obvious is its dual
identity as private document and social dialogue. That is to say, the letter writer opens
an intimate space in which private thoughts and feelings are expressed and divulged, but
at the same time the letter exists in a public continuum, not only in its inherent
insistence on the ether within the text - the addressee is present in every line - but also
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in its adherence to fixed modes of collective epistolary (and, by extension, social)
convention; in its participation in the systematic transference of information via the
public institution of the Post Office; and in its amenability to misinterpretation,
misappropriation, or miscarriage. Terry Eagleton, in The Rape of Clarissa, incorporates
this public / private dialectic into his thesis on the epistolary mode of Richardson's
novel, noticing that 'the letter [...] lies on the troubled frontier between private and
public worlds', and that as such it is 'double-edged: it is private confidence and political
weapon, intimacy and intrigue, a jealously protected space in which you never cease to
be publicly at stake' .19 Further, it seems that the letter is not just the site of a struggle
between private and public discourse, but that the public nature of correspondence taints
the private, making it self-conscious and even calculating." With this in mind, we can
agree with Nicola Watson when she writes that fictional letters, 'far from representing
authentic interiority [...] function instead as the ominous harbingers and allies of scandal
and rumour.' 21 This is as true of the Wakean letter, and Martha Clifford's in Ulysses for
that matter, as it is of the scheming and double-edged letters of sentimental epistolary
fiction of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
While it is this earlier genre of fiction on which Watson concentrates, her
observations lose no value when applied to Anna Livia Plurabelle's letter in the Wake.
This letter, ostensibly written by ALP (though there are complications to this, in
keeping with the Wakean theme of multiplicitous textual voices and identities or
'multiple mes' (FW, 410.12)), contains several layers of meaning and modes of
discourse, which Bernard Benstock has broadly classified as 'personal, political,
romantic,.22ALP's 'untitled mamafesta' (FW, 104.4) is given a litany of possible titles
at the beginning of Chapter 1.5, the last and most resounding of which is a defense of
her husband Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker (hereafter HCE), and reads:
19 Eagleton, Terry, 1982. The Rape of Clarissa. Oxford: Blackwell, 54, 51.
20 See, for example, Roland Barthes's illustration, citing the Marquise de Merteuil of Les Liaisons
dangereuses: '''When you write someone, it is for that person and not for yourself, so you must be sure
not to say what you think, hut rather what will please that person.?' For Barthes, this belies the notion of
correspondence as transparent and honest exchange; instead, it is 'a tactical enterprise to defend positions,
make conquests'. It is telling that Barthes uses the language of war and strategy to characterise the nature
of epistolary practice. Roland Barthes (tr. Richard Howard), 1990 (1977). A Lover's Discourse. London:
Penguin, iS8.
21 Nicola Watson, 1994. Revolution and the Form of the British Novel1790 - 1825. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, p.92. For an account of the incriminatory aspect of the Wakean letter, and its Poean undertones, see
Laurent Milesi, 'The Poetics of 'The Purloined Letter' in Finnegans Wake' in A Collideorscape of Joyce:
Festschrift for Fritz Senn (eds Ruth Frehner and Ursula Zeller), 1998. Dublin: Lilliput Press, pp.306-22.
22 Bernard Benstock, 1965. Joyce-Again's Wake. Westport: Greenwood Press, 9.
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First and Last Only True Account all about the Honourary Mirsu
Earwicker, L.S.D., and the Snake (Nuggets!) by a Woman of the World
who only can Tell Naked Truths about a Dear Man and all his
Conspirators how they all Tried to Fall him Putting it all around
Lucalizod about Privates Earwicker and a Pair of Sloppy Sluts plainly
Showing all the Unmentionabilityfalsely Accusing about the Raincoats
(FW,107.1-7).
This is the letter as public statement. ALP is presenting a united front and playing the
familiar public role of loyal wife - a role for which the letter is her stage - despite what
she may feel privately on the subject of her husband's alleged transgression. However,
letters are apt to betray their writers' true feelings, as Dr. Johnson has warned:
In a Man's Letters [...] his soul lies naked, his letters are only the mirror
of his breast, whatever passes within him is shown undisguised in its
natural process. Nothing is inverted, nothing distorted, you see systems
in their elements, you discover actions in their motives.23
If the reader of the letter takes time, like Issy, to 'kool in the salg and ees' (FW, 262,
fh.3), he or she might be rewarded with more than the letter-writer is conscious of
communicating, and instead of a straightforward public testimonial, the Wakean letter
presents to the reader, by means of signs and slips, 'a very sexmosaic of nymphosis'
(FW, 107.13-14). Of course, Johnson's statement that 'nothing is inverted, nothing
distorted', suggests the wilful ingenuousness of a critic not fully convinced by the
schemes and subterfuges of Richardson's epistolary fiction, and so we must counter his
caveat with one of our own: the inherent difficulty of disguising oneself completely in a
letter should not give us to presume that the writer of the letter has not succeeded in his
disguise."
The tension that is established here between efforts to reveal and efforts to
conceal is crucial to the nonsense condition (it is, after all, an essential ingredient for
both riddles and jokes), and one of the defining characteristics of the Wakean letter(s).
To mean, or to seem to mean, only to confiscate that meaning or to subtly belie it, is a
principle of nonsense writing; to communicate is to at once deliver and miscarry, just as
23 Frank Kennode and Anita Kennode (eds), 1996. The Oxford Book of Letters. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 130.
24 Johnson himself appears unsure about his rather naive epistolary hypothesis, and directly contradicts
himself in his Life 0/ Pope, writing that there is 'no transaction which offers stronger temptations to
fallacy and sophistication than epistolary intercourse'. Samuel Johnson (ed, Bruce Redford), 1992.
Letters. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 469.
21
Shaun the Post literally delivers, only to miscarry, the letter, which ends up in a
graveyard of failed communications, the dump. The compulsion of the letter writer to
mean what he or she means to mean, and the possibilityof failure that accompanies this
compulsion, reduces the letter to a rather utilitarian, straightforward, unliterary token of
exchange. Nonsense, which generally abhors reduction, seeks to alter these values by
throwing open epistolary potentiality by any means. Letters are transformed into riddles,
jokes, puzzles, verses, and games; conventions are strictly upheld in some places and
tom down in others, creating absurd and hilarious hybrids (such as Edward Lear's
idioglossic letters, to which I will return). The question of what makes a letter is thrown
open to suggestion; assumptions about identity, authorship and reception are toyed with;
and, perhaps most importantly of all, the nebulous nature of meaning and
communication are held up to constant and detailed scrutiny.
In an earlier paragraph of his letter quoted above, Dr. Johnson makes a pertinent
observation:
Some when they write to their friends are all affection, some are wise
and sententious, some strain their powers for efforts of gayety, some
write news, and some write secrets, but to make a letter without
affection, without wisdom, without gayety, without news, and without a
secret is, doubtless, the great epistolick art_25
This sentiment strongly recalls Carroll's own 'epistolick' hypothesis in Sylvie and
Bruno Concluded, in which the narrator describes his ideas for 'a new Code of Rules for
Letter-writing' with Lady Muriel. The narrator explains that what is:
"[...] greatly needed [...] is some way of expressing that we don't
mean anything."
"[ ... J Surely you can find no difficulty in expressing a total
absence of meaning?"
"I mean that you should be able, when you don't mean a thing to
be taken seriously, to express that wish" (CLC, 529).
Lady Muriel's question is a vexed one. The difficulty of expressing a 'total absence of
meaning' is in fact inherent in the language, which cannot help but tend towards
meaning, as we shall see later in an analysis of Lear. But the question of how one
generates and controls (or fails to control) meaning in a text is forever tempting Carroll
25 Kennode, 1996, 130.
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to explore the other end of the spectrum - the meaningless, the vacant, the phatic.
Take the letter used as evidence in the Wonderland trial (all three nouns here
should perhaps come in inverted commas). At first, the evidence is presented as a
straightforward letter 'from a person to a place about a thing', or as the White Rabbit
puts it: "'a letter, written by the prisoner to - to somebody'" (Haughton, 104). It soon
transpires that this letter, much like its Wakean counterpart, is neither addressed nor
signed. Unlike in the Wake though, the letter's apparent anonymity leaves its readers in
no doubt as to who wrote it: as the King informs the accused Knave of Hearts, who
must have 'imitated somebody else's hand' while writing the letter, '''You must have
meant some mischief, or else you'd have signed your name like an honest man'"
(Haughton, 104-05). As the critic Edvige Giunta has noted, both the Wonderland and
the Wakean letters are 'used to incriminate someone, the Knave and HCE
respectively'r'" In addition, both letters appear to have been written privately and
exposed to public scrutiny later on; in other words, both have been violated. This
private I public doubleness brings us by a 'commodius vicus of recirclulation' (FW, 3.2)
back to Eagleton, whose description of the letter as 'private confidence and political
weapon, intimacy and intrigue, a jealously protected space in which you never cease to
be publicly at stake' acquires special resonance here. Of course, any reader choosing to
break the invisible seal of a letter not intended for his or her eyes knows what is at
stake, and in this sense the letter takes on further powers of incrimination: not only does
it incriminate its subject (in both the Wonderland and Wakean cases), its very existence
as a temptation to any third party who happens upon it invests it with the power to
incriminate its potential, illicit readers. Jane Austen is aware of this bind in Persuasion,
when Anne Elliot stealthily reads an incriminating letter from her cousin William to her
friend. Anne's shock at discovering her cousin's true (dishonest) character is mingled
with and even mitigated by the guilt of knowing that 'her seeing the letter was a
violation of the laws of honour, that no one ought to be judged or to be known by such
testimonies, that no private correspondence could bear the eye of others' .17
The courtroom letter, too, is resistant to 'the eye of others', in that it is singularly
difficult to interpret. It begins:
26 Edvige Giunta, 'Dear Reverend: "Lewis Carroll and the Boston Girls" in James Joyce Quarterly vol
30.3 (Spring 1993), ~.8-92 (489).
27 Jane Austen, 1986. Persuasion. London: Penguin, 210.
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They told me you had been to her
And mentioned me to him;
She gave me a good character,
But said I could not swim (Haughton, 106).
The reader who opens a letter not addressed to him or her may expect to meet
bewildering references to events and characters with which they are not familiar; by
summoning these storms of floating pronouns in the letter, Carroll plays a great
practical joke on his courtroom readers, who in 'violating the honour' of the letter meet
with the confusion they deserve. Nevertheless, efforts to decode this curious text ensue.
The King desperately tries to wring some meaning out of the verbiage, while Alice
insists that there is not 'an atom of meaning in it' (Haughton, 106). Alice's estimation is
dismissive but excusable: the poem's garbled syntax and lack of concrete referents
render it very close to meaninglessness. The King, on the other hand, has been
hypnotised by the text's powers of suggestion (as well as his own eagerness to
prosecute the Knave), and this, incidentally, is one of the most frustrating and alluring
trapdoors of literary nonsense as a whole. Its failure, or refusal, to provide deliberate or
straightforward meaning is the very thing that whets our appetite for interpretative
possibility, and invites us to puzzle it out for ourselves, an opportunity we can no more
refuse than Alice can abstain from the bottle of potion labeled 'Drink Me'.
The King's analysis is bitterly comic, his earnest quest for meaning in the
pronominal chaos of the courtroom letter casting him as a rather ridiculous parody of a
literary critic. After briefly considering the idea that 'if there's no meaning in it [...J we
needn't try to find any' (Haughton, 106), he launches into a whimsical assay of both
content and context. 'Could not swim', he proposes, refers to the Knave, who is made of
cardboard and therefore a strict non-swimmer. He continues:
"All right, so far," said the King; and he went on muttering over the
verses to himself: ". We know it to be true' - that's the jury, of course-
'If she should push the matter on' - that must be the Queen - 'What
would become of you?' - What, indeed! - '1gave her one, they gave
him two' - why, that must be what he did with the tarts, you know-"
(Haughton, 106).
And so on. When his analysis starts to lose credibility with the line' before she had this
fit' (the Queen 'never had fits'), he masks his defeat with a bad pun: '''Then the words
don't fit you'" (Haughton, 106-07). A similarly narrow but morally more murky attempt
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at scientific meaning-extraction can be found in a letter of Carroll's to his child-friend
Gertrude Chataway, in which he follows a brief description of a young girl devouring
plums with his own coy exegesis:
This is a little fable to do you good; the little girl means you - the bad
plum means me - the other plum means some other friend - and all that
about the little girl putting plums to her lips means - well, it means -
but you know you can't expect every bit of a fable to mean something!
(Collingwood,385-86).
Carroll's sudden truncation of his exegesis is occasioned by a darker motive than the
King's; for while the King arrests his analysis as a face-saving measure, seeing the logic
of his method begin to unravel, Carroll's hasty about-turn signposts the territory of
innuendo and impropriety into which the logic of his own method is steering him_28
We might compare the King's outlandish exegesis, and Carroll's more
suggestive one, with that of the letter in Book 1.5 of Finnegans Wake. Joyce's stinging
pastiche of critical style and practice is more rigorous and systematic than Carroll's, its
combination of mimicry and mockery at a higher voltage. Like the King, Joyce's
'captious critic' (FW, 109.24) is both unaware of the absurdity of his analytical pursuit,
and unconscious of the lessons he is giving the reader on how to (and how not to)
interpret the text within which he himself is operating. Take this passage, for example:
[F]or we also know, what we have perused from the pages of I Was a
Gemral, that Showting up of Bulsklivism by 'Schottenboum', that
Father Michael about this red time of the white terror equals the old
regime and Margaret is the social revolution while cakes mean the party
funds and dear thank you signifies national gratitude (FW, 116.5-10).
This po-faced quid pro quo analysis, each item symbolising or 'signifying' another,
lampoons the over-simplified readings of a woolly mode of literary scholarship, heavily
reliant on finding or forcing symbolic relationships between the worlds inside and
outside of the text. As Bernard Benstock writes, the literalness of the examination of the
letter is actually being mocked in this decoding:
Codes are by their nature simple-minded: words, symbols, signs, letters,
numbers are substitutes for real meaning, and onee the key to the code
28 In his biography of Carroll, Morton N. Cohen quotes this letter as an example of how 'the images that
surface in [Carroll's] letters ... reveal his sexual nature' (226).
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is available the meaning of the message exists on a non-ambiguous
level and is completely literal. Finnegans Wake is certainly not written
in code-language and no single one-for-one ratio exists between the
words Joyce includes and the equivalents the 'keyed' reader interprets.
In this mock-Marxian decoding Joyce spoofs such simplistic reading in
such verbs as equals, means, signifies, is, and in the comic disparity of
the associationa/"
Joyce's satirical foray into textual criticism is meant to instruct us how not to read the
Wake. A straightforward decoding is not sufficient for the challenging nonsense text; to
search for or artificially conjure literal meaning from a text whose primary purpose we
know to be a dogged resistance to literal meaning is to perform a fruitless doublethink.
We see precisely why in Jean-Jacques Lecercle's linguistic analysis of Edward
Lear's nonsense letter to his friend Evelyn Baring, the text of which is quoted here in
full:
Thrippsy pillivinx, Inky tinky pobblebockle applesquabs? - Fosky! beebul
trimble flosky! - Okul scratchabibblebongibo, viddle squibble tog-a-tog,
ferrymoyassity amsky flamsky ramsky damsky crocklefeather squiggs.
Flinkywitsy pomm,
Slushypipp.j"
Lecercle's analysis fails to avoid the pitfalls demonstrated so keenly by Joyce and
Carroll, surprisingly for a critic usually so alert to nonsense's confidence tricks. His
reading begins well, as he sets about salvaging what phonic meaning he can from the
letter's apparent gibberish; though where he points out its 'blatant flouting of the
conventions of letter-writing' he has made an error that later in his book he will correct.
Clearly, it is only linguistic conventions that are flouted in Lear's letter; epistolary
conventions, from the greeting and polite opening question to the formal signing-off,
have evidently been observed. Lecercle skilfully balances the fact of the letter's
structural conventionality against its linguistic strangeness, offers some convincing
pseudo-translations of Lear's word patterns, and presents the letter as a brilliant
illustration of the limits of certain modes of communication once bound by the template
of social and epistolary convention.
Lecercle's secondary argument, though, is almost as far-fetched as the Wake's
29 Benstock in "'Concerning lost historeve": Book 1, Chapter v', Michael H. Begnall and Fritz
Senn (eds), 1974. A Conceptual Guide to Finnegans Wake. London: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 33-55 (36).
30 Lecercle, 1990. The Violence o/Language. London: Routledge, 1.
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pseudo-Marxist one. The process of analysis to which Lecercle subjects the letter
concludes with him figuring Lear's private language as evidence of homosexual desire,
concealed in Freudian coinages, for the addressee. When he points out that the reader
cannot tell if 'Flinkywitsy pomm' means 'Best wishes' or 'Go to hell,' we suspect that
he may have been too quick to consign Lear's word patterns to final undecidability.
There are phonic and orthographic patterns similar to Lear's Russian-sounding
perversions at the tail-end of Shaun's 'abasourd ... Dutchener's native' speech in
Finnegans Wake: 'Dotter dead bedstead mean diggy smuggy flasky' (FW, 430.14-16).31
Here the tone is boozily affectionate (translating as 'this is the best, my fat beautiful
bottle'); we imagine, too, that Lear's rhythmic Russo-babytalk ('amsky flamsky ramsky
damsky') and quaint Anglophonic constructions ('pobblebockle applesquabs' and
'crocklefeather squiggs', which almost sound like a pair of Dickensian squires) suggest
a more affectionate than antagonistic relationship with the addressee. Here, though, we
risk performing the same false move as Lecercle, the Wakean pseudo-Marxist, and the
King of Hearts himself. It is a speculative, rather than strictly critical, intelligence at
work here, and it leads us into dangerous waters. Rather than indulge in this speculation
as to meaning, it is more productive to consider what Lear achieves with his nonsense
letter: an imaginative and instructive mapping of, and mocking of, epistolary
conventions, and an illustration of how even apparent gibberish tends towards meaning
and invites interpretation. Bearing these twin themes in mind, we can now examine how
nonsense writers, using the template of the letter, seek to correct our collective
assumptions about the effectiveness and efficiency of written communication, to offer
their own whimsical improvements or alternatives to established conventions, and to
expose the problems and limitations of both the fictional and non-fictional letter.
2. 'A CODE OF RULES FOR LETTER-WRITING':
TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LETTER
31 'Abasourdly' is a macaronic portmanteaux of 'absurd' and the French 'abasourdir', to dumbfound.
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As I have argued, Lecercle's contention that Lear's letter displays a 'blatant flouting of
the conventions of letter-writing' seems a rather careless misreading. Of the three chief
examples of nonsense letters we have studied (by Joyce, Carroll, and Lear respectively),
only one can be said to activelyflout epistolary conventions, and that is the letter of the
Wonderland courtroom, whose status as a letter is dubious from the start (the White
Rabbit concludes, after all, that is 'not a letter' but a set of verses (Haughton, 104».
Conversely, the examples from Joyce and Lear, while eccentric and challenging in their
own right, cleave quite emphatically to established epistolary conventions, in ways that
confirm and reinforce the 'conservative-revolutionary' condition of nonsense
subversionsf
As Lecercle has elsewhere shown us, nonsense texts are not as anarchic as we
might at first assume: in order to maximise their own absurdity, most operate within
familiar, everyday frames and contexts, and uphold all kinds of established hierarchies,
rituals, received ideas and status quos (hence his characterisation of their methods as
'conservative-revolutionary: cleaving excessively to rules as a means of re-evaluating
their legitimacy). The rules ofletter writing are among these honoured rituals. In Lear's
letter, we find all the features of the standard letter form, and from them we can trace
the trajectory of an utterly conventional letter: a 'Dear X' greeting ('Thrippsy
pillivinx'), a courteous opening enquiry after the health of the addressee ('Inky tinky
pobblebockle applesquabs?'), a friendly private joke ('Fosky! beebul trimble flosky!'),
some information or intrigue, or perhaps an invitation ('Okul scratchabibblebongibo,
viddle squibble tog-a-tog, ferrymoyassity amsky flamsky ramsky damsky crocklefeather
squiggs'), and finally a 'yours sincerely' and a signature ('Flinkywitsy pomm, /
Slushypipp').
The mutating letter in the Wake also conforms to a standard template, though it
appears in many different guises. A neat comparison with Lear's letter appears in one of
Issy's footnotes in Book 2.2:
Dear and I trust in all frivolity I may be pardoned for trespassing but I
think I may add hell (FW, 270, fu3).
The critic Ronald E. Buckalew has isolated this letter-footnote and decoded it, in a
32 See Lecerele, 1994. Philosophy of Nonsense. London: Routledge, 2-3.
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reading similar to Lecercle's on Lear both in the ingenuity of its precis and the
defectiveness of its critical follow-through. Noticing that several words in the sentence,
which appears to form the overture of a rather abstruse letter, don't 'add up' ('frivolity',
'trespassing', 'add hell'), Buckalew sets about replacing them with words which are
grammatically and phonetically similar but tonally more apt: 'Dear Stannie 1 trust in all
sincerity 1may be pardoned for presuming but 1 think 1may ask help'. 33 Apart from the
handful of misplaced words in Issy's footnote-letter, we notice the tonal hallmarks of
Victorian letter-writing etiquette: the strained earnestness, the tentative clausal structure,
the overarching politeness and deferential buffers of the request ('1 may be pardoned', '1
think 1may'). These traits determine the tone of the letter, obviating the need for verbal
precision; indeed, we can piece together the gist of the sentence, despite the fact that
many of its most vital signifiers have been hijacked. As an exercise in exposing the
latent sterility, or at least arbitrariness, of epistolary conventions while operating within
those same conventions, this is a short step indeed from Lear's nonsense letter. In the
Wake's well-preserved letter-skeletons, Joyce is reminding us, like Lear, not only that
conventions of all kinds can be most effectively ridiculed and overturned when they are
doggedly upheld and observed, but that the sincerely-expressed sentiments of the
Victorian letter-writer might well represent no more than phatic byproducts of well-
established epistolary conventiona "
Some of Joyce's examples go one step further than Lear's, and self-reflexively
comment on their own form, transmuting from letter to meta-letter, as in this instructive
template from the Wake's 'Nightlessons' chapter:
Dear (name of desired subject, A.N.), well, and 1 go on to. Shlicksher. 1
and we (tender condo lances for happy funeral, one it) so sorry to (mention
person suppressed for the moment, F.M.). Well (enquiries after all-healths)
33 Buckalew, 1974. 'Night Lessons on Language' in A Conceptual Guide to Finnegans Wake (eds M.H.
Begnal and Fritz Senn). London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p.l l l. The italics are Buckalew's
own.
34 Consider the following as an example of how epistolary conventions can comically obliterate the
writer's meaning:
Dear John,
I hate you,
Love Jane (Christopher P. Wilson, 1979. Jokes: Form, Content, Use and
Function. London: Academic Press, 89). It is useful to bear in mind that the Victorian book market was
awash with guides, rules and templates for letter-writing, with reusable templates for every situation and
mode of communication, one of which Lewis Carroll authored ('Eight or Nine Wise Words About Letter-
Writing'). In many ways, Joyce's letter-skeletons in Finnegans Wake read like spoof versions of these
templates. Many of thesurvtving copies of these epistolary 'self-help' books are now housed in the tower
of the Fitzwilliam Library in Cambridge.
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how are you (question maggy). [...] (Wave gently in the ere turning
ptover.) Well, mabby (consolation of shopes) to soon air. With best from-
cinder Christinette [...] kissists my exits (FW, 280.9-27).
Here the letter comments on its own form, at times substituting the form for the
commentary. Through this process of rarefaction, the Wakean letter becomes as much
about itself as anything else, and on one level functions within a closed, self-referential
circuit. As with all texts that contain meta-levels, the letter becomes, as Hugh Kenner
writes of Beckett's metafictional Watt, 'a typographical artifact which is somehow
"about" its own existence'. 35 This, of course, strongly recalls Beckett's own words on
the Wake: that it is not 'about something; it is that something itse/f.36
As Lecercle has suggested in Philosophy of Nonsense, nonsense texts are not
necessarily interested in the flouting of linguistic rules, but the mapping of them." The
same goes for epistolary rules, which is the chief reason that Lecercle's earlier
contention on Lear's letter as a 'blatant flouting of epistolary conventions' seems so
self-contradictory. Both Lear's and Joyce's letter-skeletons ingeniously sketch out a set
of epistolary rules and standards; they are cartographical rather than cacographical,
mapping conventions rather than flouting them. This is not to say, though, that nonsense
writers do not welcome improvements and extensions to the more stale or inadequate
conventional practices, as Carroll demonstrates in Sylvie and Bruno Concluded. As part
of their proposed 'new Code of Rules for Letter-writing', Arthur, Lady Muriel, and the
narrator discuss certain traits of personality and speech which the letter is unable to
convey, for example shyness:
"Does that show itself in the letter?" Lady Muriel enquired. "Of
course, when I hear anyone talking [...] I can see how desperately shy
he is! But can you see that in a letter?"
"Well, of course, when you hear anyone talk fluently [...] you
can see how desperately un-shy she is [...]. But the shyest and most
intermittent talker must seem fluent in letter-writing. He may have
taken half-an-hour to compose his second sentence; but there it is, close
after the first!"
"Then letters don't express all they might express?"
"That's merely because our system of letter-writing is
incomplete. A shy writer ought to be able to show that he is so. Why
shouldn't he make pauses in writing, just as he would do in speaking?
35 Hugh Kenner, 1961. Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study. New York: Grove Press, 37.
36 Beckett, 2001. 'Dante ... Bruno. Vico .. Joyce' in Disjecta. London: John Calder, 27.
37 Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 38.
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He might leave very blank spaces - say half a page at a time. And a
very shy girl [...] might write a sentence on thefirst sheet of her letter-
then put in a couple of blank sheets - then a sentence on the fourth
sheet: and so on" (CLC, 529).
Carroll is onto something quite ingenious - and singularly Modernistic - here. The
reader of this fragmentary 'shy man's letter' would be reminded both of the physicality
of the letter-as-object, and of the personality of the author. It is a principle of
composition Carroll upheld in his own letters, for example here, where he affects to be
morbidly afraid of offending his addressee, and expresses as much in what looks like a
piece of proto-Projectivist verse:
My dear Polly,
Did you really take my messages for earnest, and are you really
young persOB:
offended, you extraordinary creature ? (Don't you see what
eftiki
iB:dividual
difficulties I'm in? Why can't you help me out with a word, like a good
- (difficulty again) - member of the Human Species?) I'm quite
nervous as to every word I say, for fear of offending you again! (SLLC,
41).
In another letter Carroll feigns fear of his addressee, writing in a jagged, tremulous
hand, and in another suggests that, should his correspondent be in a hurry to complete
her letter, she could just write,
"My dear Mr. Dodgson,
I remain,
Yours affectionately
Edith" (SLLC, 47).
For as he says, 'even that short note would tell me something, I should know that you
"remain affectionate," which would be worth hearing, as of course you might have
written: "I remain Yours dislikingly.",38
Tne hypothetical shy author of the first example, the eager to please one of the
second, and the fearful one of the third, all illustrate in a very concrete way the
38What Carroll plays 00 here, of course, is that the phrase 'Yours affectionately' is a conventional sign-
off, not necessarily signifying a corresponding emotion, unlike the improbable 'Yours dislikingly' .
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difficulty of portraying personality traits in the letter form, thus marking out its
expressive limitations. Many of Carroll's literary and epistolary games and experiments
of this kind circulate around questions of meaning and identity, in particular the
difficulty of controlling the meaning one creates within any given text or
correspondence (and, by extension, spoken dialogue). Joyce, too, is deeply concerned
with this, as the Wakean letter illustrates in its vagaries, lacunae, contradictions, and
obfuscations. The methods by and extent to which meaning can be controlled in a
literary text are rigorously tested in the epistolary form, because of its chiefly dialogic
purpose. Like a joke, the letter stages a specific communication which can either
succeed or fail, and whose success or failure is determined only by the reaction of the
reader or receiver (which is why Carroll is careful to emphasize, in his 'Eight or Nine
Wise Words about Letter-Writing,' that 'if it should ever occur to you to write,
jestingly, in dispraise of your friend, be sure you exaggerate enough to make the jesting
obvious: a word, spoken in jest, but taken as earnest, may lead to very serious
consequences' (SLLC, 289». The liability of the letter to communication failure is, I
contend, what makes it such an appealing tool for nonsense writers, and what prompts
them to play with conventional letter forms, either to enhance them (as we see in
Carroll's 'shy man's letter'), or simply to point out their weaknesses and limitations.
Not only is the letter limited by social convention and accepted rules of layout,
structure, and diction, it is also subject to lapses in both time and space (the time
elapsed and distance crossed from sender to addressee), and restrictions thereof
('Excuse bad writing, am in a hurry', apologizes Milly; 'If my maily was bag enough
I'd send you a toxis', regrets Shaun (D, 64; FW, 304.16-17».39 And in addition to its
dangerous propensity to enter into the hands of the wrong person, betraying the writer,
the letter is so effective a tool for deception and disguise (personality traits can be
masked; handwriting can be forged) that it is liable to be written by the wrong person
too, betraying the letter-reader. This idea is floated in Alice's unsigned courtroom
'letter', whose status as evidence is undermined by the mystery of its authorship. It is
Joyce, however, who gives this problem of the letter his full attention. Mistaken
identity, plagiarism, and forgery are recurring motifs in Joyce's late work: there are the
Wake's circulating references to the fateful misspelling of the word 'hesitancy' in a
forged letter by Richard Pigott, masquerading as Parnell (a slip which ends up indicting
39 For a Derridean analysis of this postal lapse, see Andrew J. Mitchell, 'Meaning Postponed': Finnegans
Wake and The Postcard' inJames Joyce Quarterly Vo1.44.1, Autumn 2006, 59-76.
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the forger, but also precipitating Parnell's own fall from grace); the characters'
squabbles (and the reader's genuine confusion) over who wrote the Wakean letter - the
professor's frustrated outburst of 'who in hallhagal wrote the durn thing anyhow?' (FW,
107.36-108.1) echoing the reader's 'bewilderblissed' exasperation (FW, 107.16); and of
course Shaun's vexation at Shem's supposed plagiarism of his work: 'Every dimmed
letter in it is a copy and not a few of the silbils and wholly words I can show you [...J
The last word in stolentelling!' (FW, 424.32-35).40
We see it too in the motif of mistaken or disguised identity in Ulysses: Bloom's
epistolary pseudonym, Henry Flower, returns to incriminate him in 'Circe' when,
insisting to the First Watch that he is 'Dr Bloom, Leopold, dental surgeon' (this itself is
a lie, as Bloom works in advertising) Bloom drops his Post Office card: 'Henry Flower.
No fixed abode.' (U, 432). When Martha, a fittingly 'veiled figure', appears, she too has
been concealing the facts: 'My real name is Peggy Griffin' (U 432-3). More of his
clandestine female correspondents emerge to arraign the hapless Bloom, whose
'improper letters' in 'several handwritings' attest to his duplicitous character (U 442,
441). The 'Greek ees' (U, 267) he employs as disguise in his letters to 'Martha'
resurface in the Wakean letter as 'superciliouslooking crisscrossed Greek ees
awkwardlike perched there and here out of date like sick owls hawked back to Athens',
hinting that the author of the Wakean letter is Bloom-like in his deceptions and
disguises (FW, 120.19); it is also, of course, yet another example of the 'multiplicity of
personalities inflicted on the [...] document' (FW, 107.24-25). Here it is the reader of
the letter, rather than the writer, who is compromised by the limitations of the
conventional letter form, which do not immediately betray an imposter or expose a
fraud. Of course, in this case, one man's constriction is another's opportunity, and if the
reader is liable to suffer the consequences of the letter's aptness for disguise, the writer,
conversely, only stands to gain from it, provided he or she avoids those.perilous slips;
remembers 'the spell of hesitancy'; manages to 'Remember write Greek ees' (U, 267).
If part of the nonsense writer's method is to expose the limitations of the letter,
the other is to plumb its possibilities. It is the role of the nonsense writer to ask
questions of the letter form, as he does of all received ideas and conventions, alert to its
paradoxes and problems. In the traditional epistolary novel, the fictional letter is, in
general, a closed circuit: it affects the host text, and is affected by it, but it is a sealed
40 The joke here, of ceurse, is that every (orthographic) 'letter' is a 'copy', as is every 'word' in the
dictionary, because we don't invent but inherit the language we use.
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room, and essentially a separate text, operating on a separate plane, from the main
narrative. The nonsense writer sees untapped potential here, and, surveying this sealed
room, sets about removing selected bricks, creating opportunities for the letter to leak
through to the main text, contaminating and complicating it.
Before we examine the effects of such a strategy, it is worth considering some of
these paradoxical structural, spatial, and narratological elements of the fictional letter,
all of which contribute to its problematic condition, in more detail. There is, to begin
with, the letter's twin status as textual artefact or souvenir on the one hand, and
indistinguishable part of the wider text on the other. The fictional letter is at once a
separate material entity (complete with envelope, stamp, folds, rips, and stains, as in the
Wake's 'teatimestained' missive) which stands outside of the text that hosts it, and
which directly influences the action and direction of the host text; but it is also an
inextricable part of the larger text, printed, bound, and circulated with the rest of the text
and existing as an actual, concrete 'letter' only in the reader's imagination. The
interpenetration of the letter-within-the-text and the text-outside-the-letter is complex.
On the one hand, the letter (usually) furthers plot developments, and thus holds a certain
narrative power over the text in which it is situated; this lopsided relationship is the
occasion for some of Joyce's most notable and noticeable obfuscations, for the Wakean
letter is afforded a much muddier sort of power, not so much directing the 'plot' (such
as it is) but by turns confirming, distorting and condensing it. On the other hand, the
context in which the fictional letter appears affects and limits whatever meaning the
letter is able to convey, and in this sense the letter is subsidiary, operating on a
subordinate narrative plane to the rest of the text. A further complicating factor of the
text-letter relationship is the physical state of the letter as it is described or reproduced
in the host text is curiously dependent on its situation within that text, and on what the
larger text would have it signify, as we will see later in Joyce's use of textual errors or
physical blemishes in letters from both Ulysses and Finnegans Wake.
To understand this simultaneously privileged and subsidiary textual space that
the fictional letter inhabits, I would like to compare an ingenious illustration of the
Wakean letter with a three-dimensional puzzle in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno
Concluded. In his book Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction, John Paul Riquelme
produces a pleasing illustration of the Wake's letter as Mobius strip. The letter's
contents, everything from alpha to omega we are told, are written on either side of a
strip of paper CA !' on the recto and '? 01' on the verso (FW,
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94.21-2), which is twisted and 'cunningly folded' with 'Doublends Jined' (FW, 20.6), to
make a never-ending text: a Mobius strip." Adopting the well-established reading of the
letter as synecdochic representation of the Wake in "its entirety, we might view
Riquelme's Mobian illustration as a reading of remarkable imaginative potential.
(Though one suspects the critic himself did not realise, or at least did not utilise, the
potential of his analysis, which is not extended beyond the letter itself to an analysis of
the conceptual structure of the Wake, and which is given only a cursory two pages of
discussion within his thesis). The possibilities of his reading begin to unravel, however,
if we compare this Mobius conception of the Wakean letter with a puzzle presented by
the mysterious Mein Herr in Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno Concluded. To amuse his
company, Mein Herr constructs a 'Fortunatus's Purse' from three handkerchiefs tied in
such a way that outer surface of one side of the purse is continuous with the inner
surface of the other side. It is called the Fortunatus's Purse because, as Mein Herr puts
it, "'Whatever is inside that Purse, is outside it; and whatever is outside it, is inside it.
So you have all the wealth of the world in that leetle Purse!'" (CLC, 523). This in itself
makes for a fitting description of the Wake, which, aspiring to Hamlet's principle of
'infinite space [...] bounded in a nut-shell', attempts to deliver' Allspace in a Notshall'
(FW, 455.29) or 'Omnitudes in a knutshedell' (FW,276, lefthand margin).
Now we might view the letter of the Wake as a Fortunatus's Purse, which
contains 'all the wealth' of its host text, its 'world': it is not only artefact, but artifice.
'Whatever is inside' that brief, mutating Letter, is outside it; and whatever is outside it,
is inside it. And of course, the letter always indicated this, to return to its central Mobian
riddle:
Now tell me, tell me, tell me then.
What was it?
A !
? O! (FW, 94.19-22)
Joyce poses the letter like a riddle, and challenges us to solve it; in answering the riddle,
as we would a letter, we are given a privileged insight into the textual possibilities Joyce
is exploring. The world the Wakean letter inhabits is also the world it creates, and
4! John Paul Riquelme, 1983. Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
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instead of asking whether the chicken preceded the egg or vice versa, we find ourselves
having to ask: which came first, the letter around which the book revolves, whose
discovery initiates the action and affects the book's characters ('It made ma make merry
and sissy so shy and rubbed some shine offShem and put some shame into Shaun' (FW,
94.10-12»; or the book which houses and expands the letter, and whose characters are
its authors? These are complex questions. Perhaps, as Wilhelm Fuger has suggested, it
isn't a case of which came first but rather which is which, if we take his view that 'the
letter and the novel can no longer be separated from each other, since the letter actually
is the novel - not merely in the form of a mirror-scene or a microversion of the novel
itself, but in each and every regard, in a most fundamental way. ,42
While the letter might seem powerful in its incarnation as Mobius strip or all-
inclusive Fortunatus's Purse, its full meaning is perfectly inaccessible without the rest
of the text to decode it and convert its content into narrative consequences. For it is
almost always the case that when a fictional letter (nonsense-influenced or not) is placed
within a text, its literal content - its private thoughts, feelings and observations - only
attains significance by the way in which it enables further plot developments, and by the
consequences it implies for the characters involved in it or exposed to it. And even
while Joyce invests the letter with special Mobian, 'universe in a Notshall' status, he
confirms this bind. It is not for nothing he has a chicken discover the 'egg' letter: the
letter's host, after all, retains its narrative - and natal - power over the letter itself,
whether or not the letter contains 'everything that is outside' it. The fact that the letter is
found at the dump, a morpheme that is frequently used to signal that famously obtuse
egg, Humpty Dumpty, seals the connection between egg and epistle ('a most alleghant
spot to dump your hump' (FW, 129.17-18); 'Hump for humbleness, dump for dirts'
(FW, 242.22); 'Humps, when you hised us and dumps, when you doused us' (FW,
624.13-14».
The chicken and egg puzzler is doubly apt when we consider the natal
connotations of the letter as an object, which develops or gestates in the mind and on the
page of its author, to be either carried or miscarried by the postal system and delivered
by the midwife postman (and Joyce, as we would expect, makes very good use of these
puns of (misjcarriage and delivery). Perhaps this partly explains why the letter's long-
established link with the female, and with female desire and expression, has become
42Wilhelm Fuger, "'Epis,tlemadethemology" (FW, 374.17): ALP's Letter and the Tradition ofInterpolated
Letters', in James Joyce Quarterly vo1.l9.4 (Summer 1982),405-413 (412-13).
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such a fixture of critical discourse on the theme of the letter." An impishly riddling
sentence on Shaun the Post exploits this connection brilliantly:
A human pest cycling (pist!) and recycling (past!) about the sledgy
streets, here he was (pust!) again! (FW,99.4-6)
Here, in a game of Chinese whispers/" Joyce sets a riddle whose answer is the
obviously absent word (post!). The author circles four times around this important
word, and as the sentence progresses he ticks off all possible vowels, drawing our
attention to the crucial missing vowel: '0'. Notice the silent pun: the missing word
indicates an (epistolary) letter - post - which is missing only because of an absent
(alphabetic) letter - o. The riddle is solved when the 'post' is finally delivered, via the
letter '0'. Of course, the significance of this letter is highly suggestive, both a romantic
'sweet nothing', the subject of many a Wakean 'billy doo' (FW, 437.8) but also, vitally,
a sign for the vagina. This link harks back to Molly Bloom's Penelope, who is, as Vicki
Mahaffey has written, 'obsessed with letter writing as a form of lovemaking, liberal
with letters in her mental orthography', and whose quasi-orgasmic, 'cunniform' (FW,
198.25) 'O's fall frequently as regenerative impulses throughout her soliloquy." The
epistolary, the orthographic, and the natal are knit together here, perhaps to be sent 'to
the post puzzles deparkment' (FW, 364.6-7) for unpicking. That the '0' is shaped like
the wheels of Shaun's post-bicycle, and is a circle, not only like those in which Shaun
is cycling and 'recycling', but also like the grand 'communication circulaire' of
epistolography, adds further shades of mischief and meaning."
43 For further, more conclusive explanations for this, see Carolyn Steedman's essay 'A woman writing a
letter' in Rebecca Earle (ed.) 1999. Epistola ry Selves: Letters and Letter-Writers 1600 -1945. Aldershot:
Ashgate, 111-33, and also Ruth Perry, 1980. Women, Letters, and the Novel. New York: AMS Press. For
an analysis of the Wakean women as they are reflected through the prism of the letter, see Claudine
Raynaud, 'Woman, the Letter Writer; Man, the Writing Master' in James Joyce Quarterly vol. 23.3
(Spring 1986),299-324.
44 Also known as 'Whisper-down-the-Iane', Chinese whispers is a children's game in which a group
forms a line or circle, and the leader whispers a phrase or word to the next person, who whispers it to the
next person, and so on. By the time it reaches the end of the line or has come full circle, the phrase is
usually drastically, comically altered. I apply a 'Chinese whispers' analysis to the verbal play of
Finnegans Wake in Chapter Two.
45 Vicki Mahaffey, 1988. Reauthorizing Joyce. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 175.
46 Alain Pages argues that since letters 'follow one another [and] imply one another', they follow 'a
circular rhythm based on chronological continuity,' ('La Communication ciroulaire' in Jean-Louis
Bonnat and Mireille Bossis (eds), 1983. Ecrire, Publier, Lire, Les Correspondences (Universite de
Nantes, Departement de Psychologic, B.P. 1015,343-61). For more on the significance of the letter '0' in
the Wake, and its relation to the Wakean letter, see Talia Schaffer, 1992, 'Letters to Biddy: About That
Original Hen' in James Joyce Quarterly 29, 623-42.
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3. 'FOLDED WITH CUNNING': SEX AND THE LETTER
Joyce the man may be said to be even more overtly 'obsessed with letter writing as a
form of lovemaking' than his prose Penelope, judging from the feverish urgency and
ardour of his pornographic scribbles to Nora Barnacle. Joyce the author is, with good
reason, subtler and cleverer in his demonstrations of the sexual desires and
misdemeanours of his letter-writing characters, but the 'obsession' with, the persistent
yoking of, letter-writing and sex remains self-evident. Having drawn out the pregnant
puns surrounding the (mis)carriage and delivery of the Wakean letter, it is now time to
examine the (often subconscious) practices, performances, and perversions by which the
libidinous undertones of the solitary letter-writer can be traced. We have seen how into
Edward Lear's neologic nonsense letter has been (dubiously) read an emotional
involvement and even homoerotic desire for the addressee; and how Lewis Carroll's
suggestive plum allegory in his letter to a young girl 'reveals his sexual nature.' Joyce's
fictional letters contain similar clues and codes by which we can exhume the buried
sexual cravings and crimes that colour his novels. In Ulysses, for example, the various
letters between Bloom, Molly, Milly, Boylan, and Martha, inscribe the sexual
transgressions occurring between these characters, either by referring matter-of-factly to
a realistic representation of a sexual encounter, or, crucially, by symbolically
representing it through a textual slip: a misspelling, a mispronunciation, a physical tear.
Martha's letter is a case in point: her language is riddled with different species of error,
frommisspellings ('I do not like that other world') and the mismanagement of tenses ('I
will punish you [...] if you do not wrote'), to elisions ('I feel so bad about.') and comic
grammatical blunders ('my patience are exhausted') (U 74-5). Almost all fictive letters
in Joyce's later prose come with some kind of sign referring to the sexual transgression
that 'marks' or 'stains' the pages, and of course the reputations of those signified within
the letter. This inherent slippage could be read as the mark of sin, or as a sign of a fallen
and chaotic language which goes hand in hand with man's hubris, pride, or shame.
Let us tum first to that instructive and revealing Ulysses letter: Martha
Clifford's to Bloom's illicit avatar, 'Henry Flower'. The way Joyce goes about staging
this scene is fascinating, and extremely telling. Affected indifference, underlying
agitation and a grim bravery in the face of possible disappointment are the vague and
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understated emotions with which Bloom enters the Post Office ('Careless air: just drop
in to see'; 'No answer probably. Went too far last time' (U, 69)); the soldiers staring
down at Bloom from posters on the Post Office walls as he commits his quasi-
adulterous act anticipate the Wakean soldiers bearing witness to Earwicker's indecency
in the park; solitude is crucial for Bloom both before and after his receipt of the letter -
a third party could only play the role of witness or gooseberry to his epistolary affair
(M'Coy unwittingly plays the latter in his brief exchange with the preoccupied Bloom).
The first thing Bloom does, after thrusting the incriminating article into his pocket, is
finger and 'rip' the envelope, in a passage full of unsubtle innuendo: 'His hand went
into his pocket and a forefinger felt its way under the flap of the envelope, ripping it
open in jerks' (U, 70). The delay between the receipt of and the reading of the letter is
well placed to frustrate us, just as Bloom himself is frustrated. The intrusion of the
social world (represented by M'Coy) into Bloom's private, erotic one (represented by
Martha Clifford) is keenly felt in Bloom's impatience (which we share) and
conversational inattentiveness; already titillated by the letter he is furtively fondling, he
abandons himself to voyeuristic daydreams about a woman across the road, waiting for
a flash of silk stocking from the non-complicit prototype of Gerty MacDowell.
After shaking off M'Coy and taking a moment to survey the 'multicoloured
hoardings' of shop advertisements, Bloom escapes to the 'safety' of a quiet lane, whose
description is beautifully loaded with significant and gently contrasting metaphors:
He turned into Cumberland Street and, going on some paces, halted in
the lee of the station wall. No-one. Meade's timberyard. Piled balks.
Ruins and tenements. With careful tread he passed over a hopscoth
court with its forgotten pickeystone. Not a sinner. Near the timberyard a
squatted child at marbles, alone, shooting the taw with a cunnythumb.
A wise tabby, a blinking sphinx, watched from her warm sill (U, 74).
This is the kind of street which, later that day, might accommodate the sort of furtive
couplings Bloom can this morning access only in letters. Four details stand out in this
scene: the ruins, the children's games, the 'cunnythumb', and the sphinx. Or, to unpack
these symbols a little crassly: time and decay, childhood and play, innuendo, sex, and
riddles (the cunnythumb is acutally a pitcher for small balls (e.g. marbles), but the
sexual connotations of the word should not be ignored). This mixture is a heady one, in
keeping with the chapter's drowsy narcoticism, and each swirling property is bound in
~
and embodied by Martha's letter, which Bloom can at last read:
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Dear Henry,
I got your last letter to me and thank you very much for it. I am
sorry you did not like my last letter. Why did you enclose the stamps? I
am awfully angry with you. I do wish I could punish you for that. I
called you naughty boy because I do not like that other world. Please
tell me what is the real meaning of that word. Are you not happy in
your home you poor little naughty boy? I do wish I could do something
for you. Please tell me what you think of poor me. I often think of the
beautiful name you have. Dear Henry, when will we meet? I think of
you so often you have no idea. I have never felt myself so much drawn
to a man as you. I feel so bad about. Please write me a long letter and
tell me more. Remember if you do not I will punish you. So now you
know what I will do to you, you naughty boy, if you do not wrote. °
how I long to meet you. Henry dear, do not deny my request before my
patience are exhausted. Then I will tell you all. Goodbye now, naughty
darling. I have such a bad headache today and write by return to your
longing
MARTHA.
P.S. Do tell me what kind of perfume does your wife use. I want
to know (U, 74-5).
Richard EHmann's neat summary of the diction of this letter focuses on Martha's errors,
which 'are examples of grammatical decay, of language gone gamey.,47It is gamey in
more senses than one - pungent like stale perfume, decayed like Cumberland Street's
ruins, lewd like the cunnythumb, but also game-y: full of emotional games (Martha's)
and linguistic games (Joyce's). These are twinned with the children's games that furnish
Bloom's inner and outer worlds as he opens the letter: the deserted hopscotch court he
crosses with 'careful tread', presumably out of a superstition about not stepping on the
lines, and the 'squatted child at marbles' who triggers a memory: 'And once I played
marbles when I went to that old dame's school' (D, 74). Childish things assert
themselves too in the letter's suggestive language, which assigns to Bloom the
sexualised role of a 'naughty boy' whose bad behaviour must be 'punished' by a
demanding mother figure (this reverses a template from Swift's Journal to Stella, where
he calls Stella and Mrs. Dingley 'nautinautinautideargirls'; I dare not say nauti without
dear: 0, faith, you govern me')." Oedipal overtones are reinforced by the 'blinking
sphinx' on her warm sill, whose association with riddles makes this the scene of a text-
47 Richard Ellman, 1984. Ulysses on the Liffey. London: Faber and Faber, 42.
48 Swift, 1948. Journal to Stella. London: J.M. Dent, 71.
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wide, extra-epistolary, orthographical riddle: the superfluous '1' in Martha's letter,
poached from the (yet-to-happen) misprint in that evening's paper, when an 'L. Boom'
is reported to have paid his respects at Dignam's funeral. The idea of rogue
(orthographic) letters breaking from their moorings and drifting through the text,
causing mischief by making nonsense out of perfectly sensible 'worlds' is an attractive
and playfully Joycean one; that the extra letter in this instance surfaces in Martha's
missive seems to comment on the problem of the 'space' of the fictional letter discussed
in the previous section of this chapter. By means of the wandering '1', the letter is
hinged to its host text, the relationship between the two interdependent: Joyce has built
a portal into the traditionally 'sealed room' of the fictional letter. There are sexual
implications here too: the phallic '1' from Bloom's name has penetrated Martha's
acquiescent and accommodating letter, and the roles of giver and receiver take part in a
typically 'nonsense', typically Joycean reversal or blurring of opposites, albeit on the
separate planes of epistolarity (Bloom is the receiver of Martha's letter) and
orthographical pranks (Martha's textual space is the receiver of Bloom's errant letter
'1').
It is interesting to see how these symbolic cornerstones of the scene of Martha's
letter - ruins, games, sex, and sphinx - correspond with those of the Wakean letter.
Found in the field of decay, the 'Dirtdump' (615.12), this letter has already become a
physical ruin itself, a torn and 'teatimestained' relic. Games and riddles surround it,49
both in its Mobian construction, and also in questions concerning the letter's status and
history:
Wind broke it. Wave bore it. Reed wrote of it. Syce ran with it. Hand
tore it and wild went war. Hen trieved it and plight pledged peace. It
was folded with cunning, sealed with rime, uptied by a harlot, undone
by a child. It was life but was it fair? It was free but was it art? The old
hunks on the hill read it to perlection. It made ma make merry and sissy
so shy and rubbed some shine off Shem and put some shame into Shaun
(FW, 94.5-12).
'Folded with cunning', a reference to the letter's Mobian shape but also the folds of the
female g~nitaHa, splices (with cunning) the letter and the female body. This link
reasserts itself throughout the Wake's circulating letter fragments, which, according to
49 Indeed, riddles and lettera are often yoked together in Joyce, as twin illustrations of the communication
or comprehension gap between the 'riddlemaker' (U, 454) and the solver, the letter-writer and reader.
41
John Nash, envelope the text within their 'litany of innuendo'r'" In the professorial
exegesis of the Boston letter in Book 1.5, the speaker picks up on the 'incestuish
salacities among gerontophils' and 'tenderloined passion hinted at' (FW, 115.12), and
develops his analysis into a condemnation of those 'grisly old Sykos' (FW, 115.21), a
ring of older, often pedagogic males who court the attention of young girls; who include
among their number Lewis Carroll, HCE, and Bloom, and 'who have done our
unsmiling bit on 'alices, when they were yung and easily freudened' (FW, 115.23).
The professor himself is complicit in this, however, as he is linked with the
professor figure to whom Issy (or her second personality, Maggy) writes her loveletter
in Book 3.2, perhaps the most notable section in the book for a dual indulgence in sex-
and Ietter-play" In it, Jaun conducts a stem sermon to the girls of St. Bride's, warning
of the dangers of those ill-intentioned (and here distinctly Carrollian) 'grisly old Sykos'
who 'may soon prove [the] undoing' of their innocence: 'inching up to you,
disarranging your modesties and fumbling with his forte paws in your bodice after your
billy doos' (FW, 438.3-5). Soon after, Issy / Maggy pens her loveletter toJaun and a
professor figure, or 'grapbed her male corrispondee to flusther sweet nunsongs in his
quickturned ear' (FW, 457.28-9). These 'sweet nothings' are full of 'sweet nonsense':
jokes, innuendos, puns, and doubles; more shades of Carroll's 'linkingclass girl' and
scraps of Maggy's polymorphous billet doux (FW, 459.4). There is plenty of sex: when
Issy mentions her 'latest lad's loveliletter', she remembers: 'He fell for my lips, for my
lisp, for my lewd speaker. I felt for his strength, his manhood, his do you mind?' (FW,
459.23-9) This lisping develops into a Swiftian little language and, 'to thalk thildish',
Issy gives 'a tiss to the tassie for lu and for tu!' (FW, 461.28-30). Here, as in Ulysses,
sex-talk is hinged to baby-talk via the playful, sinful letter ('Letterspeak, Lettermuck'
(FW, 456.26-7».
So, sex and its trappings have an entrenched and meaningful correlation with
epistolarity in Joyce. Returning to the Martha / Bloom correspondence, we shall see
how connection is borne out, and examine how these characters' epistolary practices
come to describe and define their sexual ones. To turn first to Martha's 'language of
flowers', whose scents Bloom blends with the sense of her letter: 'Angry tulips with you
50 John Nash, 2002, 'The Logic of Incest: Issy, Princes, and Professors'. James Joyce Quarterly 39.3,
435-55.
51 For an illuminating discussion of the professor figures in the Wake's letters, see John Nash (ibid.). The
professor as receiver ofIssy's love letter also represents the psychiatrist Morton Prince, who analysed the
multiple personalities "0f Christine Beauchamp, on whom Issy is partly based. This connection is
discussed more fully in Chapter Four.
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darling manflower punish your cactus if you don't please poor forgetmenot...' (U, 75).
(This resurfaces in the Wake, after the longest version of the letter, as 'the languo of
flowers' (FW, 621.21), when ALP recalls her husband 'Blooming in the very lotust and
second to nill, Budd!' (FW, 620.2-3).52 From the pin on the flower enclosed inMartha's
letter, Bloom's thoughts travel to the pins of women's clothes, and the 'Mairy' of a song
in which she:
... lost the pin other drawers.
She didn't know what to do
To keep it up
To keep it up (U, 76).
The habitual association in Bloom's mind between the letter and the female body, or,
more specifically, her clothes, is established over a series of mental leaps like this one.
During Bloom's conversation with M'Coy, we remember, he is balancing two separate
yet overlapping longings: the longing to read the letter in his pocket, and the longing to
'Watch! Watch! Silk flash rich stockings white' of the woman across the road (U, 71).
Later, on the strand, as this second longing is fulfilled by Gerty, his attention is drawn
back to Martha's letter; again his hand is in his pocket, but the knowing, suggestive
language that occasions his breaching of Martha's envelope is now 'soft, sweet, soft' for
this parallel 'wondrous revealment', given to us in Gerty's dreamily romantic, girlish
register (U, 362-64). During his fraught trial in Circe, Bloom is accused of lying 'on the
bed [...] gloating over a nauseous fragment of wellused toilet paper presented to him by
a nasty harlot, stimulated by gingerbread and a postal order' (U, 504), and by the
Honourable Mrs. Mervyn Talboys, who has perhaps heard of his taste for 'soiled
personal linen' (U, 511), of'implor[ing] me to soil his letter in an unspeakable manner'
(U, 442). Like the 'Greek ees', this is another Bloomian trait to resurface in connection
with the Wakean letter, which at one point is 'Too Let. To Be Soiled' (FW, 421.8).
Here, the sexual 'stain' typically represented by a grammatical or orthographical error,
or by a material tear, is bodied forth in an altogether more explicit, scatological way.
. Vicki Mahaffey has noticed the triangular relationship between 'sexuality,
language, and clothing' in Ulysses; I propose that a fourth element, letter-writing, be
52 'As well as a backwards Dublin, this 'Budd' may signal the penis, whose incarnation as a 'flower'
dominates 'The Lotus Eaters', and the Irish for which is bod, pronounced 'bud'.
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included here for a tidy, letter-shaped square of interdependent associations. 53 Like
letters, language and clothes are 'exaggerated representations of physical reality'r'" both
letters and clothes are, or can be, containers of secrets, and both perform a subtle
balancing act between 'efforts to reveal and efforts to conceal'; as we see from Ulysses
and the Wake, rips or stains on both clothes or letters are apt to write a coded history of
the misdemeanours, crimes, or histories of characters; and clothes allow their wearer, as
letters allow their author, as much opportunity for disguise as for recognition.f There
is, in light of these similarities, a comparison to be made between a relationship which
is established on an epistolary level, and a relationship which unfolds on a visual,
sartorial level: that is Bloom-Martha, and Bloom-Gerty.
Martha and Gerty both wilfully misconstrue Bloom in their somewhat tenuous
interactions with him, and their friable, distance-crossing (mis)communications with
him (neither of which, importantly, involves speech) enables them to communicate
successfully only with a Bloom of their respective imaginations: Martha's Bloom is an
unhappy 'naughty boy' who might just be the answer to her own loneliness (he is not),
and Gerty's is a 'steadfast, sterling man, a man of inflexible honour' full of 'passion
silent as the grave' (he is not). Of course, they are not alone in their deluded, solipsistic
relationships; Bloom is equally blinkered (equally wilfully), writing letters to Martha
not out of personal sympathy, but only that he may receive hers in return (a motive
evidenced by his habitual enclosure of a stamp for Martha's use - an attempt to ensure
a response), and viewing Gerty only as a 'hot little devil', and the unanticipated
occasion of his orgasm (this occasion, of course, should have been Martha's doing; but
in the end Bloom is 'Damned glad I didn't do it in the bath this morning over her silly I
will punish you letter' (U, 351». These two pseudo-amorous communications, then, are
one-sided on both sides. That the two sexual impulses linking these scenes - voyeurism
and masturbation ~ are tied up with Martha's letter and Gerty's underwear reveals the
rather pathetic defining qualities of both relationships: namely, miscommunication,
self-delusion, and sexual isolation. It also signifies the essentially solitary, even
solipsistic nature of Bloom's 'romantic' 'onanymnous letters' (FW, 435.30).
53 Mahaffey, Reauthorizing Joyce, 155.
54 Ibid., 154.
55 Letters in Joyce are also prone to mention clothes. Milly's letter to Bloom, for example, begins:
'Thanks ever so much for the lovely birthday present. It suits me splendid. Everyone says I am quite the
belle in my new tam.' (U, 63). Perhaps this is a template for one of Issy's footnote letters: 'Well, Maggy,
I got your castoff devils all right and fits lovely. And am vaguely graceful. Maggy thanks.' (FW, 273.22)
Remember also that the hen finds the letter from 'Boston, Mass.' amongst 'boaston nightgarters and
masses of shoesets', all of which she puts in her 'nabsack' (FW, 11.22-3, 19).
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These correspondences stand apart from those between Molly and Blazes
Boylan, for the simple reason that Boylan and Molly use words as a means to action:
their letter is a merely functional arranger of an actual rendezvous. For Bloom and
Martha, letters act as both erotic means and end. Circulating endlessly around one
another's words and phrases, their letters lead nowhere, and their repetitiveness is
stagnant. Carroll was aware of the black hole of epistolary repetition, warning in his
'Eight or Nine Wise Words about Letter-Writing' that the consequences of repetition
are that 'you will go on, like a Circulating Decimal. Did you ever know a Circulating
Decimal come to an end?' (SLLC, 288). Martha and Bloom typify that circulating
decimal.
Not only is their correspondence repetitious, it manages to mean very little too.
Even Martha's threats are vague and non-committal: when she warns Bloom, 'So now
you know what I will do to you [...] if you do not wrote', she is lying. All he knows is
that she will 'punish' him, but 'How will you pun? You punish me?' he is compelled to
ask (U 75, 268). Their language and dialogue is as empty, vague, and circuitous as the
'poem' Humpty Dumpty recites to Alice in Through the Looking-Glass:
"I sent a message to the fish:
I told them 'This is what I wish. '
The little fishes of the sea,
They sent an answer back to me.
The little fishes' answer was
'We cannot do it, Sir, because - '"
[...]
" 'I sent to them again to say
'It will be better to obey. '
The fishes answered, with a grin,
'What a temper you are in!' (Haughton, 190).
Nothing is said in this piscine exchange: everything is phrased with the intention of
avoiding lJoth action and signification, and just when it seems like an explanation is
about to be made, aposiopesis interrupts. The correspondence between Martha and
Bloom is coloured not only by miscommunication, but by non-communication. We
understand the letters by their various failures - failure to identify, failure to specify,
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failure to clarify - and piece together their possible meanings from omissions and
errors. This ultimate failure of communication shows their correspondence to be utterly
threadbare; they 'correspond' only in that their individual self-absorption and sexual
isolation proves to be mutual.
The self-enclosed, autoerotic 'correspondences' of the Martha-Bloom-Gerty
triangle take us back to the fundamental attribute of the letter which makes it so
engaging, as a form, to the nonsense writer. In section two of this chapter, I argued that
the tendency of the letter towards communication failure is what makes it such an
appealing instrument for the nonsense writer; it strikes him as absurd as both a concept
and an object, and is a convenient platform for underlining and undermining our
assumptions about the nature of communication, which the letter shows to be
inadequate, contaminated, and uncontrollable. Joyce, Carroll, and Lear use the model of
the letter to pose questions about the nebulous and multiplicitous natures of meaning
and identity as they are generated in a text. The condition of continuous and inexorable
misconstruction that brands all of our attempts at direct dialogic interaction runs like a
watermark throughout the nonsense letter, and is presented as part of a pattern that
stretches back to the fall of Babel, and includes an inventory of riddles, jokes, puzzles,
puns, absurd exchanges and juxtapositions, lunatic babblings and stricken silences,
omissions, errors, logical fallacies, innuendos, blank pages, violent outbursts, split
personalities, semantic and ontological crises, and multiplicitous, contradictory, or
indeterminate sets of meanings: an inventory, in other words, of all the defining
characteristics of the nonsense condition.
It is the letter's dialogic status that makes it the perfect device with which
nonsense writers can show the idea - or ideal - of clear, direct communication to be a
collective illusion, upheld by epistolary conventions which, given their limitations,
appear absurd when subjected to scrutiny. Of course, one of the main objectives of
nonsense writing is to level this same argument - that we are deceived in our
assumptions about the possibility of direct communication - at language as a whole,
and it is inevitable that the letter, being not only made of language but bound, by its
pun-twin the alphabetic letter, to the very foundations of language, should come
implicitly under fire. The reason nonsense writers choose to focus their attack on the
letter in the ways I have shown is not only because of its overtly dialogic status and
purpose, but also because the letter form is a concrete - and collectively approved -
textual template, through which the nonsense writer can test out his theories about
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miscommunication, expose the fallacies of our assumptions, and, as we have seen, float
inventive alternatives to the standard epistolary model. The communication problems
outlined above are judged by the nonsense writer to be a basic and unavoidable
condition of language; but because of its essentially inflexible, collectively-sanctioned
tonal and structural templates, these communication problems are particularly
conspicuous in epistolary letters. The letter-writer, having to contend with lapses in
time and space, potential miscarriages or mutilations, not to mention the insuperable
challenge of meaning what one means to mean, must inevitably be compromised by the
tacit acknowledgment that, in the words of the poet-aphorist Antonio Porchia: 'I know
what I have given you; I do not know what you have received' .56
CHAPTER Two
'MOCKED MAJESTY': GAMES ANDAUTHORITY
You can deny... nearly all abstractions: justice, beauty, truth,
goodness, mind, God. You can deny seriousness, but not play... The
play-concept as such is of a higher order than seriousness. For
56 Antonio Porchia (trans. W.S. Merwin), 2003. Voices. Port Townsend: Copper Canyon Press, p.69.
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seriousness seeks to exclude play, whereas play can very well include
• 57seriousness.
Don't destroy idols in anger; break them up in play. 58
In their innovative study, The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren, Peter and Iona
Opie separated the rhymes and songs of children into two broad categories: those
'which are essential to the regulation of [...] games and relationships,' and those which
are simply 'expressions of exuberance.,59 The appreciation of this distinction is integral
to an understanding of the dual and contradictory nature of games and their relationship
to authority. It is a relationship based on paradox: in order to allow their participants to
fully escape from or exclude the external hegemony of, in the Opies' preferred example,
adults over children (a hegemony which is manifested in rules, restrictions,
punishments, orders, and clearly defined perimeters of what is deemed acceptable
behaviour), children's games must follow their own regulatory systems, and be subject
to internal laws and restrictions, so as not to become the casualties of chaos, confusion,
or boredom. Much like the nonsense literature which so frequently hosts them, games
have the peculiar power of covertly reinforcing hierarchy whilst openly flirting with, or
even purporting to represent, anarchy; this is as true of complex literary games as of
those found in the playground.
It is no coincidence that games share this paradoxical status with the nonsense
condition in which they often playa part. Indeed, we might easily view the dual nature
of children's games, as described by the Opies, as a local instance of a larger
phenomenon, a subspecies of the 'conservative-revolutionary' nature of literary
nonsense. As we will recall, the descriptive term 'conservative-revolutionary' is
employed by Jean-Jacques Lercercle to account for the way in which literary nonsense
'conservatively' upholds and operates within rules, hierarchies, received ideas and
status quos as a means of ridiculing them, re-evaluating their validity, or exposing their
inherent absurdity - activities which fall into the 'revolutionary' category. By
comparing the patterns and functions of nonsense with those of playground games, we
find that the 'conservative-revolutionary' is a condition common to both, running from
57 J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens. London, Granada, 1970,21.
58 Marquis de Sade, quoted in Walter Redfern, 1984. Puns. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 14.
59 Peter and Iona Opie, 1959. The Lore and Language ofSchot1;lchildren. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 17.
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the intellectual subculture of nonsense (and children's) literature, to the social
subculture of playground lore. If nonsense upholds rules and hierarchies as a means of
ridiculing and re-evaluating them, so children's games grow naturally from a solid core
of well-established cultural norms, values, and customs which can then be modified,
distorted, or absurdly exaggerated.
Despite any distortions visited on it during play, this core of cultural orthodoxy
is the still point of the turning world of children's games, and it has two principal
functions. The first corresponds to the 'conservative' half of the Lecerclean equation: it
provides an organising pattern for further developments in any given game, and in this
sense it indirectly generates 'rules.' For example, a children's game of kings and queens
(such as Alice wants to play at the beginning of Through the Looking-Glass) will
invariably be based on the tenet that kings and queens are rich, have servants, and wield
power, ergo their orders must be obeyed. Should a child pretending to be a servant
refuse an order of a child pretending to be aking, the rules of the game have been
violated, and bitter arguments are likely to ensue: chaos dismantles the internal structure
of the game, and unhappiness is the likely result." For J. Huizinga and other play
theorists, this 'spoil-sport', who refuses to sufficiently revere the rules of the game, is a
serious threat to play, for he 'shatters the play-world itself. By withdrawing from the
game he reveals the relativity and fragility of the play-world in which he had
temporarily shut himself with others ... Therefore he must be cast OUt.,61 We see how
steadfastly children will cling to the roles and rules of any given game in Finnegans
Wake. When Glugg / Shem is cast as Devil in the children's game of Angels and Devils
in Book 2.1, his behaviour, speech and appearance are squarely in a diabolic mould.
Even though he has never 'been greatly in love with the game' and is losing badly,
attracting bullying taunts from the other children, his role as Devil seems fixed: he
60 In his treatise on play, Les Jeux et les hommes, Roger Caillois draws a distinction between the cheater
and the spoil-sport in games. He favours the cheater, for: 'Le tricheur, s'il viole {les regles], feint du
moins de les respecter ... la malhonnetete du tricheur ne detruit pas le jeu. Celui qui le ruine est le
negateur qui denonce I 'absurdite des regles, leur nature purement conventionnelle. et qui refuse de jouer
parce que le jeu n 'a aucun sens.' [The cheater, if he breaks the rules, at least pretends to respect them ...
the dishonesty of the cheater doesn't destroy the game. The one who ruins it is the spoilsport, who
denounces the absurdity of the rules, purely conventional in nature, and who refuses to play because the
gamelacks meaning]. Perhaps chaos is the greatest spoilsport of all. Roger Caillois, 1958. Les Jeux et les
hommes: Le Masque et le Vertige. Paris: Gallimard, 38.
61 Huizinga, 30. Interestingly, history has been kind to those modernist authors who started to expose the
'relativity and fragility' of their writing by similar methods - breaking the rules, making self-reflexive,
meta-fictional, or intertextual allusions, highlighting the materiality and fictionality of the text, and so on.
Any pariah status they might have endured in the early stages of their careers was quickly dissolved, and
innovators such as Joyce, Beckett, O'Brien, and Eliot, have taken their seats among the greats of the
literary canon. Literary 'spoil-sports' are evidently more acceptable than their gaming cousins.
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cannot, and would not, opt out of it (FW, 90.4).
This fixity of accepted roles - or Flaubertian 'received ideas' - operates on a
narrative level too: the social norms upheld in the Alice books, for instance, allow plot
developments utmost freedom and fluency, in the sense that once Alice is established as
an upper-middle class child whose values and patterns of behaviour are unlikely to
deviate from those of any other upper-middle class child, a basic pattern is established
which will prevent all plot developments, however absurd they become, from
descending into chaos. Susan Stewart makes this observation in her theoretical study of
play space in nonsense, writing that 'the boundaries of the event [e.g. the story, or
game] are given by convention while the space within those boundaries becomes a place
of infinite substitution ... [T]he boundaries are fixed and arbitrary, and they surround a
permutable and incongruous content.,62 In this sense, the text is subject to similar
conditions, or boundaries, as the game contained therein. The significance of these fixed
but invisible boundaries is evidenced in the fact that the existential problems Alice
experiences during the course of both books, and which are by turns the result of
memory lapses, bodily changes, grammatical loopholes, misunderstandings, and
morphing or vanishing names, are largely unable to penetrate Alice's core socially-
constructed identity as an upper-middle class prepubescent female character, and this is
what ballasts Carroll's stories against the threat of chaos (even her split personalities are
well-bred and proper).63This threat is even announced at the beginning of Wonderland
when Alice, unsure of her identity after her fall, worries that she might have become
another, less fortunate child, in which case:
"I shall have to go and live in that poky little house, and have
next to no toys to play with, and oh, ever so many lessons to
learn! No, I've made up my mind about it: if I'm Mabel, I'll stay
down here!" (Haughton, 19).
But of course, whoever Alice is in Wonderland, she is categorically not underprivileged,
uneducated Mabel; the narrator quickly quells the idea, changing the focus from her
notional ontological anxiety to an immediate ontological danger of a different kind
(Alice realises she is rapidly shrinking). Here, Alice's physical circumstances enact her
psychological worries: while she fears that she might be a lower class, ignorant girl, her
62 Susan Stewart 1989. Nonsense: Aspects of Intertextuality in Folklore and Literature. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 171.
63 I will be examining the 'threat of chaos' more fully inChapter Four.
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body is in the act of disappearing, and with it Carroll's entire narrative. If we compare
this near miss, or 'narrow escape,' as Alice calls it, to the dissolution of the play-world
when a player flouts a rule, we might view the facts of Alice's identity as the rules of
the larger game that the writer is playing with the reader. Carroll is no spoil-sport, and
he knows that to reject these rules would be to destroy his own narrative.
The second function of what I have called the 'core of cultural orthodoxy' is the
'revolutionary' one: it allows the child within the game a welcome opportunity to erase
or adapt, distort or amplify some of the more mysterious manifestations of the adult
world, and thus to critique it in similar, if less consciously sophisticated, ways to writers
of literary nonsense. The fact cannot be ignored that the dominance of authority figures
in games (particularly those that feature in nonsense), and their concomitant power to
punish, to restrict, or to impose laws upon their subjects, is the product of the imitative
imaginations of the players (for, as Vico observed, 'Children excell in imitation ... they
generally amuse themselves by imitating whatever they are able to apprehend. ,)64 Sam
Slote, in a genetic study of the games chapter (Book 2.1) of Finnegans Wake, posits that
'Children's games are a mimicry of adulthood,' noting that they enact 'some aspect of
adult society that children have observed ... They allow children to adopt the roles of
adulthood within a space circumscribed by their own boundaries. ,65 This echoes the
Opies' finding that:
In the confines of a game there can still be all the excitement and
uncertainty of an adventure, yet the young player can comprehend the
whole, can recognize his place in the scheme, and, in contrast to the
confusion of real life, can tell what is right action."
These boundaries are suitably elastic, however, for within them the child can 'extend his
environment, or feel that he is doing so, and gain knowledge of sensations beyond
ordinary experience'i'" Both this imaginative 'extension' of the child's environment and
the 'mimicry' of the adult world cross the border from a 'conservative' dependence on
rules and schemata to a 'revolutionary' editing and ridiculing of the same. This is also
true of Carrollian nonsense, which, as Hugh Haughton has written, 'give[s] us not so
64 Giambattista Vico (tr. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch), 1984. The New Science. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 75.
6S Sam Slote and Luca Crispi (eds.) 2007. '''Blanks for When Words Gone": Chapter ILl,' How Joyce
Wrote Finnegans Wake. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp.l81-213, 194.
66 Opie and Opie, 2008'lChildren's Games in Street and Playground, vol.I. Edinburgh: Floris Books, 21-2
67 Ibid.
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much an adult's view of childhood as a child's view of adulthood. Seen through the lens
of Alice, the world of adulthood is [...] dismayingly bizarre and perverse' (Haughton,
xiii):
In this chapter, I will explore the various forms and guises of authority in
nonsense, from autocratic monarchs to omniscient authors, and from the parental or
pedagogic authority of adults over children to the rigid and unspoken rules of children's
games and discourses. I will begin with my contention that games in nonsense work
against the oppressions and inequalities of the various kinds of authority which
nonsense upholds, creating tensions between the need to install rules and hierarchies,
which are generally deeply embedded in nonsense texts (and, necessarily, in the games
themselves), and the need to break them down through play and parody. I will argue
that the game-space in nonsense is therefore contaminated by the same contradictions its
purpose is to elude; that is, if games provide an antidote to the autocracy of authority
figures in nonsense (viz. the Queen of Hearts in Alice; a host of patriarchs in the Wake;
Flann O'Brien's Third Policeman), they too must require an antidote to the rules and
hegemonies the games themselves enforce, and so on ad infinitum. They are therefore
not so simple as they might first appear, and this underlying complexity has its roots in
the status of nonsense writing and children's games as literary and social subcultures
respectively, within which power struggles are always at work - or rather at play.
Following from my readings of games in nonsense as a kind of negative
performance both of real-life rules and strictures, and canonical notions of authority and
value, I will explore the role of writerly authority in nonsense, critically examining the
simultaneous, multi-voiced, patchwork aesthetic so typical of nonsense and nonsense-
modernist texts. I will demonstrate how the manner in which children's games and
songs are transmitted - indiscriminately, rapidly, and at the mercy of distortions visited
upon them by mishearing and misapprehension - plays a vital role in their literary and
ontological status. In an analysis of how game structures function narratologically in
Joyce and Carroll, I will posit that that the presence of games allows the nonsense writer
to indulge his more eccentric notions of authorship and authority. A·study of the secret
lexicon of children's games, focusing on the Wakean game of 'Colours', will end the
chapter.
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1. 'NOTHING BUT A PACK OF CARDS':
POWER, TENSION, AND ORDER IN NONSENSE GAMES
To begin, I would like to return to the idea that during their games children 'cling' to
their roles and their corresponding rules, unwilling to break the patterns and codes of
conduct dictated by the game itself. We see this in Glugg's fatalistic acceptance of his
role as Devil in Book 2.1 of the Wake, and in Alice's of her status as pawn in Through
the Looking-glass. Many play theorists have described this phenomenon in terms of a
lesson that children learn through play, and which prepares them for a productive and
law-abiding life inadult society:
The contents of the social world that surrounds a child, its moral norms
and rules, are reflected in play. Accepting a role, a child complies to
[sic] the rules and tries to act according to them ... This improves his
absorption of commonly accepted social standards and his formation of
moral motivation and voluntary behaviour as well as introducing the
child into national and general spiritual values.68
Such prescriptive attitudes have their roots in Plato, who urged that children be
forbidden to make alterations to the rules and roles within their games, 'lest they be led
to disobey the laws of the State later in life.,69
The problem with such views lies in just how much of the flavour and tenor of
any given children's game must be ignored in order to reach them. The most glaring
assumption is also the most naive: that the rules of children's games are of the same
species, and for the same general purpose, as the laws of the adult world. For a number
of reasons, this is not the case. The 'ambiguity', as Brian Sutton-Smith calls it, of
children's play, means that we can never view it as a mere microcosmic representation
of adult society: it is liminal, mercurial, and apt to revise Hamlet's famous question into
a pleasingly paradoxical condition, 'To be and not to be' what it seems. A rule of a
children's game, for example, bears little resemblance to a rule of law: on the one hand
it is more flexible, in the sense that it is constantly under review and subject to
improvements or qualifications, liable to distortions both in its transmission and in its
enforcement; yet on the other hand, a game rule is more rigid, in the sense that its very
arbitrariness exempts it from any need to change with the times, or be molded to fit new
68 Brian Sutton-Smith. 2001. The Ambiguity oj Play. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 36.
69 Opies, Children's Games, 25.
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contexts. A rule of a children's game dating back to Ancient Greece, for example, may
have changed very little in two thousand years, in contrast to the continuous process of
amendments necessary to keep much more recent democratic laws concordant with
ever-progressing social values. The rule of a children's game, therefore, connotes a law,
but not what a law connotes. It is unreasonable to expect that what a child learns in his
or her adherence to the rules of a game will encourage Iaw-abidance later in life (indeed,
if adults adhered to laws in the same way that children adhere to the rules of games,
some laws would be followed so rigorously as to border on the obsessive-compulsive,
while others would melt away, mutate or magically appear so capriciously that any
legislation would be in a condition of continuous obsolescence: a recipe for the kind of
jurisdictive nonsense we find in the 'Trial' scenes of Alice in Wonderlands. Joyce's joke
at the end of the Wake's games chapter is especially apt here: rather than entreating their
God to 'incline our hearts to keep thy Law', they entreat their Game to 'entwine our arts
with laughters low' CFW, 259.7-8). The asymmetry of the relationship between
children's rules and adult laws is especially patent in those children's games, described
in the Opies' book Children's Games in Street and Playground, which are designed to
draw attention to themselves, intrude upon adult life, and actively challenge or lampoon
its laws. Such games (whose activities commonly include disrupting traffic in the street
or knocking on doors, as the Wakean children do while HCE is in the pub (FW,
330.30» are compared to 'tribal protests,' not only about adults' command over the
children themselves, but over the territories on which they play."
Children's play in Joyce might be seen as being rooted in 'tribal protest.' So
many of the references to children and play in his writing double up as assertions of
rights, particularly of what the child feels to be his or her right to choose how best to fill
and manage their time and space. Such concerns are central to the children of Dubliners,
for whom efforts to seize control of their own time by 'miching' from school ('An
Encounter' (D, 19» or hiding from the relative who might call them in from their play
C'Araby' CD,28», are coupled with bitterness over the colonisation of their territories:
'One time there used to be a field there in which they used to play every evening with
other people's children. Then a man from Belfast bought the field and built houses in it
- not like their little brown houses, but brick houses with shining roofs' CD,34). Before
the 'man from Belfast', we are told, there was Eveline's father, who 'used often to hunt
70 Opies, Children's Games, 31.
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them in out of the field with his blackthorn stick; but usually little Keogh used to keep
nix and call out when he saw her father coming' (D, 34). This watchword, 'nix,'
resurfaces in Finnegans Wake in connection with the children, forming part of what the
Opies call their 'dialectical lore.' That is, 'the language of the children's darker doings:
playing truant, giving warning, sneaking, swearing, snivelling, tormenting, and
fighting'; language by which the young Stephen Dedalus is memorably enthralled."
Tribal preservation and protest is a crucial element of Joyce's writing on
children from his earliest to his very latest prose, and its symbolic crystalisation of
Ireland's colonial condition has not gone unnoticed. As Margot Norris has observed,
many of the Joycean child's activities bear an 'imperialistic imprint': 'Clongowes boys
compete as York and Lancaster at sums; they play cricket, the British public school
game; Stephen plays Napoleon with his Dublin friends; the Caffrey twins build Martello
towers like their colonial masters.,n We will also recall how Mr. Orelli O'Reilly's
question in Ulysses regarding 'the slaughter of human animals who dare to play Irish
games in the Phoenix park' prompts a discussion about 'Irish sport and shoneen games
the likeoflawn tennis and about hurley and putting the stone and racy of the soil and
building up a nation once again and all to that' - so phrased that 'building up a nation'
sounds like a game itself (U, 303). Through his representation of children's games as
threatened spaces, vulnerable to colonisation, Joyce is able to subscribe to 'the
desirability of the revivability of the ancient games and sports of our ancient panceltic
forefathers' with more subtlety and less bombast than the Citizen, and yet manage to
preserve the children's arena as being ultimately indifferent both to political sensitivities
- in the sense that if a game is good, it will be played, no matter its country of origin -
and adult prescriptiveness. That is, if 'hurley' were to officially replace cricket at
Clongowes, the transgressive power it might previously have shared with unauthorised
and unpoliced children's games would be lost. Norman Douglas, whose London Street
Games provided Joyce with a rich source of games for cultivation and adaptation in the
Wake, felt that 'organized games' could prove almost as damaging to the 'old games' as
the cinema, if it weren't for the fact that 'I don't know a single boy who really cares for
"organized games. '" 73
71 For 'nix', see in particular, 'next, next and next' (FW, 231.2); 'Nixnixundnix' (FW, 415.29);
'Nichtsnichrsundnichts!' (FW, 416.17). Opies, The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren, 14-15.
72 Margot Norris, 1992. Joyce's Web: The Social Unraveling of Modernism. Austin: University of Texas
Press, 189.
73 Norman Douglas, 1916.London Street Games. Gloucester: Dodo Press, 49-50.
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The argument about Irish games in Ulysses demonstrates just how crucial Joyce
considered games and play to.be to.the development and preservation of national culture
and identity. Following from this, the child's play iri Joyce's colonial Ireland is
'transgressive and creative' in character not only because the children's 'conservative-
revolutionary' gamescape is given, like nonsense, to. pseudo-anarchic protest, but
because Joyce realised, as did the anthropologist Yrjo Him whose study of children's
games Joyce used as a sourcebook, that an understanding of children's games is
essential to. an understanding of human history and civilisatio.n.74 In his essay on sport
and games in Finnegans Wake, James Atherton identified further contemporaneous
writers who. agreed that 'children in play re-enact the history of their race.'75
Uncompromised by any taint of the rather worthy, pedagogic motives we often find
running through children's songs, poems and nursery rhymes (which in some cases
prove to. be barely disguised lessons in history and good behaviour, and which Carroll
so. brilliantly parodies and unpicks in the Alice books), most children's games exist
quite outside of the realms of lessons and leaming. The uneasy juxtaposition of the
classroom and the playground makes games all the more resistant to. didactic
interference; indeed, if they are to. function, both in nonsense writing and in reality, as a
kind of relief, antidote, or even corrective to.the version of reality urged on players from
above, this juxtaposition, friction, and resistance are essential both to. the unique status
and ultimate survival of such games. With this in mind, we can define games within the
same terms we apply to. literary nonsense: something which stands apart from what we
might call 'mainstream' culture, or cultural orthodoxy, but which is nevertheless
defined by this distinction; something whose definition is dependent on what it is not,
be it 'that which is not sense' or, in the case of games, 'that which is not serious', or
even 'that which is not real.,76 I will return to. these questions in the next sectio.n o.fthis
chapter.
If a view o.f children's games as a 'co.rrective' to. autho.rised versio.ns o.f reality
seems to. co.ntradict my earlier assertio.n that such games cleave to. a 'co.re o.f cultural
o.rtho.do.xy,' so.me clarificatio.n is required. The sense in which children's games might
be s'een to. 'correct' authorised standpo.ints is in their do.gged insistence o.n the
74 Margot Norris, Joyce's Web, 189; see Yrjo Him (trans. Lucien Maury), 1926. Les Jeux d'enfants. Paris:
Stock,3.
75 James S. Atherton (ed. Jack P. Dalton and Clive Hart), 1966. 'Sport and Games inFinnegans Wake' in
Twelve and a Tilly. London: Faber and Faber, 52-64 (58).
76 See Huizinga, 26-7.
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importance of history; not history as it is taught to children in school, but rather the
histories of their games, which are inscribed into the games themselves. Although
children's games are firmly rooted in the 'now', being self-contained and taking place
within fixed temporal boundaries, they are nevertheless accompanied by far-reaching
historical contexts. Asymptotically approaching a crude kind of historicism, children's
games have been found to revise, however subconsciously, what children learn from
adults, excavating histories and behaviours long since suffocated by Christian teaching,
and even subconsciously 'teaching' adults these revised histories - which have been
received by play theorists and anthropologists from Him and Huizinga to Sutton-Smith
and the Opies as fundamental, pagan and primitive truths.77 This interplay of past and
present makes children's games an ideal thematic focus for Finnegans Wake, which, in
its presentation of complex questions about the relationship between past and present,
and concerning different versions and definitions of history, 'denies the historian's
fiction that the past can be seen as the past ... and emphasizes continually the
interpenetration of past and present, of diachrony and synchrony.' 78
Joyce's understanding of the assertion of hidden histories through games,
evident from his use of Him and Quinet as well as from his own artistic
pronouncements on the anthropological significance of 'manchind's parlements' (FW,
252.5), makes this reader skeptical of Margot Norris's argument that, in what she sees
as the 'paedocentric rewriting' enacted on previous Joycean plots (in particular A
Portrait) by chapter 2.1 of the Wake, Joyce is 'restoring infantile social reality to a
plane of serious consideration.t " To my mind (and, I think, Joyce's), no such
restoration is necessary. For one thing, while the games chapter may have been by
Joyce's admission 'the gayest and lightest thing' he had yet written, it is by no means
'infantile.' The children's games are loaded with theological bartering, sexual
bargaining, and mythical as well as legal topoi. Numerous different codes and conceits
are in circulation. The atmosphere is thick with sexual innuendo; hints at criminal
transgression; physical and mental pain (in Glugg's toothache, bruising, and
humiliation); threats of libel and blackmail; broodings on the rights of women under
English law; presentiments of the Fall, and many more dark motifs, which cluster and
accumulate around the game as darkness ('tinct, tint' (FW, 244.13)) descends on the
77 See Caillois, 8-61.
78 Derek Attridge, 2000. Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 87.
79 Noms, Joyce's Web, 190.
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gamescape of the street. Far from 'inviting trivialization' of children's play, such
allegorical density, not to mention verbal complexity, elevates the chapter and the game
itself to a powerful position within the overall narrative. We are by no means 'invited to
read children's play with the fatuous optimism ofNausicaa's narrative,' but rather to see
in children's playa resounding and rather bloody pageant, as rich in gravitas as
felicity.80
Norris is nonetheless correct, however, when she notes that: '[T]he play of
truant children in Joyce's fictions renders adult power more brutally transparent, and
invents new forms and new identities ... for children to resist its force.' This being so,
the games of Joyce's child characters, like those of real children, frequently use
templates from the adult world; and those that don't still turn on similar kinds of
tensions and power relations to those of the adult reality which casts the children
themselves - the authors and players of the game - as underdogs. Herein lies Joyce's
nonsense inheritance, his 'conservative-revolutionary' framework; in order to
demonstrate the origins and implications of this more fully, I will now turn to the
micropolitical functions of games in Carroll's nonsense world before applying my
findings to Joyce's play models.
In the games of 'tribal protest' that pepper his prose from Dubliners to the Wake,
Joyce might be said to offer an example of the effect that adult - and, by extension,
imperial - authoritarianism exercises on play culture. In Carroll, we see such
authoritarianism in all its frightening, uncensored, and majestic ferocity. The Queen of
Hearts, is 'a sort of embodiment of ungovernable passion - a blind and aimless Fury,' as
Carroll wrote of her Looking-glass successor, the Red Queen, in '''Alice'' onthe Stage'
(Haughton, 296). Such characteristics are catastrophic in an autocrat: she is violent,
despotic, and chronically contrary, posing a mortal danger to anyone within her firey
radius. She embodies not only' Fury' but absolute authority, and this renders her game
of croquet an excellent lesson in the poisoning effect of real (as opposed to pretend)
power in a game; the Queen's version of croquet is a brilliant nonsense sketch of a
theoretical disparity between a game and its rules. As the game is set to begin, Alice
quickly notices that the Queen's understanding of the rules is far from ordinary: 'the
croquet balls were live hedgehogs, and the mallets live flamingoes, and the soldiers had
to double themselves up ... to make the arches' (Haughton, 73). Rather like Carroll
80 Ibid.
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inventing the rules for a new game he called 'Croquet Castles', in which the balls divide
into 'Soldiers' and 'Sentinels' who must invade or guard the doors of their respective
'Castles', the Queen has authored for herself a version of croquet more suitable to her
purpose than the conventional game." Her purpose, of course, is to win, and sentient
balls and arches are naturally advantageous in that regard, as we see the hedgehog-balls
and soldier-arches collaborating to ensure the Queen's victory and to protect themselves
against the ever-present threat of the guillotine.
With the odds stacked firmly in the Queen's favour, Alice's difficulties are
many: in order to even begin to play, she must subdue an errant flamingo and stay a
runaway hedgehog, overcome the ground's 'ridges and furrows', and deal with arches
that get up and walk away at random, The slapstick comedy in this scene is delightful,
but soon takes on menacing undertones when it becomes apparent that failure to take the
game seriously may well prove sufficient grounds for execution. As a bemused Alice
observes the game enacted around her, we are given a description of its chaotic
character:
The players all played at once, without waiting for turns, quarreling all
the while, and fighting for the hedgehogs; and in a very short time the
Queen was in a furious passion, and went stamping about, and shouting
"Off with his head!" or "Off with her head!" about once in a minute
(Haughton, 74).
Here is what happens when the balance between the freedom of a game and its need for
rules is removed: the game appears to have no rules, and yet the consequences of
breaking them are dire. The freedom granted by an absence of rules is shown to be
specious: it becomes a death warrant. The game could be read as a microcosmic
representation of the autocratic Queen's mode of government, and an example of what
happens when the rules of a game are treated like laws; the only difference being that
both the rules of the Queen's game and the laws of her state are as final and all-
encompassing as they are fickle and transitory: a typically nonsense state of
contradiction and simultaneity.
A further example of the contaminating effect of the Queen's very real power on
the game presents itself in Alice's dialogue with the Cheshire-Cat, who asks her how
she is getting on with the game:
81 For the roles of 'Croquet Castles', see CLC, 1143-45.
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"I don't think they play at all fairly," Alice began, in a rather
complaining tone, "and they all quarrel so dreadfully one ca'n't hear
oneself speak _ and they don't seem to have any rules in particular: at
least, if there are, nobody attends to them [...]"
"How do you like the Queen?" said the Cat in a low voice.
''Not at all," said Alice: "she's so extremely .» Just then she
noticed that the Queen was close behind her, listening: so she went on
"_ likely to win, that it's hardly worth while finishing the game"
(Haughton, 75).
In other words, the game has lost its tension. The Queen's power and the inevitable
complicity of her fearful, animate croquet apparatus has done away with any notion of
competition. This is the opposite of the Joycean 'tribal protest': it is a routine and
joyless assertion of authority. The game's apparent spontaneity makes it all the more
threatening; as Alice returns to the game after her interlude with the Cheshire Cat, the
narrator tells us that 'She had already heard [the Queen] sentence three of the players to
be executed for having missed their turns, and she did not like the look of things at all,
as the game was in such confusion that she never knew whether it was her turn or not'
(Haughton, 75-6).
As an illustration of what happens when the rules of games are not respected, the
Queen's game of croquet plays a significant role in Carroll's 'conservative-
revolutionary' aesthetic, an aesthetic rooted in the contradiction between his
mathematician's love affair with the indisputable rule and his almost paedomorphic
wariness of authority for authority's sake. The game is dystopian and despotic, unlike
the more exuberant modes of play we find in the capering of the Lobster Quadrille, the
pugilistic boisterousness of the Tweedles' battle, or the absurdly egalitarian Caucus
Race. There are two final aspects of the game we must bear in mind, however: first, the
game is more chaotic and brutal in character than those just mentioned because it is the
only one of these to take place within the boundaries of officialdom: in the garden of the
head of state, rather than, like the others, in the uncorrupted no-man's-land of the
seashore or wood. The Opies were not the only play theorists to note that children's
play is more aggressive in restrictive environments such as playgrounds, where they are
watched by authority figures, than that conducted in their own territories of streets and
fields.82 The 'quarreling and fighting' of the croquet players confirms the general rule
82 See Opies, Children's Games, vol.I, 31-3.
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that, where play is concerned, oppression begets aggression. Secondly, and importantly,
there is the fact that every player sentenced to death by the Queen is quietly pardoned
by the King at the end of the game. This fact carries with it a number of possible
implications: does it indicate some tacit agreement between the Queen and the King, a
repudiation of her absolute authority; or between the King and the players, a resistance
of her authority? Did the players know to expect this release from their sentences, and
thus know them to be meaningless all along - are the Queen's calls for execution just
another part of the game? Or was the King's a genuine and spontaneous pardon from
the Queen's genuine and spontaneous diktats? And perhaps most importantly, did
Carroll consider these questions himself, or was the pardon a strategic measure designed
to mollify potentially distressed child readers (as Alice herself is mollified) and avoid
accusations of irresponsibility from adult critics?83 We are not told. But whether the
Queen's decapitatory fixation is serious, mock-serious, or even both, it may still be read
it as an illustration of the contaminating influence of power on games. Whether or not
the players are actually sentenced to death, the Queen's authority still has the rather
self-defeating effect of stopping the game dead: indeed, her game of croquet has to stop
because 'all the players, except the King, the Queen, and Alice, were in custody under
sentence of execution' (Haughton, 81).
A neat contrast can be made here with the Caucus Race, which is the first game
Alice encounters after her fall into Wonderland. As with the hectic, seemingly
unregulated proceedings of the game of croquet, in which we will recall that 'the
players all played at once, without waiting for turns' (Haughton, 74), the Caucus Race
too betrays a scant regard for order: 'There was no "One, two, three, and away!", but
they began running when they liked, and left off when they liked, so that it was not easy
to know when the race was over' (Haughton, 26). The creatures of the seashore,
however, are decidedly more democratic than the residents of the palace, and so their
similarly confusing, similarly hectic game ends not in mass executions but prizes for all.
Here, again, all tension is absent from the game, this time not because of an
overabundance of corrupting power, but because of a conspicuous absence thereof. In
the game of croquet, the lack of tension is brought about by one player's autocracy; in
the Caucus Race, it is the intense democracy of the players which renders the game, as
83 A note in Martin Gardner's Annotated Alice responds to the horror and violence of the Queen's
constant murderous thr$ts, even going to far as to suggest that children 'undergoing analysis' should not
be allowed access to the book, in case of permanent damage to their fragile psyches (Gardner, 86, n.4).
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the Gryphon would say, 'without a porpoise' (Haughton, 90). In these two parallel yet
contrasting examples, Carroll shows the reader that what these games lack is what every
game needs in order to properly function: order, tension, an element of competition, all
born of a natural, internal hierarchy rather than an imposed, external one (such as the
Queen's). That such a critique is performed within a literary text which is itself a kind
of game is telling; in arguing for method and tension in games within a text about
games, Carroll is incorporating a literary critical dimension to his thesis. A work of
fiction, like a game, should be constructed around a set of tensions or rules; and in order
for the game or text to keep its integrity, its author must be staunch but not tyrannical in
the application of these rules.
Perhaps to ensure that this argument was not missed, Carroll aligned
Wonderland's sequel with the trajectory of a chess game, which supplies the book's
narrative arch. The Looking-glass chess game quickly establishes its natural hierarchy
and its tension: Alice, a lowly pawn, is given the task of reaching the end of the board
and becoming a Queen. The entire narrative is draped over this charmingly simple,
straightforward objective. Together, Wonderland and Through the Looking-glass
present an dichotomic illustration of opposite modes of game-playing: the first fluid and
flaccidly structured, the second perfected and tightly ordered. Both make the same
argument in favour of order in games, and by extension literary texts, the first by
negation and the other by demonstration. Both Wonderland and Through the Looking-
glass use the example of games as an allegory for nonsense: Carroll's argument for
order and tension within a game is borne out in his idea of literary nonsense as a
perfectly ordered, closed structure, which eschews chaos and madness even as, in its
obsessive need for order, it inexorably approaches chaos and madness. It is this same
nonsense condition that Joyce achieves in Finnegans Wake, whose excessive
organisation and inclusiveness serve to 'reintroduce the danger it deprecates,' as Jean-
Jacques Lecercle has put it; to invite the chaos it takes such pains to expel/" The
deepest power struggle at work within these nonsense texts and the games they employ
is that between order and disorder: the order of the games, and the texts, is the last stand
against the darkness and confusion of chaos, just as the children's games of Dubliners
take a stand against adult intrusions. But the battle is a losing one, and any victories can
84 Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 67. I will return to this view of nonsense as teetering on the east-
meets-west borderline between order and chaos, in Chapter Four, with reference to Beckett's merging
'minima and maxima' fIl his essay on Joyce's Work in Progress (see Beckett (ed. Ruby Cohn), 1983.
'Dante ... Bruno. Vico .. Joyce' in Disjecta. Dublin: Calder, 21.)
62
only be transient and pyrrhic, as Joyce himself knew too well when he wrote of his
Work in Progress:
I know that it is no more than a game but it is a game that I have
learned to play in my own way. Children may just as well playas not.
The ogre will come in any case.85
The shadow of this 'ogre' is palpable in the nonsense game; Carroll's version is
the 'monstrous crow' which terminates the play of the Tweedle brothers (Haughton,
169). Metaphorical evils or ogres threaten the sanctuary of 'childream's hours' (FW,
219.5) in both Carroll and Joyce: puberty, sex, death, forbidden knowledge, scatological
fixation, bullying behaviour, and adult intervention all play their part in contaminating
the innocence of the Wakean and Wonderland childhood, creating a landscape of
innuendo and menace. Indeed, Shem admits that he is no longer able to 'play non-
excretory, anti-sexuous, misoxenistic, gaasy pure, flesh and blood games ... those old
(none of your honeys and rubbers!) games for fun and element we used to play with
Dina' (FW, 175.30-35) - Dina mentioned here in reference to the lost innocence of the
games Alice played with her kitten Dinah before her portentous fall into Wonderland.
Shem's relationship with play is irretrievably tainted, either by his knowledge of sex, or
the arrival of Freud - an ogre we might twin with 'Eveline"s sinister 'man from
Belfast' - onto the formerly unsullied scenes of childhood behaviour.
Further threatening or negative elements to the nonsense game will be examined
in the final section of this chapter. For now, we must bear in mind that the role of the
game in nonsense texts is crucial both thematically and strategically. The nonsense
game is, like the nonsense text it inhabits, a site of deeply complex, covert, and often
subconscious fears and desires; and the game stands against, in social and cultural
terms, what the text stands against in literary and philosophical terms. By interacting in
such complex and subtle ways, game and text provide fertile ground for the critic; each
adds to and informs the other, and by studying the game within nonsense and the
nonsense within the game, much can be learned about the nature, function, and meaning
of both. With this in mind, I will now move from a consideration of political and
cultural authority to a more textual approach, and examine how games inform, or
8S Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, 16 October 1926 (LIII, 144),
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interfere with, the role of the author in nonsense.
2. 'TRUST US. OUR GAME. (FOR FUN!)':
CHINESE WHISPERS, TEXT GAMES, AND DISPLACED AUTHORITY IN NONSENSE
We now have two important parallels between children's games and nonsense writing,
and some idea of the complex ways in which they interact within nonsense texts. The
first is a question of status: both games and nonsense are most easily defined, as shown
at the beginning of the previous section, against what they are not, and thus enact a kind
of negative performance of their respective 'cultural' and 'literary' norms. Nonsense is
not-sense; play is not-work, not-serious; games and fiction are both not-real: as a group,
the terms 'nonsense', 'play', and 'games' fall into a category of conceptual underdogs.
The second parallel is a question of structure: both literary nonsense and children's
games depend on the right balance of order and spontaneity, hierarchy and democracy.
Both are built on the 'conservative-revolutionary' model. By aligning both the status
and structure of games with those of nonsense writing, we can see how the inherent
status anxiety of these two 'conceptual underdogs', combined with the unique and
sophisticated structural considerations employed by both, lends itself to a literature of
resistance. Political resistance, as it relates to Norris's and the Opies' ideas of 'tribal
protest' in games, is an ever-present topos in the way nonsense writing deals with
games, as discussed above. But a more palpable and more dynamic form of resistance
can be found in nonsense writing; namely, a resistance against writing itself. The
rigorous wordplay, narrative pranks, self-reflexive in-jokes and textual games that help
to distinguish literary nonsense from other modes of writing are there in large part in
order to tear at the fabric of writing itself, to remove its mask, to expose its
contradictions, to highlight its absurdities, but most of all, to question its authority. If
Carroll's and Joyce's symbolic use of games as political resistance was qualified in that,
as Carroll is unafraid to demonstrate, authority always has the power to quash the game
(viz. Wonderland-style croquet), when it comes to literary or textual resistance, the
situation is reversed: it is the game that can eliminate authority, as the author becomes
subsumed with in the self-generating rules of the game he is playing.
To demonstrate this point, I will now turn to a phonetic word game played by
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both Carroll and Joyce, which closely resembles a popular traditional children's game
called 'Chinese Whispers' or 'Whisper-down-the-lane', and which is based on the idea
of misconstruction and communication failure. When Alice comments that Humpty
Dumpty's conversation runs '''just as if it were a game!'" (184), she is expressing one
of the most ingrained ideas in Carroll's writing: that dialogue is a verbal sport, chess-
like in logic and competition. Carroll ian dialogue, much like looking-glass chess, is
unconventional and subject to perverse logical twists. In a letter to a his sister Henrietta,
Carroll describes a rather frustrating tutorial:
Tutor. What is twice three?
Scout. What's a rice-tree?
Sub-Scout. When is ice free?
Sub-sub-Scout. What's a nice fee?
Pupil (timidly). Half a guinea!
Sub-sub-Scout. Can't forge any!
Sub-Scout. Ho for Jinny!
Scout. Don't be a ninny!
Tutor (looks offended, but tries another question).
Divide a hundred by twelve!
Scout. Provide wonderful bells!
Sub-Scout. Go ride under it yourself.
Sub-sub-Scout. Deride the dunderheaded elf
Pupil (surprised). Who do you mean?
Sub-sub-Scout. Doings between!
Sub-Scout. Blue is the screen!
Scout. Soup-tureen!
And so the lecture proceeds.
Such is Life (SLLC, 15-6).
As a mathematics tutorial this is a shambles, but as a game of Chinese Whispers it is
exemplary. Unlike Carroll's wordgame 'Doublets', which relies on the orthographic
manipulation of letters within words, this 'Chinese Whispers' effect is phonetic,
dialogic: it is an example of the 'sounds tak[ing] care of themselves', as the Duchess
would say (Haughton, 79). While it is unclear whether Joyce would have read Carroll's
'Chinese Whispers', the game none the less plays a crucial role in the Wake's linguistic
construction - it is an organising principle of its compoaition/" In the Wake, 'Divide a
hundred by twelve' could be deliberately read, heard, or written as 'Deride the
86 For a similar reading of 'Chinese Whispers' in Joyce (developed independently of the present author's),
see Dirk Van Hulle, 200S; Manuscript Genetics: Joyce's Know-how, Beckett's Nohow. Gainesville:
University of Florida Press.
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dunderheaded elf', and all the 'doings [and meanings] between.,87
Finnegans Wake is constructed around a model of simultaneity and
superimposition; Carroll's comic sketch could almost be a diagram of what two Wakean
sentences would look like once flattened out with a rolling pin. This could work with
any of the prolonged and compressed puns we find in the Wake, for example:
Tutor. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
Scout. In the name of the former and of the latter and of their holocaust (FW,
153.31).
Sub-scout .... the fetter, the summe and the haul it cost (FW, 419.10).
In this sequence, the 'pupil' is the reader, receiving each distorted message with
'surprise' and timidly constructing a response. Joyce is the tutor, but also the scouts, as
he projects each sentence through a verbal prism and records the potential phonetic
mutation of every word, delighting in the resulting layers of sound and meaning. This is
the author as Chinese Whisperer, revelling in the sui generis errors and vagaries of
language as his words and phrases make trans-historical, trans-linguistic, and trans-
cultural journeys, arriving on the page much transformed - or disfigured. Perhaps
Joyce's games of 'Doublets' in the Wake could be read in this way too; not (or not only)
as a reinvention of Carroll's letters game, but as a string of Chinese whispers running
through the text, for instance:
Item. He was hardest set then. He wented to go (somewhere) while he was
weeting. Utem. He wished to grieve on the good persons, that is the four
gentlemen. Otem. And it was not a long time till he was [...] Atem (FW,
223.35-224.07)
Rather than letter substitution, this could be interpreted as a game of misheard words,
where 'Atem' is a misheard 'Otem', 'Otem' a misheard 'Utem', and so on (for as the
author counsels elsewhere in the Wake, 'the auditor learns': we are required to listen to
the text, not merely read it (FW, 374.06)). Just as in the 'Voyage of Tristan and Iseult',
where hiccups interrupt the text to remind the reader of its materiality, here these
Chinese whispers words surface every so often to give the impression that the text is
87 The poet Geoffrey Hill makes similar Chinese-whispers-style jokes about mishearing in his book-
length poem, Speech! Speechl: 'For definitely the right era, read: deaf in the right ear.' (CV, 54). Paul
Muldoon, too, is a master of comically mis-received slant-rhymes (see, for example, 'Errata' in Hay
(1998), London: Faber and Faber, 88-9).
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itself no more than an elaborate game, being played by, rather than necessarily written
by, the author. Such game-playing disrupts the notion of writerly authority, as we are
left wondering who is authoring who - is the author controlling the game or vice versa?
On a narrative level, the same effect is achieved in Through the Looking-Glass, in
which the game of chess has authority over the narrative (and of course, we are also
never sure who is the author of the dream we are following - Alice or the Red King).
Joyce's Chinese Whispers effect takes this one step further, as the game is unleashed on
the words themselves, so that the notion of authority and authorship comes directly into
question, and the game is given the power to threaten the authority which, on almost
every other level, only threatened it.
It is interesting to consider how this overlaps with the transmission of games
themselves. In their studies of 'playground lore', the Opies observed the speed with
which games and rhymes were transmitted across country, noting that such efficiency of
exchange makes playground lore 'of peculiar value to the student of oral
communication, for the behaviour and defects of oral transmission can be seen in
operation.,88 Carroll and Joyce both being ardent students of oral communication, it is
easy to see how such a subject attracted them. The Opies comment on the inevitable
distortions and competing versions that accompany such swift oral transmission, adding
that such variations 'occur more often by accident than by design. Usually they come
out through mishearing or misunderstanding.t'" They then provide several distinctly
Wakean examples:
A line in the song 'I'm a knock-kneed sparrow' quickly becomes 'I'm
a cockney sparrow'. 'Calico breeches' become 'comical breeches'.
'Elecampane' becomes 'elegant pain' At one school the pledges
'Die on oath', 'Dianothe', and 'Diamond oath' were all found to be
current at the same time.9o
Simultaneity, mutation, and error: all abiding artistic features of Finnegans Wake, writ
large in the transmission of children's games, rhymes, and oaths. We see the children of
Finnegans Wake taking part in the very same phenomenon, as their rhymes and songs
change and distort, whether to adapt to new environments and contexts or simply by
way of being misheard, misconstructed, or misremembered. We witness the same in
88 Opies, 1959. The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren, 8.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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Alice, where the rhymes of her everyday world '[get] altered' phonetically, symbolically
and thematically to accommodate her new nonsense surroundings (Haughton, 45).
There is an overlap, too, between the 'pelagiarist pen' (FW, 182.3) with which
Joyce composed the Wake, and with which Carroll parodically altered existing poems,
songs, and fairytales, and the peculiar authorlessness of children's games and rhymes,
which are at once invented and remodelled by every child, yet at the same time are only
ever copies, unowned and unfettered by one fixed origin or author. That both literary
nonsense and children's lore thrive on 'the last word in stolentelling' (FW, 424.34) adds
further to their shared condition of fragmented authority, displaced authorship, scattered
sources and uncertain origins. Carroll provides us with the perfect demonstration of this
with the following anecdote, in a letter to a child-friend:
... A very curious thing happened to me at half-past four yesterday.
Three visitors came knocking at my door, begging me to let them in.
And when I opened the door, who do you think they were? You'll
never guess. Why, they were three cats! Wasn't it curious? However,
they all looked so cross and disagreeable that I took up the first thing I
could lay my hand on (which happened to be the rolling-pin) and
knocked them all down as flat as pancakes! "If you come knocking at
my door," I said, "I shall come knocking at your heads." That was fair,
wasn't it?91
Carroll tells this story as if it is his own invention (indeed, as if it actually happened),
but a survey of children's lore tells us otherwise. In a section on nonsense rhymes, the
Opies list three sing-song variations on this tale, all involving a combination of cats,
door-knocking, and rolling pins.92 Carroll appropriates the rhyme, fleshes it out with a
narrative, and tells it has if it is his own story - exactly the plagiaristic behaviour the
Opies found children to display in the circulation of their games and rhymes. In blurring
the distinction between original authorship and blatant 'stolentelling', Carroll ruptures
the relationship between the author and what is being authored.
The rupture is still more evident in Carroll's use of games and dreams. At the
end of Through the Looking-glass we are presented with an astonishing conundrum,
when' the author invites us to decide who dreamt the dream in which Alice found
herself: Alice or the Red King. It is a remarkably postmodem, Flann O'Brien-esque
confidence trick, as unsettling to the reader philosophically as it is to Alice
91 Letter to Agnes Hughe-s, 1871 (SLLC, 49).
92 Opies, The Lore and Language of Street Children, 23.
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ontologically when she is moved to assert through tears "'I am real'" (Haughton, 165).
But if this is one way of distancing the author from his work, and the reader from any
sure sense of whose authority the work falls under, the chess game is quite another. As
an ingenious alternative to the historical novelistic practice of laying out chapter
headings and short abstracts at the beginning of a book, Carroll presents the narrative
arch of his book in a sequence of chess moves, complete with a diagram and succinct
spoiler, posed as a chess problem: 'White pawn (Alice) to play, and win in eleven
moves' (Haughton, 113). Immediately, the author has become subordinate to the game;
once the rules and moves of the game have been established, they cannot be deviated
from, and the game takes over as the voice of authority. We might compare this strategy
with Joyce's schema for Ulysses, in which every move made by his characters has a
precedent, and every theme a fixed rationale. In both examples, the relationship between
the author and the work is intercepted by the system, which has a strange power over
both the author who shaped it and the narrative it then shapes.
Not content with this merely triangular model of authorial distancing, however,
both Joyce and Carroll have created a matrix of distancing games and structures,
planting games within games to produce a disquieting hall-of-mirrors effect.
Wonderland's game of croquet, for instance, takes place within a game of cards, and
there are various games of logic subsumed within a game of chess in Through the
Looking-glass. In her study of nonsense, Susan Stewart writes of the folkloric quality of
this 'nesting' technique, and cites as an example a pastime much beloved of children,
and which, incidentally, the young Stephen Dedalus uses in A Portrait when he doodles:
Stephen Dedalus
Class of Elements
Clongowes Wood College
Sal/ins
County Kildare
Ireland
Europe
The World
The Universe (AP, 11).
Stewart, though, limits her description of nesting to the intertextual, referencing
stories with stories and quotations within quotations. These methods, she holds, renders
the nonsense text 'a surface inscribed by an infinity of overlapping, mutually
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implicating layers of textuality.' 93 Thus the text is able to 'flaunt its fictive frame and is
no longer under obligation to make sense.,94 But unlike Stewart's example of Borges'
Pierre Menard's Cervantes' Don Quixote, whose plagiaristic nests defuse, decentre and
dissolve the text's powers of signification while shoring up our notion of what it means
to be an author as opposed to, say, a copy-writer, conman, forger, trickster or
performance artist (however we choose to view the plagiaristic Menard), Carroll's
nesting of games, rather than texts, do quite the reverse. The games played within
games multiply Carroll's texts' powers of signification, rendering them conceptually
and contextually complex; and on the other hand, authorial power is undercut by the
game or games, which wrest narrative control from the author while vying for it
between themselves.
A pertinent example of this dual fragmentary function of nested games can be
found in the 'Lion and Unicorn' chapter of Through the Looking-glass. Already we are
aware of Stewart's intertextual nests, as we find 'all the kings horses and all the kings
men' crashing through the forest to the aid, we are given to assume, of a fallen Humpty
Dumpty; these are characters from a separate text, and almost run Alice over as they
follow their separate plot. The main textual plane is quickly re-established, though,
when the White King remarks that he 'couldn't send all the horses ... because two of
them are wanted in the game' (Haughton, 194). But no sooner has the chess game been
reasserted than another game is opened up within it, as Alice takes cue from the name of
the King's messenger to begin a popular Victorian parlour game:
"I love my love with an H," Alice couldn't help beginning,
"because he is Happy. I hate him with an H because he is Hideous. I fed
him with - with - with Ham-sandwiches and Hay. His name is Haigha
and he lives-"
"He lives on the Hill," the King remarked simply, without the
least idea that he was joining in the game (Haughton, 196).
Now, just as the game of chess governs the over-arching narrative of Through the
Looking-glass, this internal mini-game takes charge of the internal, mini-narrative of the
chapter, quite independently of its internal author (Alice); for sure enough, Haigha's bag
is magically full of ham sandwiches and hay. Once again, the game has wielded
93 Stewart, Nonsense, pp.124-5.
94 Ibid.
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authority over the action." As long as the messengers Haigha and Hatta remain, the
chess and parlour games operate alongside one another; when another intertext, the 'old
song' of 'The Lion and the Unicorn', is inserted into the mix, the main narrative is
redirected, or supplanted, yet again. By creating this dense and multi-layered tapestry of
contending intertextual para-narratives and cleverly regressing sequences of games
within games, Carroll disrupts the notion of both authorial control and originality,
presenting a patchwork of borrowed subplots and pre-existing patterns and game
structures.
Never one to be outdone, Joyce takes these Carrollian nests of games even
further, incorporating a great many games into the Wake, which are enacted on varying
narrative planes. There is an unmistakable element of menace and confusion in all these
multi-layered games. In the Prankquean passage, for instance, the children are
kidnapped by the Prankquean as they play, 'kickaheeling their dummy on the oil cloth
flure' of their father's 'homerigh, castle and earthenhouse' (FW, 21.12-3). Their game,
which is subsumed within the Prankquean's game (based, as we know from Grace
Eckley, on two real children's games, 'Mother, Mother, the Pot boils Over', and 'Sally
Waters'), which in turn is subsumed within Joyce's game ('Wimmegame's fake' (FW,
375.16-7», is not a safe place to be.96 By positioning the Prankquean's game between
an inner, micro-scopic game (that of the children) and an outer, macro-scopic one (that
of the author), Joyce allows the sinister fiction of child-theft in a real children's game
(,Mother, Mother') to become a sinister reality in a fictional game (that played by the
children); we learn, therefore, to assume that if children's games are by definition short-
lived and, remembering Joyce's letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, ogre-threatened, a game
within a game within a game is even more so.
Joyce employs his games in much the same manner as Carroll. He allows
alphabet games to seize temporary control of both the theme and language of his text,
95 Alphabet games have a tendency to do this in Carroll, who wrote in a letter that 'One of the deepest
motives (as you are aware) in the human breast (so deep that many have failed to detect it) is
Alliteration.' (LLC, 601). Compare the Lamb's story in Sylvie and Bruno Concluded: 'I went to the A-
field, and I helped them to make A!' - 'I went to the B-hive, and the B gave me some honey' - 'I went to
the C-side, and saw ships sailing on the C!' (CLC, 588). Note also the prominence and plot-driving
potential of the letter B in 'The Hunting of the Snark', and of the letter M in the Dormouse's story at the
Wonderland tea party. Joyce himself was no stranger to that 'deepest ... motive'; alliteration games
abound in the Wake. Note, for example, an alliterative alphabet game similar to Alice's own: 'Hootch is
for husbandman handling his hoe' (FW, 5.9); 'LeI lols for libelman libling his lore' (FW, 250.19);
'Rutsch is for rutterman ramping his roe' (FW,314.12).
96 See Grace Eckley, 1<185.Children's Lore in Finnegans Wake. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
105-123.
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and allows the structure of games such as chess, Colours, hide and seek, the tug of love,
and so on, to temporarily dictate the structure of his narrative. Book III, chapter four of
the Wake makes a particularly striking nod towards the Looking-glass when a strange
pseudo-disturbance in the dream sequence is acted out in chess mode. The scene
involves the slumbering husband and wife and a child frightened by a nightmare.
Whether this bedroom scene is 'an interruption of the dream or part of it' remains an
open question - just like Carroll's 'which dreamt it?' puzzler at the end of Through the
Looking-glass." Like the evening children's games, the scene is a 'play' in both senses
of the word: a 'dumbshow' and a game, played out on the 'eight and eight sixtyfour'
squares of a 'tabl[i]er', or chessboard (FW, 559.14-32). Other games contaminate the
chess, however: after ALP's opening 'gambit', which gives her a 'queen's lead', there is
an out of place 'Hum' - a draughts move. Though they are ostensibly 'spill playing
rake and bridges' (rooks and bishops, i.e. chess), mentions of backgammon, whist, and
snakes and ladders confuse matters. By intermixing these different species of games,
Joyce goes further than to imply his own partial ceding of authorial control; taking his
cue from Carroll, he provides a coded commentary on the nonsense author's role, which
is a mixture of skill (represented by chess and draughts), and chance (dice- and card-
based games). The nonsense author's last judgment is less Dies Irae than 'dice's error'
(FW, 433.30) his game-text 'overlorded by fate and interlarded with accidence' (FW,
472.31-2), and unaffected by the standards of 'the Great Sommboddy within the
Omniboss' (FW, 415.17): the familiar, omniscient, Realistic author-god." Through the
game-text, the author presents himself as a 'pixillated doodler' (FW, 421.33),
responsible for but only indirectly in control of his narrative structures, which are
regulated by the game. The battle for narrative control between game and author is one
the game can dominate, for whatever narrative power the author awards himself, he is
still operating within the rules of his own game, as the author of Finnegans Wake knows
too well when he writes: 'I am a quean. Is a game over? The game goes on' (FW,
269.21-2).
3. 'A DARKTONGUES, KUNNING':
97 See William York Tindall, 1969. A Reader's Guide to Finnegans Wake. London: Thames and Hudson,
284-5.
98 For more on the Wake's 'alchemy of error,' see Tim Conley's excellent Joyces Mistakes (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003).
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SECRECY, SHIBBOLETHS, AND STATUS ANXIETY IN NONSENSE GAMES
If the textual game has the habit of destabilising or disrupting authorial control and
responsibility, it would also seem to detract the text's canonical status, demoting it from
serious intellectual exercise to a merely frivolous diversion. Kimberly Bohman-Kalaja,
in her study of play-texts and reading games, notes that the very hierarchical 'play-
versus-seriousness' dialectic, dismissed as inaccurate by play theorists such as Huizinga
and Caillois, has 'impeded serious thematic analyses' of play writing." This extends to
nonsense writing, as Susan Stewart points out when she writes that, thanks to the
hierarchical distinctions made between seriousness and play, sense and nonsense:
Nonsense becomes appropriate only to the everyday discourse of the
socially purposeless, to those on the peripheries of everyday life: the
infant, the child, the mad and the senile, the chronically foolish and
playful. Nonsense becomes a negative language, the language of an
experience that does not count in the eyes of commonsense
discourse.l'"
It is fair to say that this peripheral rabble of children and fools accounts for a large
cross-section of nonsense protagonists too, from Alice and the Doodles children to
Beckett and O'Brien's socially excluded and mentally fragile heroes and the chorus of
outcasts in Edward Lear's poems and limericks. Neither can we ignore the fact that, at
least for the literary critics and guardians of the golden gates of canonicity, the nonsense
readership is also uniquely rich in juveniles and oddballs. The literary and cultural
subordination of nonsense mirrors the social subordination of the nonsense protagonist
and, conceivably, the nonsense reader. The resulting underground or subcultural status
of nonsense, its protagonists, authors, and readers, makes it fertile ground for the sort of
codes and shibboleths that circulate so freely amongst those without power, whether it
be children in a playground or political activists at a rally. Just as children's games and
rhymes germinate freely and quite outside the radar of adults, so too do their
codewords, conspiracies, and the internal hierarchies these both produce and protect.
99 Kimberly Bohman-Kalaja, 2007. Reading Games: An Aesthetics of Play in Flann O'Brien, Samuel
Beckett and Georges Perec. New York: Dalkey Archive, 99.
100 Stewart, Nonsense, 5.
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There are countless famous examples of shibboleths in literary nonsense; most,
however, are not presented as shibboleths - as exclusive codewords imbued with secret
meaning or significance - but rather as innocent gibberish, the kind of amusing, vacant
babble that children like to invent. Trophies of this category include Edward Lear's
'runcible spoon' and Carroll's elusive 'snark': nonsense words that signify nothing
specific while suggesting a vast spectrum of possible meanings.l'" Critical attempts to
hunt down the meaning of the such words have proved as fruitless and absurd as the
hunting of the snark itself - a wonderful in-joke on Carroll's part. A separate category
of verbal nonsense lurks behind this supposedly innocuous goobbledegook, however:
that of deliberate coding, whether in the creation of a made-up word, or a new usage of
an already existing word, which is deliberately made to represent something secret, and
which therefore becomes powerful. Examples here include Joyce's 'heliotrope',
codeword of the Maggies in their game of Colours; Humpty Dumpty's unique use of the
word 'glory' in Through the Looking-glass; or Ali Baba's enduring 'Open Sesame' - a
mystical password which runs through Finnegans Wake.102 The former category - of
innocent verbiage - might be described as inclusive to the latter's exclusive. The first
group of words are deliberately lacking in obvious signification, and are thus
democratic: as to what a 'snark' is, one reader's guess is as good as another's, as Carroll
was always keen to point OUt.103 The latter group is imbued with power: these words are
weapons that guard against intruders, or keys that unlock certain privileges and
responsibilities to those entrusted with their secrets. They are infused with intrigue, and
entangled with notions of tribal identity and secret activity, complementing what Roger
Caillois called 'the affinity which exists between play and the secret or mysterious.' 104
George Steiner makes a convincing argument for this secret lexicon as a tribal
code of honour, at once excluding the other (i.e. adults) while at the same time enacting
'a night-raid on adult territory'. Like children's games, which are so often patched
together from the socio-cultural brio-a-brae which constitutes their understanding of the
adult world, and which are as parodic and rebellious as they are derivative, their
language also fuses the imitative and the mutinous:
101 Se~ my discussion of Edward Lear's nonsense letter in the previous chapter.
102 For example, '(open shunshemal),' 98.04-5; 'Sesama to the Rescues. The Key Signature,' 302.19-21;
'0 szeszame open,' 333.1.
103 Carroll wrote to a child friend: 'As to the meaning of the Snark, I'm very much afraid I didn't mean
anything but nonsense! Still, you know, words mean more than we mean to express when we use them; so
a whole book ought to mean a great deal more than the writer means. So, whatever good meanings are in
the book, I'm glad to accept as the meaning of the book' (Collingwood, 173).
104 Caillois, Man, Play and Games, 4.
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The fracture of words, the maltreatment of grammatical norms which,
as the Opies have shown, constitute a vital part of the lore, mnemonics
and secret parlance of childhood, have a rebellious aim: by refusing, for
a time, to accept the rules of grown-up speech, the child seeks to keep
the world open to his own, seemingly unprecedented needs. lOS
Not only this though; the child who by turns makes up and mangles the language given
to him by the adult world (just as he or she corrupts and converts its cultural norms into
games) is not merely preserving his or her own identity, but also actively critiquing that
world. As James C. Scott has written:
Every subordinate group creates, out of its ordeal, a "hidden transcript"
that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the
dominant. [...] I suggest, along these lines, how we might interpret the
rumour, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes, and theatre of the
powerless as vehicles by which ... they insinuate a critique of power
while hiding behind anonymity or behind innocuous understandings of
their conduct. 106
If the public transcript of the Wake's children is their diligent study in Book 2.2, their
hidden transcript is the rough-and-tumble, sexually knowing and linguistically cryptic
play of the preceding chapter. In section one of this chapter, I argued that children's
play is intrinsically linked with ideas of tribal protest in Joyce, and used as an example
his tendency to colour the innocuous tensions and power struggles that take place
between players of games with dark imperialistic overtones. Steiner's 'secret parlance'
- which extends to shibboleths - plays an important role in the politics of Joyce's child
characters, whose games are so evocative of diverse forms of oppression and rebellion,
and whose speech is accordingly cryptic and idiomatic.
Those Dubliners children who would 'mich' from school and keep 'nix' while at
play have developed their own private language, inaccessible to adults, and yet, of
course, these words can also function as a means of exclusion among the children
themselves: Stephen feels alienated from the group of older boys at Clongowes because
he doesn't know the meaning of the word 'smugging,;107 Shem is ostracised from his
group of playmates when he fails to guess their codeword, 'heliotrope'. Writing on the
lOS George Steiner, 1975. After Babel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 35.
106 James C. Scott, 1990. Domination and the Arts ofResistance. New Haven: Yale University
Press, xii-i.
107 Joyce, A Portrait, p.40.
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high incidence of 'cloaked references to Gaelic culture or Irish history' in modern Irish
writing in English, Dillon Johnston has noticed 'two kinds of unstated or suppressed
references', which invite comparison with the idioglossic 'darktongues' of the Joycean
child (FW, 223.28):
first, those omissions introduced to frustrate a colonial auditor and
convey secrets to a primary audience, and, second, those omissions
introduced into a song or story when the fuller context is lost over time
or simply drop~ed because in a place as small as Ireland everyone
knows the plot. 08
Such cultural guardedness characterises children's lore too, whose omissions and
secrets tend to be the results of either deliberate barriers to unwanted intruders, or the
sign of a collective understanding in which some things are simply too obvious to state.
Play theorists and political scientists alike have learned to view such verbal secrecy and
separatism as a mode of protest against a ruling power - whether it be British rule or the
English language in Johnston's Irish example, adult authority in the case of children's
lore, or the standards and expectations of mainstream canonical fiction vis-a-vis
nonsense literature. Joyce's writing has a stake in all three of these forms of protest, and
it is often through games that he enacts it, employing the same rhetoric of power and
subversion that children do, albeit unconsciously, in their own games, and in so doing
attempting to restore the reputation or status of the subordinate group he is representing.
The children's game of 'Colours' or 'Angels and Devils' could be seen as the
apotheosis of this ambitious aim. For one thing, while some of the most crucial
sourcebooks for the writing of this passage took the form of informative if basic indices
such as Norman Douglas's London Street Games, we know that Joyce's scope reached
far beyond the mere listing and interweaving of traditional games and songs. Convinced
of the inherent cultural and allegorical importance of these games, Joyce overwrote
them with lofty theological, legal, and cultural references. Even during the chapter's
protracted process of composition, these twin themes of child's play and philosophical
gravity were consistently balanced and juxtaposed, as we see from Stuart Gilbert's
Paris Journal:
To JJ bi-weekly I read information concerning Angels and Devils (from
108 Dillon Johnston, 2601. The Poetic Economies of England and Ireland, 1912-2000.
Basingstoke: Palgrave, xiv.
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Aquinas; 'Le Diable' by Abbe; Waite's 'Magic') and play English
children's singing games, German children's ditto, Dalcroze and
French popular songs.109
Through its use of the codeword or shibboleth, the Wakean game of 'Angels and
Devils' merges the two themes perfectly. The rules of the game are straightforward, and
best explained by Joyce himself:
The Angels, girls, are grouped behind the Angel, Shawn, and the Devil
[Shem] has to come over three times and ask for a colour, if the colour
he asks for has been chosen by any girl she has to run and he tries to
catch her.110
What Joyce omits to mention here is that the chosen colour, both in the Wakean version
of the game and in scores of actual traditional children's games, corresponds to the
colour of the girls' underwear, placing the game squarely in that category which is of
interest to the child because of 'the incident in it that least appeals to the adult: the
opportunity it affords ... to say aloud the colour of someone's panties, as in 'Farmer,
Farmer, may we cross your Golden River?,1l1 The purpose of the game, then, is that
Shem, as Devil, 'must fand for himself by gazework.what their colours wear as they are
all showen drawens up' (FW, 224.26-7). It is not entirely guesswork, however, as a
series of complex and imaginative clues are given throughout the chapter, including one
derived from the letters of the Hebrew alphabet:
There lies her word, you reder. The height herup exalts it and the
lowness her down abaseth it. It vibroverberates upon the tegmen and
prosplodes from pomaeria. A window, a hedge, a prong, a hand, an eye,
a sign, a head and heep your other augur on her paypaypay. And you
have it, old Sem pat as ab be seated. (FW, 249.13-8).
Asterisked on either side by the hint of an alphabet ('abaseth it'; 'ab be seated'), the list
is comprised of the equivalents in English of the meanings of Hebrew letters, here
arranged to spell H-E-L-I-O-T-R-O-P .. Elsewhere similarly ingenious riddles suggest
the answer, which Shem nevertheless fails to find. For the children who earlier failed to
solve Shem's own riddle ('the first riddle of the universe: [...] when is a man not a
J09 Stuart Gilbert, 1993. Reflections on James Joyce. Austin: University of Texas Press, 41.
HO Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, 22 November 1931 (SU, 355).
HJ Opies, Children's Games, 21.
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man?' (FW, 170.4-5», this must seem like fitting revenge, and neither Shawn nor the
Maggies lets him off lightly, instead chiding, mocking, and even physically bruising
him.
It is no coincidence that during the process of his humiliation Shem's aggression
turns on his parents, whom he wishes to blackmail or publicly insult. The game of
'Colours' is, ostensibly, a form of 'illicit play' by any play theorist's definition: it
involves, among other things, pranks, toilet humour, sexual slang, taunting, antagonistic
laughter, bullying, playfighting, hegemonic interaction, exclusion, and name-calling; or
as Joyce would have it, 'hoots, screams, scarf drill, cap fecking, ejaculations of aurinos,
reechoable mirthpeals and general thumbtonosery' (FW, 253.26-8). Such forms of play,
as the Opies and others have found, are predominantly found where children feel most
encroached upon by adults. By channelling the anger he feels towards himself and his
peers towards his parents, Shem is betraying his desire for access to the tribe's
'heliotropolis', despite his ignorance of their shibboleth and his attendant victimhood
(FW, 594.8).
Not only does the Wakean game of Colours fall into the category of 'illicit play',
it is also inherently hostile, turning on the alienation and humiliation of another player.
Here Joyce makes an important observation about both the nature of games and of
childhood interaction: the taunting of a minority or a weaker Other serves to reinforce
the authority and unity of the dominant group. Joyce's interest in this anthropological
phenomenon, and the means by which it is manifested, can be traced back to A Portrait,
and Stephen's humiliation at Clongowes. Caught between the draconian austerity of his
teachers and the boisterous mockery of his peers, Stephen is frequently singled out for
ridicule by the older boys. Much of Stephen's distress is caused by his failure to gain
access to certain secrets of the life and lingo of Clongowes, as when he learns that some
boys were caught 'smugging':
Stephen looked at the faces of the fellows but they were all looking
across the playground. He wanted to ask somebody about it. What did
that mean about the smugging in the square? ... It was a joke, he
thought (AP, 40).
'Smugging', like 'heliotrope', is a kind of shibboleth, the ignorance of which casts
Stephen, like Shem, in the role of outsider. This is the dark side of the shibboleth, which
Joyce is intent on emphasizing: not the word that unites a tribe, but the word that
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excludes an Other. Play forms in Joyce are built on exclusion: riddles that the listener
cannot answer (Shem's) or that are deliberately kept secret (as in A Portrait, when Athy
informs Stephen that he knows 'another way' to ask a riddle, 'but I won't tell you what
it is' (AP, 22»; games whose purpose is to exclude, such as 'Colours', or which
indirectly exclude ('The noise of children at play annoyed him and their silly voices
made him feel ... that he was different from others. He did not want to play' (AP, 65»;
sports which are themselves excluded (Irish games in the park); jokes which exclude
minority groups (such as Mr Deasy's anti-Semitic gag in Ulysses (U, 36», and which
even manage to exclude the reader (Ulysses' ever-puzzling 'U.P.: up' (U, 151».
The emphasis Joyce places on the negative element of play, the weight he lends
to its powers of exclusion and aggression, harks back to the Carrollian world of killer
croquet, unanswerable riddles, and cruel jokes. For both Carroll and Joyce, games not
only contain important philosophical and anthropological truths, they also conceal the
basest human instincts, in particular the violent, the sexual, and the scatological -
hidden elements they share with jokes, a link which will be explored in the next chapter.
That Joyce's 'Colours' game yokes these base instincts with eschatological depth is
extremely significant; intellectual and cultural hierarchies are powerfully undercut. As
Sam Slote has noted in his genetic study of the games chapter, Joyce's belief in the
inherent philosophical and "'eschatological'" nature of the games he incorporated into
Finnegans Wake is shared with Yrjo Him, from whose book Les Jeux d'enfants Joyce
took copious notes. This '''eschatological tendency''', writes Slote, 'allowed Joyce to
interlace the frivolity of the games with "loftier" matters.' 112 By 'interlacing' not only
the frivolous but the crude with the spiritual and profound, Joyce is able to perform a
vital 'conservative-revolutionary' nonsense manoeuvre, removing 'privileged
signification' and levelling the thematic playing field (pun intendedj.l':' That Joyce uses
the theme of play to perform such a trick is, as I have shown, no accident. We see
literary nonsense following the 'conservative-revolutionary' framework by upholding
seemingly trivial conventions while simultaneously uprooting deeply embedded and
highly complex structures of verbal communication, reader reception, and literary
meaning; likewise, children's play attaches itself to the trifling routines and repetitions
of the adult world while simultaneously disputing orthodox cultural values and accepted
112 Sam Slote, 'Blanks for when words gone: Chapter ILl', in Luca Crispi and Sam Slote (eds.), 2007.
How Joyce Wrote Finnegans Wake. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 181-213 (210, n.5).
113 The removal of 'privileged signification' is one of Susan Stewart's chief requirements for nonsense.
See Stewart, Nonsense, 118-9.
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versions of history and reality. Its use of play allows literary nonsense an ideal vantage
point over the worlds of both the adult and the child. It is able to trade and translate
ideas between these two worlds, to merge them: it can see the adult world of seriousness
and complexity through the prism of the child world of exuberance and curiosity, and
vice versa. A cross-pollination of ideas occurs between the two: verbal child's play may
fertilize the subject of linguistic philosophy, for example, and matters of topical interest
in the adult world may find themselves comically corrupted into playground
Iimericks.!" Such cross-pollination is particularly dominant in Joyce, who as Grace
Eckley has noted, 'made children's lore a window to the adult world at the same time he
treated adult themes with childish lightness.' 115 This is the nonsense method: it is built
upon clever reversals and contractions, which serve to bring to light uncomfortable
truths which would otherwise fall foul of both Freud's and the Lord Chamberlain's
assiduous censor.
The fact that Joyce draws so heavily upon children's games and the cross-
pollination with adult life that such games effect teaches us something about Carroll's
use of games too. For while the use of children's games in Victorian nonsense may be
written off as a straightforward effort to contextualise and validate the experiences of a
child audience, when that child audience is removed, as in Joyce, we discover more
complex motivations for the incorporation of child's play, such as those outlined above.
Not only do we witness a strange intermingling of child and adult worlds, and a removal
of any inherent privilege of one world of the other, we also sense a politics of resistance
coming to the fore; for while Joyce and Carroll might treat the child world as equal to
the adult world, both writers are also acutely aware of the actual subordination of the
child world. The inequality of the relationship between the respective worlds of adult
and child, where one takes more than equal share of power and respect, lies in parallel
to that of the relationship between canonical fiction and nonsense. The same notion of
hierarchy determines both. Thus, in setting itself the task of levelling out playing fields,
whether by infusing children's play with dark motifs and eschatological significance, or
by caricaturing royalty, or by raising simple word games to the level of linguistic
philosophy, nonsense is able to cleverly and subtly salvage its own reputation, to boost
its own intellectual and cultural status. If children's games are as rich, as valid, and as
114 See Opies, 'Topical Rhymes' in The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren, 98-120. Joyce makes great
use of the childish-but-topical, lighthearted-but-serious jingle in Ulysses and Flnnegans Wake.
liS Eckley, Children's Lore in Finnegans Wake, xv.
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culturally important as adult life, then nonsense literature is as demanding, as
rewarding, and as artistically valuable as mainstream, canonical fiction, 'constantly the
same as an equal to himself and magnificently well worthy of any and all such
universalisation' (FW, 32.20-1).
CHAPTER THREE
'JEST JIBBERWEEK'S JOKE': COMIC NONSENSE
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For Immanuel Kant, architect of the 'incongruity' theory of humour, a joke's success
lies between the 'something' of the setup and the anticlimactic 'nothing' of the
punchline.v" Out of this core juxtaposition arises a host of similar incongruities and
contrasts - the logical and illogical, the profound and the trivial, the high- and low-brow
- which meet in the joke's irreverent punchline. The joke is thus dual in structure: its
humour hinges on the conceptual discord between the contrasts and reversals it exploits;
after all, nothing can be incongruous on its own. This double nature extends to form,
too: the joke requires both a teller and a listener, as Freud noted, in order to exist.
Making nothing from something is a little like weaving gold back into straw: it
requires great sophistication alongside a rather perverse rationale, where Racine's
criterion for creativity - 'Toute I 'invention consiste a faire quelque chose de rien,1l7 -
is rebelliously flouted. Martin Grotjahn, in his book on literary humour, writes that
'sophisticated but faulty thinking' lies at the core of the comic impulse, which is
therefore 'related to the nonsense technique.,118He is right: humour, like nonsense, is a
relentlessly methodical thwarter of logic, favouring the particular over the general, and
the superficial over the profound. All literary nonsense contains an element of humour -
that we laugh, however darkly, is a crucial element of the nonsense condition's
diagnostic criteria.l'" One could even go so far as to venture that all humour contains an
element of nonsense, though this would be difficult to prove. Certainly anything that
prompts laughter involves a jolt to our 'strained expectation' - the surprise of
witnessing any sensible sentence or everyday scene give way to an error of form. In
both the physical and verbal gag, the outer world of words and things presides over the
inner world of meaning and purpose: the slapstick comedian gets a laugh when his
purpose (walking to post a letter, say) is undermined by some surface rupture (slipping
on a banana skin, perhaps), which disconnects his intention from the outcome and
injures more than his pride. Likewise, a verbal joke is funny when the content or
meaning of a sentence or dialogue is frustrated by a surface semantic ambiguity: 'My
dog has no nose.' / 'How does he smell?' / 'Awful.' Here, the word 'smell' is the
banana skin that trips up the questioner; his disobliging lexicon causes him to fall into
the joke, and it is his 'disappointed expectation', to quote Cicero, that 'makes us
116 Laughter arises from 'the sudden transformation of strained expectation into nothing.' See Kant (trans.
James Creed Meredith), 1952. The Critique of Judgement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199.
117 Jean Racine, 1796. (Euvres, vol. 3. Paris: Pougin, 13.
118Martin Grotjahn, 1957. Beyond Laughter. New York: McGraw-Hill, 8.
119 As this thesis prefers to describe nonsense as a 'condition' rather than a 'genre', it seems more
germane to use the language of pathology in discussing it: instead of defining nonsense, we diagnose it.
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laugh.,120
These familiar examples operate on the same principles as literary nonsense,
which, like them, endorses a tyranny of the signifier over the signified; this tyranny is
their common denominator, or 'comedy nominator' as the Wake would have it (FW,
283.7). Both nonsense writer and comedian know that every surface word can be
manipulated at the expense of internal congruity and semantic integrity; in this sense,
both are reverse Rumpelstiltskins, determinedly weaving golden 'somethings' back into
straw 'nothings'. Carroll's craftsmanship and delivery of these nothings is, as we shall
see, exemplary; and Joyce, to quote Flann O'Brien's Sergeant Pluck, is 'the heir to his
nullity and all his nothings.,121
The nonsense-humour overlap. forms the rationale for this chapter. Section one
will focus on the dual structure of the comic - the joke as a dichotomy between
'something' and 'nothing', and how this is staged in the bantering but combative
dialogues between the double acts which populate the works of both Carroll and Joyce.
The hostility and exclusionism identified by Freud as the dark underbelly of the human
comic impulse is examined in section two, particularly in relation to the treatment of
outsiders in Joyce, Carroll and Lear. A treatise on I 'humour noir and the bad pun
concludes the chapter, moving from Carroll's 'illstarred punsters', through Myles na
gCopaleen's notorious 'Keats and Chapman' sketches, to the pun-infatuated jokescape
of Finnegans Wake.
1.NONSENSE DOUBLE ACTS
'All forces occur in pairs, and these two forces are equal in magnitude
and opposite in direction. '
120 Cicero, 1970. On Oratory and Orators (tr. J.S. Watson). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 157.
121 Flann O'Brien, 1993. The Third Policeman. London: Flamingo, 59.
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- Newton's Third Law of Motion.
Lewis Carroll's literary double acts provide us with some of the most memorable,
endearing, and iconic figures in the canon. Two observations can be made of them with
confidence: all his most famous duos are cruel to each another, and all are comic. All
are also firmly pair-bonded. Tweedledum and Tweedledee spend half their time
reinventing logic and reciting humorous verse, and the other half competing for
attention and staging battles over broken toys. The Walrus and the Carpenter, creations
and alter-egos of the Tweedle brothers, walk 'close at hand' (originally ihand-in-hand'
(Haughton, 159)) through a Daliesque terrain of masterful comic absurdism, but fight
bitterly over their haul of oysters. The Hatter and the March Hare, and their Looking-
glass incarnations Hatta and Haigha, are playful yet bickering, while the Lion and the
Unicorn exchange nonsensical pleasantries in between 'fighting for the crown'
(Haughton, 198). As a general rule in Carroll, where there is comedy there is combat
and vice versa. Equally, if a Carrollian pair is not actively antagonistic, they are unlikely
to be remotely comic - take Sylvie and Bruno, whose relationship is all good manners
and treacly mutual affection, and whose two limp narratives altogether lack bite.122
What is it about the comic couple, then, that makes them so confrontational? We
can agree that not every confrontation between two real or fictional foes is funny; actual
fights tend to be clumsy, undignified, and dully routine, and any laughter they might
inspire through their own ham-fisted ineptitude would be unintentional and unwelcome.
And yet the inverse of this equation is much cloudier: there is, I contend, an element of
combat in every comic couple in nonsense. What is more, that Joyce's clowning double
acts in particular share a template with far more portentous historical pairs (Cain and
Abel, Jacob and Esau) suggests that there is something not only unhierarchical but
anthropologically inevitable about the warring pseudocouple. It goes without saying that
while they seem uniquely at home in a nonsense climate, antagonistic double acts were
not invented by Joyce or indeed Carroll; they have always existed. We see them in
Greek, Roman, and Egyptian myth; in the conflicting twins of Plautus; in Chaucer's
122 The two Sylvie and Bruno books are a disappointment to most Alice readers for this reason; the
babyishness and sentimentality of its central characters can be hard to take, as can the flaccid and
disorganised excuse for a plot. The books are, however, a veritable treasure trove of ideas, aesthetic
experiments, and scientific speculations, and if treated as a compendium of Carroll's impressive
philosophical intuitions and theories are enlightening and at times astonishing documents.
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squabbling chickens; in the knockabout shows of medieval carnivals and royal court
fools, and later in the circus and the Music Hall. After Carroll, we see wrangling
pseudocouples in Flaubert's ill-starred dilettantes Bouvard and Pecuchet; in Beckett's
glorious procession of paired-off tramps; in Nabokov's shady Doppelgangers; and of
course in a varied troupe of television and radio acts, from Morecombe and Wise to
Mitchell and Webb, and not forgetting Peter Cook's and Dudley Moore's Derek and
Clive, whose recorded dialogues turn on self-perpetuating mutual abuse. Given its
history, it seems that the comic, combative double act is something of a cultural
monument.
With this whistle-stop tour of the history of the double act in mind, I want to
tum to Carroll's and Joyce's own particular brand of it, and to what exactly the double
act has to do with the structure of the Kantian 'incongruous' joke. Both Joyce and
Carroll emphasise and exploit the double nature of the joke, using it to generate the
vaudevillean dialogues and comic contrasts between the character-duos that feature
throughout their respective oeuvres. Carroll and Joyce were, in their separate ways, very
much aware of how the joke's dual structure lends itself to dialogic duels, and in their
writing consistently matched the internal contrasts in the joke's structure with the
external contests of similarly clashing pairs of characters. For both Carroll's Tweedle
brothers, the typical identical-antithetical twin set, and their successors, Shem and
Shaun, jesting and jousting are the same, while they themselves are at once
incompatible and interchangeable. For both pairs, their paradoxical state is writ large in
their 'brother battles', when, even as their incompatibility is staged in boisterous brawls,
their interchangeability is exposed in their vertiginous blurring of identities.
We might view Shem and his double-cum-nemesis Shaun, who borrow from the
Tweedle template more than once in the Wake ('from tweedledeedumms down to
twiddledeedees' (FW, 258.23-4)), as reconfigured and updated versions of the
Tweedles; they are more complex, they are more historically heavyweight, and there is,
in general, more at stake in their arguments. Unlike Carroll's, Joyce's sets of enemy-
twins take their place on a spectrum of historical double acts which ranges from biblical
adversaries to vaudevillian stooges (a combination which itself seems 'collateral and
incompatible,' to steal a line from Louis MacNeice).123The greater part of their
complexity can be put down to the gigantic cross-cultural palimpsest Shem and Shaun
123 Louis MacNeice, 200', 'Snow', in Collected Poems (ed. Peter McDonald). London: Faber and Faber,
24.
85
represent; in the Wake, they are to be read as the last in a line of historical and literary
double acts but also, because somewhere inside them grapple Cain and Abel, the first.
And yet, for all their complexity and grandiosity, they remain like the Tweedles
clownishly simple: they are for and about boisterous combat, joke-telling and absurd
debates. They are a physical endorsement for the hurnan sense of hurnour, defined by
Christopher Bollas as that 'which takes pleasure in the contradictory movements of two
objects.,124 They are stock-in-trade nonsense characters - funny, many-voiced,
contradictory, and 'serious at playing around' .125
While the Wakean templates are perhaps the most fully-flexed examples of
dialogic war and jest, it's important to remember that comic couples crop up
everywhere in Joyce. The miching schoolboys in 'An Encounter' are typical prototypes,
where the sensitive and bookish narrator stands in contrast to the bold, blunt Mahony.
From this early hingeing of high and low, shown in the antagonistic friendship between
the shy intellectual and the charismatic buffoon, we can trace all Joyce's later pairings,
which could be read as denser reworkings of 'An Encounter"s boyhood double act.
Examples of joking pairs from Joyce's pre-Wake output provide a useful guide to Shem
and Shaun's more fraught and complex relationship, not least because these comic
precursors are very often present in the multi-layered and dizzyingly intertextual brother
battles of the Wake. After our doubling Dubliners, then, we meet Stephen Dedalus, who
as he matures often assurnes the role of the suffering straight guy to his companion's
merciless joker: in A Portrait, we contrast the scholarly Stephen with the groin-rubbing
Lynch; in Ulysses, the sombre Stephen with Mulligan's wise-cracking clown.
The dialogues between these pairs are jokey, but not bantering. They are funny
not because both characters quip and bounce witticisms off one another, a method more
in line with the contemporary mode of dialogic hurnour we know from cartoons and
sitcoms; they are funny in the more traditional, vaudevillean style, where one half of the
duo is straight-faced and serious, struggling to hold his position against the torrent of
gags and giggles launched at him from his buffoonish counterpart. Stephen's lecture to
Lynch on aesthetics towards the end of A Portrait more than demonstrates my point: as
Stephen stresses the perfect stasis of the aesthetic emotion, which causes the mind to be
'arrested and raised above desire and loathing,' Lynch's mind is mired quite literally in
124 Christopher Bollas, 1995. Cracking Up: The Workof UnconsciousExperience. London: Routledge,
244.
125 Fernando Pessoa, 2002. TheBook 0/Disquiet. London: Penguin, 121.
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memories of pornographic graffiti and cow dung (AP, 222-3). Stephen's role in this
lecture, though he is not aware of it, is not to teach Lynch or tease an engaged response
out of him, but simply to feed him lines, which Lynch can then reduce to his preferred
form of lewd humour: '_ You would not write your name ... across the hypotenuse of a
rightangled triangle,' says Stephen. '_ No ... give me the hypotenuse of the Venus of
Praxiteles,' says Lynch. 'Let us take woman,' says Stephen. 'Let us take her!' says
Lynch (AP, 225-6). Mulligan's role in 'Telemachus' is markedly similar, where a
solemn Stephen, recast by Mulligan as a rather unsuitable 'Kinch', is thwarted in his
attempts to take himself seriously by Mulligan's relentless mockery. When Stephen, in
his seriousness, invokes a servant's cracked lookingglass as a symbol for Irish art, his
efforts are cheapened by Mulligan, in his churlishness, having proposed 'a new art
colour for our Irish poets: snotgreen' (U, 5).
The meeting and sparring of high and low, as seen in these exchanges, is
probably the most common and universal contrast in Joyce's work, and the one most
effectively used for comedy. Often it is made to imply a battle between related contrasts
- order and chaos, the sublime and the profane, the profound and the trivial, etc. What
better way to write about these powerful oppositions than to have them personified by
clashing characters; what better way to stage this war of opposites than by having those
characters enter into a battle of wits; and what better way to show their complementarity
and altogether complicate the situation than to have those characters sometimes fuse,
exchange, or reverse? All these objectives come together in the Wake, more strongly
and more completely than in the previous works, and at times quite problematically.
The question is how these oppositions relate to the comic. Joyce was, as we
know, an enthusiastic subscriber to grand theories of celestial unification and terrestrial
opposition _ this is the most important lesson he took from Giordano Bruno. Shem and
Shaun embody a state of earthly disparity, occasionally seeming to fuse into a kind of
mongrel approximation of Bruno's theory of 'dualism' as Joyce called it - only to part
again on less than polite terms. We find one especially tidy example of this in Jarl van
Hoother's 'two little jiminies ... Tristopher and Hilary (FW, 21);' that is, geminis Shem
and Shaun as distillations of Bruno's aphoristic line: 'In tristitia hilaris hilaritate tristis'
(in sadness hilarity and hilarity sadness).126 The argument here is that everything
contains its counterthing; as Borges wrote in his story "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius': 'a
126 Quoted in William York Tindall, 1950. James Joyce, His Way of Interpreting the Modern World.
London: Scribner, 86.
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book which does not also contain its counterbook is considered incomplete.' 127 Later in
the Wake the interpenetrativeness of Tristopher and Hilary is again represented when we
find the Porter parents 'weeping like fun ... for they were never happier, huhu, than
when they were miserable, haha' (FW, 558.24-5). It is hard not to think of Beckett's
great line from Endgame here, when Nell says to Hamm: 'Nothing is funnier than
unhappiness, I'll grant you that.' 128
So, we find in Joyce's many oppositions a degree of Bruno-esque 'Bimutualism.
Interchangability.... Consummation. Interpenetrativeness.', to quote Shem's margin in
the Nightlessons chapter (308, 7-13). But, of course, it is not quite as simple as that, for
mergence is a dubious activity in the Wake and it is hard to say if fusion is ever really
accomplished, even when the brothers seem at their least distinguishable (as for
example at the end of the Butt and Taff episode). It was Harry Levin who first advanced
the theory that the twins' identities ultimately merge, and early Wakeans such as
Campbell and Robinson and William York Tindall more or less upheld this assumption.
It has since been thrown into doubt, by Grace Eckley, Richard Beckman, Kimberley
Devlin and many others, whose various arguments against the idea of 'mergence' are
extended with varying degrees of success (Eckley's is based on subtle close readings of
the text; Devlin's on a sometimes heavy-handed reading of the twins' relationship as a
staging of the dichotomy between self and other). My own argument it that part of the
reason for the twins' overall failure to fuse is tied to the importance of the joke structure
as an organising principle of their relationship. Returning briefly to Kant, we remember
how the joke consists of a pair of opposites - at its simplest, a something and a nothing.
There can be a degree of interplay between the two, but they remain fundamentally
distinct.
Often when Joyce yokes his favourite opposites - the high and the low - outside
of a comic context, he does so in order to bestow upon the low plane something of the
significance and respectability of the high. (We see this in the Wakean children's
twilight games, where frivolous high jinks meet and merge with theological clout).
Inside a comic context, however, the juxtaposition of opposites is not necessarily meant
to be merged or resolved: the clash is part of the point. The components of the joke are
required to remain in a state of conflict or contradiction, or as Kant would have it,
127 Jorge Luis Borges, 1962. "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius', in Labyrinths and Other Stories (ed, Donald A.
Yates and James E. Irby): New York: New Directions Publishing, 27-42 (37).
128 Beckett, 1986. Endgame, in Complete Dramatic Works. London: Faber and Faber, 101.
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incongruity: it is out of this that the humour arises. In the children's games there is a
cross-pollination at work between seriousness and silliness: distinctions are blurred,
hierarchies levelled. In the joke, such clouding of distinctions is to be avoided. The joke
must retain a 'neatness of identifications', to misuse a line from Beckett; 129 for if the
initial clash of opposites loses its sting, the humour risks being lost with it.
The conceptual clash around which the joke is built is, as I've said, fleshed out
in the Wake into a more candid clash between two principal speakers - quarrelsome
brothers who, in their role as vaudevilleans, become the joke's teller and listener,
physically manifesting the contrasts on which the joke is based. When Margot Norris
writes that 'the social teleology of humour, the joker's need for the laughter and
endorsement of a listener ... is not present in the Wake', she is only half_right;130
Wakean humour and laughter is indeed generally 'unpremeditated and spontaneous',
but this doesn't mean that the Wakean characters are oblivious of the social rules of
joke-telling, or that they don't, in general, stick to them. Even the drinkers and roisterers
of Book 2.3 know that 'they were abound to loose a laugh ... as the leashed they might
do when they felt ... their joke was coming home to them' (323). In other words, when
they know the joke is coming to an end, the least they might do is laugh, to keep the
social contract between teller and listener. The children keep a similar contract in the
same chapter, and when the 'Knock knock' jokes are told follow the required question-
answer protocol: 'Knock knock. War's where! ... The Twwinns. Knock knock. Who's
without! ... An apple' (FW, 330).
That jokes and riddles are so much a part of the Wake's thematic and stylistic
furniture could be seen as a consequence of the importance of Bruno's dualism to
Joyce's overall scheme; for few other modes of discourse manage to distil and embody
such fundamental oppositions as high and low, light and dark, something and nothing.
Riddles and jokes both demand a Kantian incongruous answer to what might seem like
a sensible question, and both are 'incorrigibly plural,' to quote MacNeice's 'Snow' once
more: double both in their structure and their transmission. The joking, bickering
pseudocouple is, as I have said, a theatrical convention going back centuries - from the
antithetical twins of Plautus's plays, to Shakespeare's versions of them in A Comedy of
Errors, Twelfth Night and so on, to Beckett's Vladimir and Estragon, Hamm and Clov,
129 Beckett, 1983. 'Dante ... Bruno. Vico .. Joyce', in Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writingsand a Dramatic
Fragment (ed. Ruby Cohn). London: John Calder, 19.
130 Margot Norris, 1978."I'heDecentered Universe of Finnegans Wake:A Structuralist Analysis.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 92.
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Nagg and Nell et al. Given this (specifically) theatrical history, it is no coincidence that
when the Wake twins' comic dialogues are at their most extended and unpolluted, they
are written as if scripted (as with Mutt and Jute, Justius and Mercius, Muta and Juva), or
are performed for the stage (see Glugg and Chuff) or screen (Butt and Taff). David
Hayman has described the interplay between Stephen and Mulligan in Ulysses as
'stageworthy.t+" and this certainly seems to be what Joyce is aiming for in the Wake's
most dialogic scenes: a distillation of opposites and character types which does away
with description and relies for its effect on direction, gesture, and dialogue, for
maximum clarity and entertainment value. The cut-and-thrust repartee between the
Wake's opposing pairs is invariably a lot stronger, funnier, and indeed more
'stageworthy' than that of Richard and Robert in Joyce's only play, Exiles, despite the
Wake's linguistic obstacles.
Mutt and Jute are the first vaudevillian couple we meet in the Wake to have their
dialogue laid out in script fashion, based as they are on a pair of American comic-strip
characters, Mutt and Jeff. Their scene takes place just after nightfall, and is initiated by
an invitation to 'swop hats and excheck strong verbs weak each other' (FW, 16.8-9)
(hat-swapping being by-the-bye a distinctly vaudevillian convention, memorably used
to great comic effect in Beckett's Waiting jar Godot and the Marx Brothers' Duck
Soup). Jute, as questioner, propels the dialogue, allowing Mutt to deliver a war-themed
historical lecture to him. Their speech is marked not just by Anglo-Saxon cadence but
by habitual doublings. Their script ends with a sign-off steeped in what Mutt calls
'sound seemetery' [symmetry]:
Mutt. - Ore you astoneaged, jute you?
Jute. - Oye am thonthorstrok, thing mud. (FW, 18)
Echoing one another's phrasing, they also find themselves reflected 'Face to Face,' with
a typographical trick stressing not just their doubling but their mirroring. (They reappear
in the same attitude in Book 2.2: 'F F, (at gaze, respecting, fourteenth baronet, meet
[Mutt], altrettanth bancorot, chaff [Jeff])' (FW, 266».
Inevitably, in the Wake's 'multimirror megaron of retumingties,' Jute and Mutt
return as Muta and Juva as dawn approaches (Fw, 582.20). Here, their roles are
reversed (or mirrored), and it is Muta, the doubting Shem, who does the questioning,
J3J David Hayman, 'Forms of Folly in Joyce: A Study of Clowning in Ulysses' in ELH (vo1.34, n.2, June
1967),260-83.
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and Juva, the priestly Shaun, who provides the certainties. Again they engage in 'sound
symmetry'; sounds from Juva's mouth are repeated and distorted in Muta's, so that
'Dorminus master' becomes 'Diminussed aster', 'porters of bonzos' becomes ' Pongo
da Banza!' and so on. Of course, this isn't quite symmetry: the phrases are non-identical
pairs. The verbal distortion at work is strikingly similar to that of a pair of
Shakespearian twins, Dromio and Dromio, whose speech in A Comedy of Errors
frequently takes the form of statement and warped echo, for example:
Dromio of Syracuse: Maud, Bridget, Marian, Cicel, Gillian, Ginn!
Dromio of Ephesus: Mome, malt-horse, capon, coxcomb, idiot, patch!132
There are two parallel interpretations to be made of this kind of 'sound symmetry': one
is that in mirroring one another's speech, the Wakean twins become mirror versions of
one another, as Lewis Carroll's Tweedledum and Tweedledee are,133and as the Dromio
twins are when one says to the other: 'Methinks you are my glass, and not my
brother.'134 The other interpretation is that, as rivals, one twin is deliberately copying
the other, imitating his speech and stealing his lines, as Shaun accuses Shem of doing in
Book 3.1., as Tweedledum accuses Tweedledee of doing in Through the Looking-glass,
and as one Dromio laments when he addresses the other: 'Oh villain! Though hast
stolen both mine office and my name.' 135 While it is certainly quite a paradox, both
interpretations are correct, or 'twyly velleid' (valid) as Muta would say, and both are
borne out in the complex relationship between Shem and Shaun, who as Maren Linett
has pointed out, are 'at once complementary, equal and opposite, and an unequal pair
dominated by Shaun. ,136
It's no coincidence, either, that the Jute/Mutt-JuvaiMuta sketches appear at the
beginning and end of the Wake, those times nearest to twilight. It is telling that the twins
are 'twyly velleid' - veiled in twilight: for twilight is a classic both-and-neither state, an
example of maxima meeting minima, to paraphrase Beckett's essay on Work in
Progress. It is thus the perfect neutral ground for a meeting of antagonistic twins, where
132 Shakespeare, 1905. The Comedy of Errors, in Complete Works.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 106.
133 Martin Gardner conjectures that the brothers are enantiomorphs - mirror image forms of each other -
and Tenniei's illustrations corroborate the theory, bar the one conspicuous error that sees the Tweedles'
names sewn asymmetrically on the left of both their collars (Gardner, 191, n. 3).
134 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Brrors, 118.
135 Ibid., 106.
136 Maren Linnet, 'The Jew's Text: "Shem the Penman" and "Shaun the Post,'" in James Joyce Quartley
(vo1.45, no. 2, Winter 2008), 263·80.
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neither the light-representing Shaun nor the dark-signifying Shem has advantage (it is
also, for the same reason, the perfect time for a contest between an Angel and a Devil,
in the children's twilight games of 2.1). Twilight is also the most common time for a
Gothic hero to come face to face with his double in the German Doppelganger fiction of
the nineteenth century, in Dostoyevsky's novella The Double, and in the stories of
Edgar Allen Poe. The light-yet-dark, dark-yet-light twilight condition is also
comparable to the strange climate of 'The Walrus and the Carpenter':
The sun was shining on the sea,
Shining with all his might:
He did his very best to make
The billows smooth and bright-
And this was odd, because it was
The middle of the night.
The moon was shining sulkily,
Because she thought the sun
Had got no business to be there
After the day was done -
'It's very rude of him, , she said,
'To come and spoil the fun! '
That this 'both-and-nothing' time of day was Carroll's chosen stage for his great double
act ballad is a telling coincidence.
In a fascinating note to Harriet Shaw Weaver, Joyce transcribes the Burmese for
twilight, 'Nyi - ako - moo - thi - ta - thi'. Joyce tells Weaver that this translates
literally as '(the time when) younger brother (meets) elder brother, does not recognise
him but yet recognises him.' 137 This simultaneous recognition and misrecognition has
great comic potential - when Shem and Shaun seem sporadically to merge, perhaps
each is merely mistaking his other for himself, a bit like another famous vaudeville skit,
the mirror gag. Used to great comic effect in the Marx Brothers' Duck Soup, the mirror
137 Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, 23 October 1928, in L, 273. In the same letter, Joyce confesses that
'the only thing I have wn:tten in the last 4 months [is] a short description titled 'TWILIGHT OF
BLINDNESS AND MADNESS DESCENDS ON SWIFT.'
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gag involves one character looking into his mirror, not knowing that it has in fact been
smashed and the reflection he thinks he is seeing is actually another man apeing his
every move. Joyce makes much of this in the split personality of Issy, whose mirror
twin is a projection of a Christine Beauchamp-inspired other. With the brothers though,
it is less a sign of psychological fragmentation than of their interchangeable status, as
when they swap hats as Mutt and Jute in another Marx Brothers-esque routine. This
interchangeability has its roots in the twins' infancy; it is conjectured that they were
exchanged in the cradle: 'This one once upon awhile was the other but this is the other
one nighadays' (FW, 561.5-6).
This babyhood switch, which marks up the brothers' interchangeability, is a
manoeuvre repeated in their battles, as in their fencing match as Butt and Taff:
As he was queering his shoolthers. So was I. And as I was cleansing my
fausties. So was he. And as way ware puffing our blowbags. Souwouyou.
Come, thrust! Go, parry! Dvoinabrathran, dare!
[ ] Exchange, reverse.
[ ] And each was wrought with his other. And his continence fell
(FW, 251.36-252.14).
As Sam Slote has written of this passage, 'In the blur of battle [Shem and Shaun] are
indistinct in their exchange and reverse'; during their fight, one becomes an
'antagonistic reflection' of the other - the recognisable-yet-unrecognisable mirror-twin,
the collateral-yet-incompatible, comically warring pseudocouple. The slippage between
pronouns of the above passage, where 'he' morphs to'!', which morphs to 'we' and
then to 'you', is another common feature in passages relating to Shem and Shaun, and
bears a striking resemblance to the climactic fight scene in Nabokov's Lolita. Nabokov
is a writer obsessed with doubles, a fact he put down to his bilingualism, but which I
suspect he also inherited from Joyce. When, towards the ends of Lolita, Humbert
Humbert wrestles with his nemesis-cum-double Clare Quilty, the pronouns become
suddenly fluid: 'He rolled over me. I rolled over him. We rolled over me. They rolled
over him. We rolled over us' .138 This Shem-and-Shaun-esque scuffle over the Issy-like
Lolita: is acutely but darkly comic. Its structure resembles that of a joke: the tension, or
'something,' of the protracted (and rather slapstick) scuffle giving way to the resolution:
the round 'nothing' of the bullet hole in Quilty's head. In this scene, as in numerous
138 Vladimir Nabokov, 2000. Lolita. London: Penguin, 299.
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Wakean duels, we see how most the brutal conflict might share its basic structure with
the most flippant gag - man slaughter morphing to man's laughter, as punned in the
Wake (FW, 433.29-30). Only by emphasising this connection can Joyce justify aligning
such great grave Biblical foes as Cain and Abel with a couple of comic-strip clowns.
What is particular to the verbal and conceptual structure of the joke is also particular to
the form and substance of Shem and Shaun's relationship. In the combat and comedy of
his 'doubleparalleled twixtytwins' (FW, 286, fn.4), Joyce is able to replay historical
battles loaded with gunpowder and gravitas, all the while shoring up his 'jests, jokes,
jigs andjorums for the Wake' (FW, 221.26).
2. 'SO THEY SMASHED THAT OLD MAN WITH A GONG':
HOBBESIAN HUMOUR IN NONSENSE
We have seen how comic dialogues and jokes thrive on meanness; how comic duos are
locked into their endless agon of fist-fights and wars of words, and how one loves
nothing more than an opportunity to laugh at the other's expense. The structure of these
contests, though, is dependent on the parity of their contestants; theirs is the humour of
incongruity, of that which 'takes pleasure in the contradictory movements of two
objects'. It is the absurdist, well-matched, incongruous face-off of Cabbages v. Kings.
Where a given pair is unequal in some way, though, the species of humour can no
longer be understood in the Kantian way. The knockabout, mutual meanness grows
nastier, more brutish - in short, Hobbesian. Laughter for Hobbes is, famously, the
'sudden glory [caused by] the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves': a pessimistic vision of
laughter as the expression of mankind's postlapsarian superiority and spite. Centuries
later, Baudelaire was to repeat the Hobbesian position, proposing in his misogelastic
essay 'On the Essence of Laughter' that 'laughter comes from the idea of one's own
superiority.' He scorns such 'pride and delusion', linking this 'Satanic' laughter with
the mad, whom (he generalizes) 'have an excessively over-developed idea of their own
superiority.,139 Laughter for both Hobbes and Baudelaire is the apanage of the Fall, a
139 Baudelaire (ed. and tI\ns. Jonathan Mayne), 1995. 'On the Essence of Laughter', in The Painter of
Modern Life and Other Essays. London: Phaidon, 147-65 (152). Compare this aphorism from
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damning indictment of our moral paucity and ignoble motives.
It is a joyless outlook, but one we cannot afford to ignore, as nonsense humour is
teeming with the bullies, toughs, and mobs who so capably enforce the Hobbesian
position. The menacing 'they' of many of Edward Lear's limericks furnish us with
some classic examples, where social intolerance of an eccentric protagonist inevitably
leads to mockery and violence:
There was an Old Man with a gong,
Who bumped at it all the day long;
But they called out, '0 law! you're a horrid old bore!'
So they smashed that Old Man with a gong (CNV, 160).
And, near identically:
There was an Old Man of Whitehaven,
Who danced a quadrille with a Raven;
But they said - 'It's absurd, to encourage this bird!'
So they smashed that Old Man of Whitehaven (CNV, 172).140
Carrollian echoes of quadrilles and ravens aside, the reflex aggression displayed here by
the clamouring mob will be recognized by any social psychologist as a fundamental
feature of crowd mentality, and by anyone familiar with the superiority theory of
humour as a textbook example of Hobbes's position, where an amorphous 'they' made
strong by their conformity jeers at a subject made weak by his eccentricity.
As Jean-Jacques Lecercle has pointed out in The Philosophy of Nonsense
(though not in relation to humour), many of the finest examples of Lear's mob-menaced
limericks are concerned about utterance in particular - not just doing the wrong thing,
but saying it.141 For instance:
There was an Old Man of Ibreem,
Who suddenly threatened to scream;
But they said, 'If you do, we will thump you quite blue,
Baudelaire's fellow Black Humorist, Lictenberg: 'The highest level that can be reached by a mediocre but
experienced mind is a talent for uncovering the weaknesses of those greater than itself' (Andre Breton
(ed.), trans. Mark Polizzotti, 2009. Anthology of Black Humour. London: Telegram, p.63).
140 George Orwell, commenting on this limerick, noted its distinctly Orwellian atmosphere: 'To smash
somebody just for dancing a quadrille with a raven is exactly the kind of thing that 'They' would do.'
(Orwell (ed. John Carey) 2002. 'Nonsense Poetry: TheLear Omnibus edited by R. L. Megroz' in Essays.
London: Everyman, 973"1 (976». .
141 Lecercle, ThePhilosophy of Nonsense, 107-9.
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You disgusting Old Man ofIbreem!' (CNV, 375).
The vocal urges of yet another 'old man' are similarly discouraged here:
There was an Old Man at a Station,
Who made a promiscuous oration;
But they said, 'Take some snuff - You have talk'd quite enough,
You afflicting Old Man at a Station!' (CNV, 338).
To be plied with snuff is, on balance, a fate more agreeable than being thumped blue,
but the crowd's motive and tone are the same in both poems. The verses are rather
painful to read, like the pathetic crux of Lear's (even more?) biographical poem 'How
pleasant to know Mr Lear!' (not forgetting T.S. Eliot's not-so-pathetic parody of it).142
Though their tone is matter-of-fact, the limericks actively invite our sympathy for their
perennial subject who, in the way of all martyred eccentrics, is solitary, misunderstood,
and somewhat feeble. These characteristics, and the hostile, Hobbesian consequences
they bring about, call to mind the fate of a fellow literary outsider, Leopold Bloom,
whose own 'promiscuous orations' in the Cyclops chapter of Ulysses provoke his
already hostile company into a Learesque display of violence and ridicule.
The Cyclops chapter itself, though not a typically nonsense text, has many
nonsense traits: it is full of verbal slips and tricks, jokes and Rabelaisian reversals, and
we need only note a few examples to get a feel for the chapter's Carrollian comic
overlay. The characters' wordplay is as witty and sophisticated as Humpty Dumpty's,
for instance when Alf entreats Joe not to 'cast your nasturtiums on my character' (U,
307), or when he asks who made allegations about Bloom and Joe admits 'I'm the
alligator' (U, 323). 'Could a swim duck?' is the narrator's answer to the question of
142 In this poem we see Lear, like the Old Men of his limericks, piteously under siege:
When he walks in a waterproof white
The children run after him so!
Calling out, -- 'He's come out in his night-
gown, that crazy old Englishman, -- OJ'
He weeps by the side of the ocean,
He weeps on the top of the hill;
He purchases pancakes and lotion,
And chocolate shrimps from the mill (CNV, 429).
Eliot's version is more upbeat, but lexically faithful to Lear's brand of nonsense: 'How unpleasant to
meet Mr. Eliot! / Witb a bobtail cur / In a coat of fur / And a porpentine cat / And a wopsical bat: / How
unpleasant to meet Mr. Eliot!' (Eliot, 1985. Collected Poems 1909-1962. London: Faber and Faber, 151).
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whether he could manage another pint (U, 300), and the lexicon, like that of the games
we studied in the previous chapter, is rich with puns, codes, private jokes and Freudian
trap-doors. When Bloom 'slopes in' to the pub, affable but uneasy, the stage is set for a
deft and unnerving Hobbesian exposition. Immediately he is wary of Garryowen, the
citizen's glowering dog, and of the baser, bullying instincts of the company we can
understand the dog to represent. While Bloom launches bravely into the first of his
many unfortunate orations (or 'codologies'), Garryowen is 'smelling him all the time,'
as the narrator cruelly observes: 'I'm told those Jewies does have a sort of a queer odour
coming off them for dogs' (U, 292).
Bloom's problem here is on a split-level. It is obvious to the reader that Bloom's
outsider status is marked primarily by his manner: his speech is gentler, his arguments
subtler, his attitudes more generous than those of the drinkers. The drinkers themselves,
however, cannot permit this account of the discrepancy: simply put, it would make them
look bad. Bloom, for them, is an outsider not because of his qualities but because of his
'faults': he is a Jew, and he is a scrounger, and he is a bore. Reducing him in this way,
they collectively perform a Hobbesian self-deception: 'it is incident most to them, that
are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in
their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men.' 143 For the narrator, it is
a purely reflex reaction to his irritation at Bloom's 'know-all' conversational style; this
is why, amidst all the uncharitable assertions and mockeries that prowl through his
psyche for the remainder of the chapter, he never once questions the motives behind his
mean-spiritedness. His resentments are automatic - unexamined, unreconstructed,
Garryowenesque - and the escalating hostility of the episode is similarly mechanistic.
It is this lack of self-reflexiveness that leads the narrator and his companions to
warp reality to make it correspond with their own negative impressions of Bloom,
which are by this time collective, calcified, and self-perpetuating. The pivotal example
of this is of course Lenehan's fatal assumption that Bloom has sneaked off from the pub
to collect substantial winnings from a racing bet, an assumption based on an earlier
misunderstanding between Bloom and Bantam Lyons. What is remarkable is not
Lenehan's assumption itself, which is permissible if ungenerous, but the speed with
which it attains the status of hard fact. No sooner has Lenehan stated his suspicion than
the company agree that Bloom is a 'dark horse' with a fortune of five pounds in his
143 Hobbes, 125.
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miser's pocket (U, 321). Less significant but similar injustices are done to Bloom
throughout the chapter: when Bloom commends the antitreating league, for instance, the
narrator mocks him inwardly: 'Gob, he'd let you pour all manner of drink down his
throat before you'd ever see the froth of his pint' (D, 298). This remark is not only
unfair, but from the evidence we have seen, untrue; when Bloom first enters the bar and
is offered a drink by Joe, he declines, consenting when pressed to accept a cigar instead.
Is this really the behaviour of a notorious sponger?144 The cigar itself is also used as a
stick to beat Bloom with, when the narrator mentions 'his twopenny stump that he
cadged off of Joe' (297). The cigar was, of course, not cadged, but settled for somewhat
reluctantly: when Joe offered Bloom a drink, Bloom said 'he wouldn't and couldn't and
excuse him and no offence and all to that and then he said well he'd just take a cigar.'
At the time, predictably, that answer itself met with a sarcastic reception in the mind of
the narrator: 'Gob, he's a prudent character and no mistake' (D, 291).
It's clear that Bloom cannot win. The impoverished and impercipient attitude of
the narrator and his company towards Bloom is no more sophisticated, and no less
cheaply spiteful, than that of Stephen's merciless schoolmates at Clongowes (a link
hinted at in the episode's long roll-call of saints, one of whom is listed as'S. Stephen
Protomartyr' (U, 324». The Clongowes scene in question turns on the matter of whether
or not the young Stephen kisses his mother before bed. When Stephen answers, 'I do,'
he is laughed at; when he then answers, 'I don't,' he is again laughed at. The episode
provokes a physical reaction in Stephen: 'He felt his whole body hot and confused in a
moment. What was the right answer to the question? He had given two and still Wells
laughed' (AP, 9). Stephen, in his innocence, thinks Wells must be demonstrating a
grammatical paradox, but of course Wells and his cronies, like the Cyclopean mockers,
are not so high-minded as that; all they are demonstrating is a symptom of the
Hobbesian model of scornful laughter; the Darwinian dominion of the strong over the
weak; the Learesque cruelty of 'they. '
If we return to Bloom's specific predicament, though, we will see that we have
neglected to address an important aspect of the problem: Bloom's own culpability.
However much we would like to absolve Bloom from blame by diagnosing the
144 In 'Oxen of the Sun' too, when Bloom is surrounded by boisterous and drunken company, he alone
remains sober, taking a drink out of politeness and furtively redistributing most of it: 'And the learning
knight let pour for childe Leopold a draught and halp thereto the while all they that were there drank
every each. And childe Deopold did up his beaver for to pleasure him ... and anon full privily he voided
the more part in his neighbour glass and his neighbour nist not of his wile' (U,370).
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psychopathology of a brutish rabble, we cannot ignore his own social naivety, which
exacerbates his situation considerably. Going back to Lear, we can admit that the
clamouring mobs of the limericks, for all their severity, are not entirely unprovoked; the
wanton banging of gongs 'all day long' would try anyone's patience. Similarly,
Bloom's insistence on careful, empirical debate, 'with his but don't you see and but on
the other hand', is clearly not apt for the occasion (U, 293).145 His frustrated attempts to
raise the level of discussion above bawdy jokes, slurs, and gossip grow increasingly
inappropriate, and betray a certain inflexibility in his character; he has gatecrashed a
carnival and tried to make of it a seminar.
There is a famous nonsense scene in which the same thing happens: a well-
spoken and out-of-place stranger arrives halfway through a party, sits down and begins
to find fault with the manners and customs of the merry company. Like Bloom, Alice is
rather more high-minded than the volatile members of the 'Mad Tea-party;' like Bloom,
she is always 'glad to get an opportunity of showing off a little of her knowledge'
(Haughton, 54); like Bloom, she is persistently trying to steer the conversation into
more respectable waters; and like Bloom, her social manner is somewhat awkward and
inflexible, an unfortunate combination to which she adds her own brand of aristocratic
hauteur. At first, she is not even welcome at the table:
"'No room! No room!" they cried out when they saw Alice coming.
"There's plenty of room!" said Alice indignantly, and she sat down in a
large arm-chair at one end of the table' (Haughton, 60).
Timid Bloom, of course, would never have sat down uninvited, as the citizen ruefully
observes: '-The strangers. [...]. Our own fault. We let them come in' (U, 310) (the
citizen, of course, at first encouraged Bloom's entrance to the pub with the words
'Come in, come on' (U, 290)). This aside, the events of the mad tea-party chime with
those at Barney Kiernan's in a number of ways. Alice and Bloom are frequently singled
out for teasing, and their efforts to raise the level of dialogue are consistently (and
rudely) interrupted:
145 Robert H ..Bell levels the same charge at Stephen Dedalus, whose priggish behaviour provokes the
(justifiable) 'impatient mockery' of Buck and others. Only 'magnanimous' Bloom is patient with
Stephen, perhaps recognising in him aspects of his own social awkwardness; but Bloom is treated with
'minimal civility for his pains': 'Stephen yawns in Bloom's face and hardly says a word in the shelter;
when he does speak, it is to sing an anti-Semitic ballad, or to talk ... over his host's head, or to renew his
patent on the egotistical 1mblime' (Bell, 1996. Jocoserious Joyce: The Fate of Folly in Ulysses.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 33).
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"Really, now you ask me," said Alice, very much confused, "I
don't think-"
"Then you shouldn't talk," said the Hatter (V, 67).
And for Bloom:
_ You don't grasp my point, says Bloom.What I mean is...
_ Sinn feint Says the Citizen. Sinn fein amhdinl The friends we love
are by our side and the foes we hate before us (U, 293).
Both Alice and Bloom depart the scene beneath a dark cloud. While Bloom's exit is the
more violent this time around, there is a noticeable correlation between his narrow
escape from the hurled biscuit tin and Alice's fraught departure from the Duchess's
house, an environment as hostile and suspicious as Barney Kiernan's, and in which
babies and frying-pans are indiscriminately lobbed about (Haughton, 55). While the
mad tea-party-goers stop short of throwing missiles, they do return to give evidence at
Alice's trial, just as Bloom's tormentors resurface as witnesses and jurors at Bloom's
trial in Circe.
Of course, the members of the mad tea-party are by no means the only
Hobbesian characters in Alice, and neither are they the most extreme. The Caterpillar
chapter conjures the same atmosphere of suspicion and intolerance: "'You!" said the
Caterpillar contemptuously. "Who are yout"' (Haughton, 41). The obsessive interest in
Alice's identity calls to mind similar questions launched accusingly at Bloom, such as
Ned Lambert's: "_ Is he a jew or a gentile or a holy Roman or a swaddler or what the
hell is he? Says Ned. Or who is he?" (U, 323). The Duchess, too, is citizen-like in her
belligerence, and in her ability undermine Alice's 'know-all' tendencies by twisting her
words into threats:
" ... You see the earth takes twenty-four hours to turn round on
its axis-"
"Talking of axes," said the Duchess, "chop off her head!"
(Haughton, 54).146
146By strange coincidence, just as the abrasive, violent Duchess later returns much changed, full of charm
and syrupy affection towards Alice, so the next time we meet the citizen he is 'choked with emotion' as he
glorifies Bloom: 'May the good God bless him!' (U,460).
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The verbal trick the Duchess uses here, which manages triumphantly both to make
Alice's knowledge seem ridiculous, to swing the topic of conversation back to her own
dark preferences, and to make a punning joke, is similar to Alf's (minus the pun) when
Bloom is holding forth on the 'deterrent effect' of capital punishment (note the thematic
overlap, by the way): '_ There's one thing it hasn't a deterrent effect on, says Alf [...J
The poor bugger's tool that's being hanged' (U, 292). Predictably, Bloom proceeds to
account scientifically for this phenomenon, confirming his inability both to read the
situation and to adapt to its bawdy level.
Importantly, despite this irritating habit of Bloom's (and Alice's),147 he
nevertheless inspires sympathy in the reader. Despite their social clumsiness, the dignity
and good manners of Bloom and Alice are preserved, and the reader remains firmly on
their side. In The Philosophy of Nonsense, Lecercle draws on Geoffrey Leech's
'Politeness Principle' to analyse the excessively polite behaviour of Alice towards
characters who are so relentlessly rude to her. He then reverses it to create the
'Selfishness Principle' by which the citizens of Wonderland live, and whose basic
maxim is: 'minimise damage to self, maximise damage to other.' 148While Lecercle
acknowledges that these two behaviours are 'closely linked', he nevertheless proceeds
to analyse them separately, giving examples from Carroll's text and clunkily trying to
decide which of these show the characters 'minimising damage to self and which show
them 'maximising damage to others.' Not only is his analysis uncharacteristically
simplistic, it is fundamentally flawed. By treating each clause of his maxim as a
separate entity, Lecercle ignores the causal relationship between them and fails to
recognise that, in fact, the act of 'maximising damage to other' is a corollary of the
desire to 'minimise damage to self; as Byron put it, 'if! laugh at any mortal thing / 'Tis
that I may not weep.'149 In effect, the 'Selfishness Principle' is just another way of
phrasing the Hobbesian position on laughter; the comic-aggression of the nonsense
troupe is the expression of 'sudden glory,' 'the apprehension of some deformed thing in
another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.' Compelled by the
desire to 'minimise damage' to themselves, and to 'keep themselves in their own
147 A particularly forceful example of Alice's social awkwardness occurs near the beginning of
Wonderland, when, before an audience of mice and birds, she seems unable to check her chatter about her
cat Dinah's 'capital' mouse- and bird-hunting abilities. Inevitably, the company scatters and Alice is left
in tears, 'very lonely and low-spirited', but still with only a limited awareness of her error (21-2; 29-30).
148 Lecercle, 102-4.
149Byron,(ed. Jerome J."McGann), 2008. The Major Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Canto IV,
line 25).
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favour' as Hobbes writes, they set about ruthlessly 'observing the imperfections of other
men': maximising damage to others. ISO Bloom and Alice are victims of this Hobbesian
version of reality: Alice's name is 'stupid' (according to Humpty Dumpty); her face is
'ordinary' and 'not clever' (Humpty Dumpty and Rose); the Mock Turtle calls her a
'simpleton', while the Duchess tells her, "'You don't know much [...] and that's a fact'"
(Haughton, 53). Likewise, Bloom has a 'lardy face'; he is effeminate ('one of those
mixed middlings' (U, 323»; he is not-Irish; he is dull.l5l The unfortunate rigidity of
Bloom's and Alice's attempts at interaction amplifies their isolation, but the pathos of
their predicament rests with the inescapably Hobbesian psychology of their bullies.
Hobbes concludes his analysis by offering the high-minded alternative to the
'sudden glory' of scornful laughter, advising that 'of great minds, one of the proper
works is, to help and free others from scorn.' 152 Perhaps this is what distinguishes Alice
and Bloom most of all from the company which loves to bait them. Bloom's compassion
cuts through the invidious atmosphere of Barney Kiernan's as he speaks above the
mockery of 'that bloody lunatic Breen' to plead for sympathy 'on account of the poor
woman. I mean his wife' (U, 307).153 In 'Oxen of the Sun' he similarly distinguishes
himself, his concern for Mina Purefoy (of whose difficult labour he first hears from Mrs
Breen herself) preventing him from entering into the same jocular spirit as the others.
The company in the Maternity Hospital is altogether more friendly than that of Barney
Kiernan's establishment, but they are scarcely less irreverent, and Bloom is caught
between his social obligation to join in and his awareness of the nearby Mrs Purefoy's
suffering. Bloom's sympathetic nature puts him at odds with the mocking tone of his
150 Hobbes, 125.
151 And in Circe, of course, he is much more than this: 'a wellknown dynamitard, forger, bigamist, bawd
and cuckold and a public nuisance to the citizens of Dublin' (U, 445). Even Bloom gets off relatively
lightly compared to HCE and the 'long list [...J of all abusive names he was called' when he is reviled in
the pub, including 'Firstnighter, Informer, Old Fruit, Yellow Whigger,' and perhaps worst of all, 'Artist'
(FW, 71.05-21).
152 Hobbes, 125.
153Sensitivity and good grace are the qualities Bloom admires in others too. By the time he reaches the
pub, he will not have forgotten Martin Cunningham's kindness to him in the funeral cab that morning,
when the conversation tumed to suicide (a painful topic for the son of a self-poisoner):
- But the worst of all, Mr Power said, is the man who takes his own life.
Martin Cunningham drew out his watch briskly, coughed and put it back.
- The greatest disgrace to have in the family, Mr Power added.
- Temporary insanity of course, Martin Cunningham said decisively. We must take a chartiable
view of it.
- They say a man who does it is a coward, Mr Dedalus said.
- It is not for us to judge, Martin Cunningham said.
Mr Bloom, abobt to speak, closed his lips again. Martin Cunningham's eyes. Looking away now.
Sympathetic human man he is. Intelligent. (U, 93)
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companions, just as it does in the 'Cyclops' episode; but he is no longer on enemy soil,
and the gentle qualities that were mocked in the pub ('Gob, he'd have a soft hand under
a hen' (U, 302» are now celebrated:
And sir Leopold that was the goodliest guest that ever sat in scholars'
hall and that was the meekest man and the kindest that ever laid
husbandly hand under hen ... ' (U, 370).154
Alice, too, is considerate towards her fellow creatures in ways the citizens of
Wonderland and the Looking-glass cannot understand: in Wonderland she consoles a
lonely puppy in the wood, rescues the Duchess's baby from its abusers, hides the
condemned card-men from their executioners, and defends the knave amidst the injustice
of his trial. In Through the Looking-glass, her kindness towards the mentally fragile
White Queen is especially touching, and recalls Bloom's own benevolence to the 'blind
stripling', whom he helps to cross the road (U, 172-3). Harry Blamires describes this act
as 'the impulse ... of the compassionate Jesus-Bloom, and also of the outsider-Bloom,
hungry for companionship and sympathetic towards a fellow outsider.,155 We know from
her preoccupations during the White Queen episode that Alice's motives are similar, her
goodwill both instinctive and tinged with loneliness: "'Only it is so very lonely here!"
Alice said in a melancholy voice; and, at the thought of her loneliness, two large tears
came rolling down her cheeks' (Haughton, 173).
Bloom and Alice, the Hobbesian scapegoats of many a comic scene, are also
Hobbesian saviours of others like them, doing 'proper works' to 'free others from
scorn' .156The situational and behavioural similarities between Alice and Bloom, as
illustrated above, border on the uncanny, and prompt us to ask why nonsense is so in
thrall to the Hobbesian version of humour. Why does one of its most dominant cornic
modes centre around persecution and ridicule? And why is kindness so often made to
154Bloom'spenchantfor explainingscientificphenomenais likewisepositivelyrecast, earninghim the
Bunyanesque moniker'Calmer' ratherthanthe scornful'Know-all'as heuseshisknowledgeof thunderto
soothea fretfulStephen(U, 377).
155 HarryBlamires, 1985. The Bloomsday Book. London:Methuen,74.
156 Onemightevenwritea Learesquelimerickaboutit:
TherewasanOldFellowcalledBloom
Whodrewsmirkswhenhe entereda room.
LikekindheartedAlice
Hewaswithoutmalice,
ThatgentleOldFellowcalledBloom.
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stand for the opposite of laughter? The answer will surely tell us a great deal about the
nonsense condition itself; for while the particulars of Alice's and Bloom's respective
predicaments are consistently and eerily alike, it is unlikely that Joyce was aware of
them.IS? Rather, it says something about the Hobbesian atmosphere of nonsense in
general, and of the importance of the isolated individual to the nonsense narrative. We
might see nonsense as a kind of hysterical existentialism: the most universal nonsense
narrative is of the friendless hero wandering through a comic-aggressive landscape,
neither understanding nor being understood. This is as true for the protagonists of Lear
and Carroll as it is for those of Joyce, Beckett, O'Brien, and Nabokov. However the
Hobbesian model of superior laughter has been revised over the years, it nevertheless
provides an important imaginative scaffold to the nonsense brand of humour. Crucially,
it is also a significant precursor to Freud's theories of the comic, to which, in our search
for the link between hostility and nonsense humour, we must now turn.
3. 'THE CREW COULD DO NOTHING BUT GROAN':
L 'HUMOUR NOIR AND THE BAD PUN
The problem with all the Hobbesian nastiness we find lurking in the psyche of the
nonsense antagonist is that it becomes difficult to extract the humour from the hostility.
The 'group drinkards' (FW, 312.31) in Barney Kiernan's tell no good jokes and laugh
no 'ethical' laughs: the amusement they enjoy is the result of a heady brew of gossip,
tribalism, exaggeration, and inebriation. Their jokes are seldom ones in which the reader
can share; like Swift we abhor 'the senseless tribe, / Who call it humour when they
jibe,' rising above their callousness and siding with their victim.1s8 The humour the
reader experiences in the 'Cyclops' episode is derived not from the humour the
Cyclopeans enjoy, but from the humour they unwittingly generate in their enjoyment (as
well as from Joyce's bravura comic interludes, of course): the clownishness of the
157 It has been suggested by John A. Rea that Joyce in fact had read some Carroll before he started writing
Work in Progress,adapting Carroll's Mischmasch parody of Thomas Moore's Lalla Rookh in 'Circe'
(John A. Rea, "A Bit of Lewis Carroll in Ulysses.' James Joyce Quarterly, Fall 1977 (86-9». Rea's
argument is a sketchy one, but even if it is true, there is little possibility of Joyce having studied the Alice
books carefully enough on a structural level to work in Carrollian allusions as detailed and subtle as the
~ara11els outlined above.
58 Swift (ed. C.H. Sissofi:), 1977. Selected Poems. Manchester: Caroanet, 85-6 ('Verses on the Death of
Dr. Swift').
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drinkers, the narrator's lively internal monologue, and the Citizen's hilarious accidents
of self-contradiction ('- By Jesus, [... ] I'll brain that bloody jewman for using the holy
name. By Jesus, I'll crucify him so I will (U, 327)).159 Recalling the incident later on,
Bloom thinks the 'drunken ranters' of Barney Kiernan's 'ought to go home and laugh at
themselves' (362-3). This, of course, is the one kind of laughter not accessible to the
drinkers; it springs from the 'true humour' or 'risus purus' that Beckett's Arsene calls
'the laugh of laughs,' in which, as Simon Critchley explains, 'the object of laughter is
the subject who laughs.,160 Being mean-spirited and (like the Cyclops himself) myopic,
the 'drunken ranters' are no more capable of laughing at their own expense than
Wonderland's Queen of Hearts is of losing a game of croquet; for to do so would mean
to accept a reality in which they, too, are flawed, fallen, and ridiculous.
But if the humour of these Hobbesian scenes, whether in the pub or at the mad
tea-party, is only felt by the reader in an indirect way - we laugh at the jeerers and not at
their jeers - what about the humour generated by actual jokes? In short, is nonsense
humour funny? Of course, in an important sense this question is unanswerable: the act
of finding something funny is subjective, and operates on a solipsistic level; we can
make no blanket judgments and enforce no standards. On the other hand, it is usually
easy to recognise a comic animus, whether or not we ourselves are moved by it. I wrote
at the start of this chapter that humour is a 'crucial element' of nonsense's 'diagnostic
criteria.' Since then, however, we have learned just how black that humour tends to be,
finding its home in fights between brothers and in the taunts of bullying gangs. We have
studied the situational conditions of nonsense humour and the often brutal forms it can
take; but what of the actual jokes themselves? What are they about, who tells them, and
are they funny? This final section will endeavour to answer these questions.
If we analyse the content of nonsense humour, it is easy to see the dark
preoccupations, mostly with death and mental pain, of so many of the jokes. Inhis essay
on Alice, 'The Child as Swain,' William Empson points out the frequency of Carroll's
159 Of course, in laughing at the unselfconscious Cyclopeans, the reader is also guilty of Hobbesian
'superior' laughtenthe comedy in 'Cyclops' is,it seems, inescapably hierarchical.
160 Critchley, 49-50; Beckett, Watt, 46. Arsene expands on 'the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the laugh
laughing at the laugh, the beholding, the saluting of the highest joke, in a word the laugh that laughs -
silence please, - atthat which is unhappy.' Joyce and Lear are uniquely capable of laughing at themselves:
Lear, who signs his letters 'your loving fat friend' or 'the globular foolish topographer' (Selected Letters,
187, 163) and whose poems are so full of weeping comic self-portraits and spherical self-caricatures;
Joyce, who signs a letter to Giorgio and Helen entreating them to 'Breathe a prayer, drop a tear for I The
Crockery Joyce' (13 August, 1935) and who is 'for ever cracking quips on himself' (FW, 463.8). Carroll
takes himself a little more seriously, though he does frequently cast himself as comic victim in the stories
he tells in his letters to child-friends.
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death jokes; 161 he doesn't mention that death is also the central subject of 'The Hunting
of the Snark' and many of Carroll's shorter poems, and an occasionally torpefying theme
in his diaries. In a story entitled 'The Death of Edward Lear,' the worthy nonsense
nephew Donald Barthelme comically re-imagines Lear's death as a ticketed event of
utmost gravity and poise, whose invitations read:
Mr. Edward LEAR
Nonsense Writer and Landscape Painter
Requests the Honor of Your Presence
On the Occasion of his DEMISE.
San Remo 2:20 A.M
The 29th of May Please repl/62
Nonsense is, in general, very much in thrall to death, and humour appears time and again
to be the acceptable 'safe' outlet for any philosophical ruminations on the subject.
For Joyce, death is a superlative comic subject, as we see his aesthetic mode
moving from the sepulchral meditations of his early prose to the pantomime skits of
parts of Ulysses and the Wake; although, leaving aside the swooning soul of Gabriel
Conroy, Dubliners is far from humourless about the subject, as evidenced in the
touchingly comic dialogue on the death of Father O'Rourke in 'The Sisters' ('No one
would think he'd make such a beautiful corpse' (D, 13». Still, the gentle black humour
we occasionally glimpse in Dubliners is nothing compared to the Wake's cartoonish
frankness: 'His howd feeled heavy, his hoddit did shake .... Dimb! He stottered from the
latter. Damb! He was dud. Dumb!' (FW, 6.8-10). This typical example of the Wake's
treatment of death both mongrelises the original 'Finnegan's Wake' lyrics in a style
similar to Alice's nonsense recitals of old poems, and mixes in a Carrollian game of
Doublets - 'Dimb ... Damb ... Dumb' - for good measure. As Joyce allowed the
Romantic morbidities of Gabriel Conroy, Stephen Dedalus, and much of his poetry to
give way to the Shakespearian death puns, capering gravediggers and funereal farce we
see throughout the Wake, he adopted a palpably 'nonsense' approach to his central
subject. When Bloom reflects on death jokes, grotesque juxtapositions, Ophelia's
gravediggers, and gaseous 'cheesy' corpses in 'Hades' (U, 105), Robert H. Bell rightly
161 Empson, 1974. Some Versions of Pastoral. New York: New Directions.
162 Donald Barthleme, 2003 (1981). Sixty Stories. London: Penguin, 359. The time of death on 'Edward
Lear"s invitation is accurate, but the date is precisely four months late. It is unclear whether or not this is
intentional.
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observes that he 'virtually defines the Joycean human comedy' in the process.163
For Freud, too, death was a powerful comic theme: the 'crassest' but also the
'purest' kind of humour. The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious ends with an
example of gallows humour, in which 'a rogue who is being led to execution on a
Monday exclaims: "Well, that's a good start to the week.",164Here, says Freud, the
super-ego of the rogue cleverly shields the ego from the fact of its imminent destruction
by joking about it. Following from this, Freud concludes that humour is fundamentally a
means of defence against uncomfortable or unnatural truths, which explains why death is
among its most popular and 'purest' themes. It should come as no surprise that nonsense
humour is as awash with death jokes as any other comic mode; but further, it could
easily be argued that death jokes are in fact more ubiquitous in nonsense than in other
comic forms, because, as death jokes are about resisting the real, they fit with perfect
logic into a genre whose wider purpose is a sustained resistance to the real.
In an essay on 'The Uses of Victorian Laughter,' Donald J. Gray observes that
'Cruelty, pain, irrationality, death [oo.] are recurrent topics in Victorian humor' and
nonsense in particular, before offering an interesting genetic reading of the 'Lobster
Quadrille' in Wonderlandl'" He traces a parody of a popular minstrel song, 'Sally,
Come Up' from Carroll's diaries, through the originalAlice's Adventures Underground,
to its eventual (and not very recognisable) form in Wonderland's 'Lobster Quadrille,'
(which parodies more directly Mary Howett's verse about a predatory spider and a
relauctant fly):
"Will you walk a little faster?" said a whiting to a snail,
"There's a porpoise close behind us, and he's treading on my tail.
See how eagerly the lobsters and the turtles all advance!
They are waiting on the shingle - will you come an join the dance?
Will you, wo 'n 't you, will you, wo 'n 'tyou, will you join the dance?
Will you, wo 'n't you, will you, wo 'n 't you, wo 'n 't you join the
dance? (Haughton, 89).
The snail is understandably reluctant to 'join the dance,' which seems to be a dance of
death,(and in which, ominously, the whiting end up with their tails in their mouths, as
163 Robert a.sen, Jocoserious Joyce, 85.
164 Freud, 2002 (1940). The Joke and Its Relationship to the Unconscious. London: Penguin, 223. This
example of gallows humour was revisited twenty years later in Freud's essay 'Humour,' in which it was
the principle theme.
165 Donald J. Gray, "The-Uses of Victorian Laughter,' in Victorian Studies, Vol. 10, No.2 (December
1966), 145-176 (167).
107
served in restaurants, because 'they had to fall a long way' (Haughton, 90». The
atmosphere here recalls similar lurings-in of unwary fish dinners in Carroll's other
parodies, 'How doth the little crocodile' and 'The Walrus and the Carpenter.' In his
analysis, Gray notices that Alice must frequently stop herself from revealing the many
animals she has consumed to the Wonderland creatures, who are justifiably sensitive
about such topics. Her self-censorship is generally successful; when the Mock Turtle
asks if she has seen whiting, her hasty aposiopesis, '''I've often seen them at dinn---"',
goes unchallenged: '''I don't know where Dinn may be," said the Mock Turtle'
(Haughton, 89). When she is instructed to recite a poem, however, Alice's diplomatic
abbreviations unravel, and her carnivorous customs are exposed with Freudian
inevitability as her words 'come out queer' and tell of an over-cooked lobster and a
picnic shared by a Panther and an Owl, which ends ominously:
"When the pie was all finished, the Owl, as a boon,
Was kindly permitted to pocket the spoon:
While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl,
And concluded the banquet by-------"
"What is the use of repeating all that stuff?" the Mock Turtle
interrupted [...].
"I think you'd better leave off," said the Gryphon, and Alice was
only too glad to do so (Haughton, 93).
Here it falls to the Mock Turtle to interrupt Alice, to spare himself from hearing the
poem's unavoidable last words: 'While the Panther received knife and fork with a growl,
I and concluded the banquet by eating the owl.' Gray wonders why, if the Mock Turtle is
so offended by carnivorous behaviour and so unconvinced by 'the use of repeating all
that stuff,' he then launches into a rendition of 'Beautiful Soup,' 'a curious choice for a
mock turtle.' He concludes rather weakly that the Mock Turtle, 'in his own unreflecting
way,' has 'answered his own disturbed question.' 166 In fact, we should give the Mock
Turtle more credit; it is not for nothing that Andre Breton chose the 'Lobster Quadrille'
chapter to showcase Carroll in 'L 'humour noir.' Far from unreflecting, the Mock Turtle
is hisown eulogist: mourning and morbidly exulting in his own vividly imagined death-
by-soup, not that this delicacy ever seriously threatens to appears on the menu. His
actions are worthy of Barthelme's Lear, and of John Donne too, who indulged the
166 Ibid., 174.
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morbid pleasure of having himself painted in his shroud. The Mock Turtle is luxuriating
in a similar custom, memorably phrased by Howard Jacobson as 'taking to the grave
before the grave can take to you.' 167
Gray hypothesises that in his treatment of death here, Carroll is 'relieving his
fears of an unsanctified nature by burlesquing its principles' - being a good Freudian, in
other words. While there are many instances of Carroll's Freudian camouflages,
particularly when it comes to sex, it is not entirely convincing that that is what is going
on here. For a start, unlike Freud's rogue who jokes about his own impending
execution, the Mock Turtle is not laughing. In fact, his voice is 'choked with sobs' as he
sings; further, both of Tenniel's illustrations of him show tears streaming down his face,
and his entire meeting with Alice is marked by a 'constant heavy sobbing', even as he
makes the most consistent and colourful puns of any of Carroll's characters (Haughton,
83).
There are several aspects to this complex characterisation of the punning
depressive, who at once fears and lyricises his own slaughter, but whose 'Lobster
Quadrille' seems sublimely unaware of its own deathly context. It is my contention that
character of the Mock Turtle, and of the Gnat in Through the Looking-glass (who
develops many of the Mock Turtle's ideas), holds some vital clues about how we must
read nonsense humour, how we can understand or account for the link between death
and the pun (a link so central to both Freudian and nonsense humour), and in what way,
if at all, we can classify nonsense humour as 'funny'.
As I have said, the Mock Turtle is the most punning character in Wonderland;
his paronomasia is systematic and relentless. He gives us 'tortoise' and 'taught us',
'lesson' and 'lessen', copious marine puns, and some monsterised areas of study:
'Reeling and Writhing'; 'Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision'; 'Mystery,
ancient and modem'; 'Drawling, Stretching, and Fainting in Coils'; 'Laughing and
Grief (Haughton, 85).168 Glossing this last example, Hugh Haughton writes that 'The
Mock Turtle is especially prone to Grief, though his puns inspire Laughter.' This
observation places the Mock Turtle firmly in the 'tragic jester' category, joking through
tears to please an eager audience. It is based, however, on an unfortunate assumption:
that the Mock Turtle's puns 'inspire Laughter.' It is, in fact, remarkably difficult to
167 Howard Jacobson, 1997. Seriously Funny: From the Ridiculous to the Sublime. London: Viking, 223.
168 Seeing as I have removed some of these puns from their contexts, I will translate for clarity'S sake:
Reading and Writing; Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division; History, ancient and modern;
Drawing, Sketching, and Painting in Oils; Latin and Greek.
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argue that any of Carroll's puns do this - even taking into full consideration the
changing comic fashions between the Victorian period, the Modem period, and now.
This is probably the most important reminder that the Alice books were written for
children: however much literary critics, linguists, logicians, and mathematicians might
protest that the books are inaccessible to children in numerous important ways, it is
when we look at the quality of the jokes that we must accept one of two possibilities:
that Carroll himself isn't funny, or that only children find his jokes funny.
Of course, we are now in danger of falling into the trap, flagged near the start of
this section, of trying to make all-purpose value judgments on what is and is not
'funny'. Even Carroll's best biographer, Morton N. Cohen, blunders here, complaining
that:
many of the critiques of the Alice books seem to have been written by
people who seldom laugh [... ] they cannot come to grips with these
books, where the jests, the shattered shams, the punctured pretenses, and
the peals of laughter are essential elements to understanding and
enjoying (Cohen, 140).
Perhaps the reading advanced in this chapter is merely humourless, but it has struggled
to detect those 'peals of laughter' Cohen describes. Whose laughter does he mean? It
seems sensible to read the text on its own terms, and ask what the Mock Turtle's
companions think of his jokes. Do his puns, as Haughton and Cohen suggest, 'inspire
Laughter' in those around him? The answer is surely a resounding no: Alice is only
confused by them, demanding endless clarifications, while the Gryphon remains silently
indifferent.
What is more, the puns themselves are fairly gruesome: they invoke nightmarish
forms of physical and mental torture. Even verbally, they are not true puns, but have
been contorted and disfigured into assuming plainly pessimistic second meanings. They
would serve as a decent illustrative answer to the Wakean children's essay question
'When is a pun not a pun?' (FW, 307.02-3), and are of the same type as those Joyce
uses throughout the Wake, but most potently in his Mock-Turtle-esque lists: 'Ulcer,
Moonster, Leanstare and Cannought' (FW, 389.05); 'moanday, tearsday, wailsday,
thumpsday, frightday, shatterday' (FW, 301.20-1). Whether or not the reader finds them
funny, the Mock Turtle's puns fall short of inspiring laughter in his fictive audience,
instead inspiring frustration (in Alice), indifference (in the Gryphon), or downright
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despair (in the Mock Turtle himself). In this instance at least, nonsense humour is self-
evidently not funny.
Enter the Gnat, whose opening gambit in Through the Looking-glass is aweak
and diminutive idea for a pun: "Youmight make a joke on that- something about 'horse' and 'hoarse', you know'"
(Haughton, 147). That the Gnat is unable even to articulate its own jokes, instead only
planting his proposals in the ear of a surrogate, shows its feebleness; the jokes
themselves are like ghost notes, bloodless and de-emphasised to almost silence. Soon
after its first attempt at humour, the Gnat does it again: "'You might make a joke on that" for a
poor pun on 'wood' and 'would' (Haughton, 147-8). Alice asks it a reasonable question:
"If you're so anxious to have a joke made, why don't you make one
yourself?"
The little voice sighed deeply. It was very unhappy, evidently [... ]
(Haughton, 148).
During their conversation, the Gnat describes to Alice the various Looking-glass
insects, each of whom exhibits the physical features of the pun that its name contains:
the Rocking-horse-fly is a rocking horse with wings, the Snap-dragon-fly an airborne
plum-pudding, and so on. The Bread-and-butterfly is a particularly tragic figure, being
always already doomed to die of starvation on account of its impractical diet of weak tea
and cream. When the Gnat finally makes a pun of its own, it tells Alice '''I wish you had
made it":
"Why do you wish I had made it?" Alice asked. "It's a very bad
one."
But the Gnat only sighed deeply, while two large tears came
rolling down its cheeks.
"You shouldn't make jokes," Alice said, "if it makes you so
unhappy" (Haughton, 152).
At this point, the Gnat 'sighs itself away,' apparently dying of sadness. Clearly the
Gnat's stillborn puns no more inspire laughter than those of the Mock Turtle, and
Haughton's note on the Gnat as 'sad comedian' again seems to fall short of an adequate
explanation. Far from being funny, or even meaning to be funny, the puns of both these
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gloomy characters take pain or death as their subject, seek and receive no laughter, and
are resolved in the literal death of the 'illstarred punster' (FW, 467.29).169
Carroll was more than aware of the punning joke's potential to elicit pain rather
than laughter. Often in the Alice books, the joke's occasion for laughter instead prompts
physical pain, and conversely, occasions of pain prompt laughter: Alice never laughs at
other characters' jokes, but laughs uncontrollably at the Duchess 'boxing the Queen's
ears' (Haughton, 73); the White King's terror as she picks him up (129); and the idea of
being beheaded in battle (167). 'The Hunting of the Snark' is particularly rich with
pain-inducing laughter, for instance when the Bellman attempts to keep up the crew's
lagging spirits:
The Bellman perceived that their spirits were low,
And repeated in musical tone
Some jokes he had kept for a season of woe -
But the crew could do nothing but groan (CLC, 684).
The joke that extracts groans of pain from its audience instead of laughter is a form of
anti-humour we find often in Modernist comic writers, particularly Joyce, Beckett, and
O'Brien. In the Wake we find laughter recast as illness as Shem is found 'coming down
with the whooping laugh', blurring whoops of laughter with the painful childhood
affliction, whooping cough (FW, 423.26), while we recall from the above section on
comic double acts the distinctly Beckettian condition of the Porter parents, who 'were
never happier, huhu, than when they were miserable, haha' (FW, 558.23-4). In Beckett
himself, the urge to laugh is one often rued by his physically blighted characters, when
for example, in Waiting for Godot, Vladimir erupts into a "hearty laugh which he
immediately stifles, his hand pressed to his pubis, his face contorted. ,170 Ideally laughter
and unhappiness are in equilibrium, as suggested by Pozzo's Newtonian meditation on
the constant quality of the world's tears, but for physical discomfort to tip the scales too
heavily in favour of woe spoils the symmetry of the conceit; and anticlimax, that
169 In Beckett's Endgame, there is a striking example of the mortal danger oflaughter, as Nagg and Nell
reminisce about a narrow escape from drowning caused by a funny story:
NbGG: You were in such fits that we capsized. By rights we should have been drowned.
NELL: It was because I felt happy.
NAGG: [Indignant.] It was not, it was not, it was my story and nothing else. Happy! Don't
you laugh at it still? Every time I tell it. Happy! (Beckett, 1990, 102).
Clearly, Nagg feels that laughter need not - perhaps should not - be compatible with happiness. The
couple's near-drowning1iemonstrates the Joycean morphing of 'man's laughter' and 'manslaughter.'
170 Beckett, 1990. The Complete Dramatic Works. London: Faber and Faber, l3.
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constant nonsense stand-by, is a useful method of ensuring one element does not get to
lord it over the other. O'Brien's (Myles na gCopaleen's) Keats and Chapman sketches,
for instance, weave endlessly intricate and absurd narratives that resolve themselves in
anticlimactic, profoundly cringeworthy puns, so painfully unfunny as to be funny again
in a ingenious east-meets-west manoeuvre.!"
Not all nonsense puns are groan-inducing, though. While few people can claim
to read Finnegans Wake purely for the belly laughs, there are nevertheless moments of
pure punning virtuosity that can elicit a reflex snort from the somberest reader.
Modified proverbs and idioms are the best examples: 'Lumpsome is who lumpsum
pays' (FW, 270); 'A vagrant need is a flagrant weed' (294, fn.2); 'plotsome to getsome'
(312); 'Lard have mustard on them!' (409.15-6); but these are also merely 'loose
carollories' of Wonderland's own altered axioms, of which the most famous is the
Duchess's 'Take care of the sense and the sounds will take care of themselves'
(Haughton, 79). Joyce's and Carroll's extended puns may not be particularly 'funny',
but neither do they make us cringe; instead, they give us a moment of pure lexical
pleasure at the possibility and adaptability of language.
But if the Wakean jokes don't quite make us cringe, like so many of Carroll's
do, they don't quite make us laugh either. Professional Joyceans might chuckle together,
in their scholarly way, at this or that pun, quip, or surprise allusion; but refract those
same jokes onto an audience of undergraduates or lay readers, and the likeliest reaction
is a Gryphon-esque silence. Much of this is, of course, to do with difficulty. The history
of Joyce's reputation as a comic writer is fairly straightforward, in that it has grown in
tandem with our understanding of his work. Throughout most of his career, Joyce was
routinely exasperated by a readership that, in general, failed to get his jokes. His
complaints about his audience's lack of comic recognition, for both Ulysses and
Finnegans Wake, are scattered throughout his letters and biography. 'No, no, no [ ... J
it's meant to make you laugh,' he insisted to a visitor who asked about the Wake's
'levels of meaning' (EHmann, 704); this after a frustrating decade of grumbling that not
enough people found Ulysses 'funny.' It must indeed have been baffling for him, given
how endlessly funny he found his own work, as a sleep-deprived Nora Barnacle tells us:
"'Jim is writing at his book ... I go to bed and then that man sits in the next room and
171 Some punchlines include: 'Great mines stink alike'; 'Dogging a fled horse'; 'A tete worse than debt';
'His B.Arch is worse thsn his bight'; 'Foals rush in where Engels feared to tread'; and so on (Flann
O'Brien, 1968. The Best of Myles. London: Grafton, 182-95).
113
continues laughing about his own writing. And then I knock at the door and say, "Now,
Jim, stop writing or stop laughing.ml72
We know that while Joyce was interested in theories of the comic (as a young
man he sketched out his own theory, linking the comic to 'joy'), he was suspicious of
contemporary, psychoanalytic approaches to the subject. Freud's famous 'relief' theory,
whereby the joke short-circuits repressed instincts and desires by allowing the mind to
take pleasure - and find relief - in the verbal and conceptual economy of wit, was
blithely dismissed by Joyce, as we see here in an anecdote from EHmann:
One evening when Ottocaro Weiss has been discussing Freud's theory
[of humour], Joyce replied gaily, 'Well, that isn't true in this case.' He
then told his father's story of Buckley and the Russian General, which
was to be mentioned in Ulysses and to wind in and out of Finnegans
Wake. Buckley, he explained, was an Irish soldier in the Crimean War
who drew a bead on a Russian general, but when he observed his
splendid epauletts and decorations, he could not bring himself to shoot.
After a moment, alive to his duty, he raised his rifle again, but just then
the general let down his pants to defecate. The sight of his enemy in so
helpless and human a plight was too much for Buckley, who again
lowered his gun. But when the general prepared to finish the operation
with a piece of grassy turf, Buckley lost all respect for him and fired.
Weiss replied, 'Well, that isn't funny'(Ellmann, 411).
This passage is illuminating on various aspects of Joycean humour. First, there is the
question of why Joyce chose the story of Buckley and the Russian General to show that
Freud's theory 'isn't true,' given that the story itself is a composite of war tales 'brought
together by a logic not unlike that which informs Freud's dreamwork or jokework', and
that its final form, like the rest of the Wake, is built on typically Freudian principles of
repression unmasked by the irrepressible, economical pun.m Second, Weiss's blunt
response to Joyce's yam raises the familiar problem of comic subjectivity: Joyce found
this story so fascinatingly funny, and Weiss did not. The passage does, however, give us
a good indication of what impressed Joyce comically (though there is the complicating
factor of Joyce's emotional investment in his father's joke leading him to overvalue its
comic merit). The thematic ingredients of the Buckley story are upturned rank,
defecation, and death, while the home Joyce eventually finds for the story embeds it in a
172 'An Interview with Carola Giedion-Welcker and Maria Jolas,' ed. Richard M. Kain, James Joyce
Rrarterly 11 (1974),96. Cited in Robert H. Bell, Jocoserious Joyce, 7.
1 3 Kelly Anspaugh, 'How Butt shot the Chamber Pot': "Finnegans Wake" II.3, James Joyce Quarterly,
vol. 32, no. I (Fall 1994), 71-81 (72).
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nonsense context: it is told by double act Butt and Taff, through nonsense 'punns and
reedles' (FW, 239.36).
In a chapter on the Irish Bull in his brilliant book, Beckett's Dying Words,
Christopher Ricks remarks that 'the bull, like the cliche, gravitates towards death, partly
because the bull is itself a form of suicidal self-cancellation.' 174The pun is more a self-
duplication than a cancellation, but we may see it as suicidal not only because its two
meanings are forever at war, battling for supremacy like a pair of murderous nonsense
twins, but because its lowly philosophical status as 'freak or accident', as Derek Attridge
has noted, has already banished it to 'the realms of the infantile, the jocular, the literary,'
just as its impoverished comic status as 'the lowest form of humour' has banished it
from all levels of adult comic discourse (unless it is used ironically, in which case the
joke is always on the pun's failure to be funny).17s O.W. Holmes, whom Carroll greatly
admired and who figures a few times in the Wake as 'the auto cart of the bringfast cable'
(FW, 434.31) called the pun an act of 'verbicide,' even though he was himself a skilful
punster. In any case, the pun and I 'humour nair fit well together: both are fairly
marginal comic forms which take on leading roles in nonsense. The pun's obvious comic
impulse, and its failure to deliver on this, makes it the ideal form for the nonsense
writer's meditations on death, allowing jokes to be made while cheating the reader out of
an opportunity to laugh.
We might remember from that connoisseur of failed humour, Beckett's Murphy,
a method of organising his experiences into 'jokes that had once been good jokes and
jokes that had never been good jokes.'!" It is possible that Carroll's bad puns and
(John) Joyce's Buckley story always belonged to the latter category. But perhaps the
Buckley story proves that Freud's theory 'isn't true' for that very reason; by failing to
be funny, these jokes fail to supply the pay-off of relief yet they are still, ostensibly,
jokes. Far from representing an embarrassment to the Joycean paradigm, however, this
failure redirects our miscarried laughter into an inevitable question: since we know that
Joyce is prodigiously capable of genuinely funny writing, why are some of his jokes so
conspicuously not-funny, and is this deliberate?
, In his introduction to The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, John Carey
glosses Freud's argument that dreams are forced to adopt the camouflaged form of the
114 Christopher Ricks, 1993. Beckett's Dying Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 172.
175 Derek Attridge, 2004':Peculiar Language. London: Routledge, 189.
176 Beckett, 1969. Murphy, John Calder, 48.
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'dream-work' in their attempts to evade the conscious mind, and 'seem to have a
partiality for bad punS.'l77 Carey also notes with 'shock' the jokes at the more
'tendentious' end of the Freudian scale, in which suppressed hostility takes an
increasingly overt form, as in the joke of the doctor and husband ignoring the Baroness
in childbirth, as they are busy playing cards. If the verbal complexity of the joke, on the
model of its oneiric counterpart, is styled the 'jokework', the relationship between the
complexity of the jokework and the funniness of the joke is hardly a given. A familiar
(and fairly innocuous) joke might run: 'What do you call a dozen lawyers at the bottom
of the sea?' To which the answer is, 'A start.' A different version of the joke can easily
be imagined, however, substituting the harmless joshing of a professional group with an
ethnic slur. The reaction to such a joke would tend in most cases to be straightforwardly
hostile: this is not humour, but abuse. Yet the jokework in question remains essentially
the same, so what has changed?
Yeats counselled against telling 'the dancer from the dance,' but where jokes are
concerned too, teller and context are all; they, as much as its content, will determine
whether a joke is funny or merely offensive. It is never a good idea to explain jokes, but
when Carroll's hopelessly weak-willed gnat makes its feeble pun on 'horse' and
'hoarse' it apologises for the temerity of this tiny detonation of wit, utterly undermining
the joke in the process. In this case, the comedian is neither funny nor offensive: the
joke withers and dies from the lack of a will-to-humorous-power (as does the gnat
itself). The drinkers in Barney Kiernan's pub, by contrast, could not be more
hormonally convinced of their right to give vent to their bullish opinions, however
funny or unfunny the jokework in which they clothe them. The consequences of their
uninhibited belief in their own funniness, we are left in no doubt, are verbal violence,
with the threat of physical violence not far behind; how preferable things would be if
the Citizen and Lenehan traded dismal puns and sapless tales about Russian generals. In
this sense, faded or failed humour begins to acquire a strangely utopian side.
Nevertheless, we must hastily add, Cyclops is of course riotously funny. Does the
humour reside .in the fact that we are laughing at rather than with the drinkers, as
suggested earlier in this chapter? Perhaps, but there is surely a little more to it than that.
As Shane Weller observes of Baudelaire's theory of humour, 'only the fallen can laugh
and [... ] the fall at which they laugh is always taken to be the fall of the other.'178We
177 John Carey, introduction to The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious, vii.
178 Shane Weller, Beckett, Literature, and the Ethics of Alterity (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 84.
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laugh as a release from our unease at the latent violence in the air, and out of
Schadenfreude that the bullies are picking on Bloom and not us, but also, no less
uneasily, at a recognition of the fallenness we share with these benighted specimens.
Nevertheless, the fundamental thrust of Joyce's humour is to vindicate Bloom in the
face of his tormentors. As Morton Gurewitch writes of what he terms Freudian
'disaster-humour' :
[It] always involves [... ] devictimization. Thus if we are shown a
pitiful protagonist - a little man, an underdog, a misfit - disaster-
humour will rehabilitate him ... This rehabilitation is possible because
the protagonist, whatever the way in which he has become a cipher or
a creature of misfortune [... ] has a good heart that counterbalances
his physical, mental, or social inadequacies. Among these
adequacies, the characters' lack of a sense of humour is often
conspicuous.U"
Or as Empson observed of Alice, 'moral superiority involves a painful isolation.'180
This is certainly something Bloom, too, knows all about.
With this in mind, one might compare the tum in Freud's theories of humour
with the publication of the 1927 essay 'Humour', and its increased role for the violent
dimension of wit, with his development in the same period of the theory of the death
drive. Where it had previously seemed a given to Freud that the organism would seek
self-preservation itself and act on the erotic drives to perpetuate itself, he now began to
recognise 'the hypothesis of a death instinct, the task of which is to lead organic life
back into the inanimate state' .181The theory of the death drive adds a tragic dimension
to the internal squabbles of id, ego and superego, giving a look of inevitability to the
human failure to break the historical cycle of violence and warfare. But in so far as
humour is an unruly force, it too is part of this cycle. With its need for tidy control, the
ego aspires to purge its world of humour, only to be shielded from the impossibility of
doing so by super-ego-derived forbidden humour, most usually on the subject of death.
179 Morton Gurewitch, 1975. Comedy: The Irrational Vision (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP), 102.
180 Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral, 285.
181 Freud, 1987. 'The Ego and the Id', in Albert Dickson (ed.), On Metapsychology - The Theory of
Psychoanalysis: 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', 'The Ego and the Id', And Other Works. London,
Penguin, 380.
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As Freud notes: 'in bringing about the humorous attitude, the super-ego is actually
repudiating reality and serving an illusion,182. In this lies the key to understanding the
apparent distaste for genuinely funny humour that stalks the nonsense world. When
Beckett's Watt smiles he copies an action he has seen other people perform but of
which, it is hinted, he has no real comprehension himself: 'To many it seemed a simple
sucking of the teeth. Watt used this smile sparingly.'183 The attempt to readmit the
forbidden topic of death through humour is resisted by the ego's refusal to get the joke,
and the upshot is the particular miscarried delivery that is nonsense humour. As Freud
comments of the 'Janus-headed' jokes based on absurdism and non sequitur:
The conflations do not lead. us to any instance in which the two
conflated items really give rise to a new meaning; if we try to analyse
them, they fall apart entirely. [... ] So in fact only the one interpretation
is left to apply to these jokes: nonsense. We can decide one way or
another whether we call these productions - which have exempted
themselves from one of the most essential characteristics of the joke-
'bad' jokes or deny that they are jokes at all.184
Yet they do have a comic effect: 'either the comedy arises from uncovering the
modes of thinking of the unconscious [... ] or the pleasure comes from comparison with
a fully formed joke. [ ... ] There is no denying that it is just this inadequate adoption of
the form of a joke [... ] that turns this nonsense into comic nonsense.' Nonsense humour
allows us to simultaneously acknowledge and disavow the dark secrets at its core. In
doing so, it aims to bring the dark zones of violence and death under its control, and
bring chaos definitively under its control. But this crusade invariably proves quixotic,
and the chaos that threatens to swamp the nonsense world more usually stems from the
excess of zeal with which the world of reason prosecutes its campaign. Beyond a certain
point, in other words, the pursuit of reason becomes an agent of chaos in its own right,
into which it falls unceremoniously but also hilariously. We have now reached the final
stage 'of our comic hegira, with everyday comic pratfalls giving way to the biggest upset
182 Freud, The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, 104-5.
183 Beckett, Watt,23.
184 Freud, The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, 209.
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of all: the fall of man. The humorous secrets of this improbable source of laughter is the
stimulus of my next and final chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NONSENSE AND THE FALL
Darkness falls from the air.
- Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.
Brightness falls from the air.
- Thomas Nashe, 'Summer's Last Will and Testament.'
A woman eats an apple; an Irishman slips from a ladder; a twin murders his brother; an
egg topples from a wall; a heavenly angel grows cocky; 'a lunatic tower [is] launched at
the stars,;185 a little girl plummets down a rabbit hole; a politician misspells 'hesitancy';
a physicist hits upon gravity; an ancient city is sacked; a family man is tried for public
indecency; a child learns about sex; a Greek flies too close to the sun; a Baker sees a
Boojum: things falling, from the silliest slip-up to the gravest ruin, are ubiquitous in
nonsense. When Leopold Bloom, whose mind like Edward Lear's is 'concrete and
fastidious' CCNY, 428), recalls from his college curriculum the 'Law of falling bodies:
per second, per second' (U, 69), he is doing more than merely testing his memory; he is,
like all analytically-minded persons, attempting to understand and control through
numbers and logic what otherwise seems frightening and unruly. The law of falling
bodies is, as Bloom calculates, 'Thirtytwo feet per second, per second,' a neat and
reassuring detail that returns as a fall motif in Finnegans Wake as the number 1132,
standing not just for consoling mathematical certainty but also for stony Pauline
reasoning: 'For God has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to
all' {II :32, Paul's Epistle to the Rcmansj.l'" Bloom's instinctive need to reduce the fact
of falling bodies to its numerical particulars is not unlike Samuel Johnson's lexical
response to the problem in his Dictionary of the English Language, whose entry under
'fall' is eccentrically lengthy, and is clearly meant to be exhaustively so. Johnson lists
myriad examples, many of them bizarrely specific, and to his prolific ways of falling
(drop, diminish, apostatize, sink, recede, and so on) attaches over a hundred illustrative
185 George Steiner, After Babel, 57.
186 The Holy Bible (Newicevised Standard Version), 1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press, New
Testament, 157).
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quotations.P" There is a definite sense, in both the Joycean and Johnsonian examples,
that anything pertaining to falling must be contained, controlled, categorised, in order to
be thought about at all.
Literary nonsense, which cleaves almost fanatically to logic, order, and
categorisation, is at once morbidly fascinated, philosophically vexed, and comically
saturated with falling. The biblical Fall, which threatens the fixed world of nonsense
with a whole cargo of imposters, including death, madness, fear, lust, and - most
critically - chaos, presents itself as an immense artistic challenge to the nonsense writer,
whether he sees the culpa as felix or otherwise. It poses a very large question: how can
nonsense, which is built on rules and logic, find room for the dissenting voice of its
enemy, which seeks to tear down those rules and install chaos and melodrama in their
place? The fall is, after all, the single most pervasive motif in Finnegans Wake, and a
luridly obvious narrative stimulus for both Alice books, particularly Wonderland (in
Alice's literal fall and subsequent efforts to reach to the Edenic rose garden). As if to
confirm rumours of this strange relationship between nonsense and the fall, Wakean
allusions to Carroll are commonly embedded in a lapsarian context, for example in
ALP's retitling of Alice's Adventures as 'Measly Ventures of Two Lice and the Fall of
Fruit' (FW, 106.21), orin the wistful:
Wonderlawn's lost us for ever. Alis, alas, she broke the glass! Liddell
locker through the leafery, ours is a mistery of pain (FW, 270.19-22).
Commenting on the connection, Grace Eckley notes that Joyce on this topic
'makes a distinct departure from Lewis Carroll; Joyce celebrates the fall as a necessary
part of the ongoing cycle of life' whereas Carroll takes a more solemn view:
Thus, although Joyce stayed close to many of Lewis Carroll's themes,
he remains distinctly opposed to prevailing views of the Fall and to
Carroll's aversion to sexual matters.188
Eckley's observation is true in a broad sense, but potentially quite misleading. Joyce's
emphasis, with its strong sense of the felix culpa and the always-pending redemption
that the fail both implies and enables, does indeed differ from Carroll's, with its belief
187 See the facsimile of the Dictionary under 'Fall' in Samuel Johnson: A CriticalEdition of theMajor
Works (ed, Donald Greene, 1984. Oxford: Oxford University Press), 331-4.
188 Eckley, Children's Lore in Finnegans Wake, 75-6.
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in a tragic and terminal loss of innocence; but the divergence is religious rather than
artistic. It is true that Joyce's ability to believe in the fall's redemptive power allowed
him to treat his characters' sins with humour, and that such conduct was anathema to
Carroll (whose letters to friends, editors, writers, and even a Lord Bishop bearing
accusations of sacrilegious humour are many, their tone ranging from sympathetic, to
stem, to outraged).189 But in their artistic treatment of, and fascination for, the theme of
the fall there is little contradiction; both Joyce and Carroll flirt with ideas of the fall
from within the safe confines of their own textual games, rules, and inventions, pre-
emptively rejecting its most destructive consequences, the most dire of which would be
a loss of control over their material. Morton N. Cohen, seeking to account for Carroll's
judgmental streak in his letters condemning religious humour, writes:
He had a fiercely religious cast of mind, a faith worked out by his own
stem rules of logic. To compromise it in any way would have been to
abandon it altogether and to find himself in a spiritual desert (Cohen,
306).
For Andre Breton, that Carroll was Anglican-pastor-Iogician-mathematician was a
perfect signal of 'the appearance [of nonsense] in literature,,)90 but he is forgetting the
rigid spiritual mechanics (to use a Swiftian phrase) of the medieval schoolmen. If we
cast back to Stephen Dedalus just after his decisive non serviam, we will remember that
for Stephen, too, religion and logic were by no means mutually exclusive. When Cranly
asks him whether, having forsaken 'the God of the Roman catholics,' 'you do not intend
to become a protestant?', Stephen counters:
What kind of liberation would that be to forsake an absurdity which is
logical and coherent and to embrace one which is illogical and
incoherent? (AP, 266).
189 An especially wretched example of this behaviour is given in Cohen's biography, involving a Boston-
based student magazine called, in homage to Carroll, Jabberwock. Carroll had had a friendly
correspondence with the magazine's schoolgirl editors, until he received an issue containing a throwaway
limerick beginning, 'There was an old deacon ofLynn, / Who confessed he was given to sin.' The next
issue carried the report that Carroll 'had sat down and with a quill of wrath stopped the Jabberwock once
and for all, saying that he never wanted to see a copy again, and that he was deeply disappointed that the
young editors could allow anything in their columns which made light of so solemn a subject as the
confession of sin!' (Cohen, 305-6). Perhaps the limerick's deacon protagonist and its clear debt to Lear
added insult to injury.
190 Breton (tr. Mark Polizzotti), 2009. Anthology of Black Humour. London: Telegram, 137.
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Denominational differences aside, both Carroll's and Joyce's notions of religious faith
are bound up in logic and structural coherence, and are as such absolutist: to bend one
rule is to abandon the lot. Both writers address the problem of the fall within this logical
framework, and Joyce's less sombre attitude towards it is only a consequence of his non-
religious (or at least non-believing) approach; artistically, Joyce's treatment of the
subject does not diverge in any important way from Carroll's, and is entirely consistent
with the nonsense method.
With this distinction made, we can now turn our attention to the way nonsense
deals with the problem of the fall, what it means to the nonsense author, and why it
seems so important. Elizabeth Sewell was onto something when, in her landmark study
The Field of Nonsense, she asked, 'If Nonsense is on the side of order, what does it do
about disorder?' Answering her own question, she proposes that nonsense is fighting a
battle against the forces of disorder, but that:
The battle ... is bound to be inconclusive, because so long as the mind
stays in the field of language, to which Nonsense is limited, it cannot
suppress the force towards disorder in the mind, not defeat it
conclusively ... Nonsense can only engage the force towards disorder in
continual play. 191
The fall and its consequences are inscribed into nonsense texts, because it is the only
way disorder can be engaged with (and monitored) within such a necessarily ordered
framework; as Sewell puts it, nonsense keeps disorder 'continually in play and so in
check.' The fascination, therefore, is at once self-destructive and self-preserving.
This chapter will examine three important manifestations of the fall in nonsense.
The first describes a fall into madness, and deals with the ontological uncertainty,
forgetfulness, and split personalities that torment many a nonsense protagonist. It will
compare Issy's many-selved state with Alice's, on whom Issy is partly based. The
second considers the fall into language, heralded in the Babel story (a vital Wakean
meme), and nonsense's linguistic response to this happy catastrophe. This Babelian
discussion will open into a study of the threat of a fall into chaos, asking why nonsense
seems so dangerously to tempt what would destroy its fundamental tenets, and what this
Adomo-esque vision of the self-annihilating work of art says not just about Joyce's
191 Elizabeth Sewell, 1952. The Field of Nonsense, 46-7.
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complex and self-conscious inheritance from Carroll but also, as Alice ponders, 'the
reason insects are so fond of flying into candles' (Haughton, 151).
1. 'THINK OF A MAIDEN [•••) DOUBLE HER':
MAIDENS, MORALS, AND MADNESS
In the Wake, there is no such thing as the individual; all characters are irrepressibly
divided, doubled. As we saw in Chapter Three, the pseudocouples that abound in
nonsense are embodied, comic forms of doubleness; Shem and Shaun, Browne and
Nolan, the Tweedle brothers each have distinct bodies but occasionally blurred
identities, where one might sometimes stand as the other's 'secondary personality' (FW,
38.26-7), or both might 'coalesce, their contrarieties eliminated, in one stable
somebody' (107.29-30), always eventually to 'dissimulate themself,' and reclaim their
distinct personalities (384.34). For the principle female characters, however, the
'multiplicity of personalities' we find in Joyce and Carroll must share the same host,
without the luxury of a bodily doppelganger: in the Wake, Issy is divided amongst
herself, as was Alice before her.
There have been several important essays on the nature of Issy's split
personalities, most of which have focused on Issy's fixation on her alien mirror image,
whose face is the face of Issy's other personality: the 'linkingclass girl' whom Issy has
named Madge (FW, 459.4). The most notable of these is Adaline Glasheen's
'Finnegans Wake and the Girls from Boston Mass,' which first identified Joyce's debt
to Morton Prince and the case of Christine Beauchamp as a foundation of Issy's divided
psychological state.192 In an aside, Glasheen notices that 'Joyce surrounds Issy and her
reflection with references to Alice Through the Looking-glass', but her limited
Carrollian credentials lead her down a blind alley: she claims that Alice 'has no mirror
image' and implies that she is merely 'narcissistic' rather than (like Issy) multiplicitous.
192 Glasheen, 'Finnegans Wake and the Girls from Boston, Mass.', Hudson Review (7, Spring 1954), 89-
96. See also Morris Beja, "Dividual chaoses": Case Histories of Multiple Personality and Finnegans
Wake', James Joyce Quarterly (14.3, Spring 1977),241-50; Catherine Driscoll, 'Felix Culpa - Sex, Sin,
and Discourse in Joyce's Fiction' in Joyce on the Threshold, ed. Anne Fogarty and Timothy Martin.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2005, 171-86.
Edvige Giunta, 'Dear Reverend: "Lewis Carroll and the Boston Girls" inJames Joyce Quarterly vo130.3
(Spring 1993), 488-92 (Jt89); and John Nash, 'The Logic of Incest: Issy, Princes, and Professors', James
Joyce Quarterly (39.3, Spring 2002), 435-456.
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In fact, we can clearly see Alice's mirror image as she crosses into the 'Looking-glass
house' in Tenniel's illustration (in any case, how can Alice be properly 'narcissistic' if
she casts no reflection?); furthermore, there are numerous instances of Alice addressing
herself as another (or several others) throughout both of her adventures.i'" Commenting
on Glasheen's stillborn comparison, Edvige Giunta repeats her mistake ('it is true that
Alice has "no mirror image"'), but sketches out the beginnings of a more sustained
critique. This itself fails to do justice to the connection, thanks to a combination of
incomplete research and lack of critical follow-through, but makes a promising start.194
The Alice- Issy connection may end with mirrors, but it begins with a fall.
Wonderland opens with a drowsy Alice fixed inside a paradisean 'golden afternoon',
and the first impression we are given is of Alice's restlessness within the stasis: 'Alice
was beginning to get very tired ... of having nothing to do' (Haughton, 9). Edenic
undertones are not hard to find: for Eve-like Alice, the perfection of her world is starting
to drag - without any prospect of adventure - until she meets a talking creature (albeit a
rather meek variant on the serpent), who piques her curiosity and promptly lures her to
her downfall. Before the first chapter is out, we learn that Alice is in the habit of talking
to herself, and sometimes 'scolded herself so severely as to bring tears into her eyes;
and once she remembered trying to box her own ears for having cheated herself in a
game of croquet she was playing against herself' (Haughton, 14). Alice's doubled self,
it seems, is no simple case of self-amusing dialogue; there is transgression and
punishment involved, one 'good' Alice chastising the other 'bad' Alice when she
misbehaves.
This division happens be replicated exactly in Issy, who, as Catherine Driscoll
writes, 'is often understood as a duality comprised of opposing versions of herself,
frequently represented as a division between good and bad girls.'I95 In the Wake, Issy's
split personality is given wings as she becomes a 'ravenindove' (FW, 354.28), an
unsubtle metaphor for the conflict between the black, bad side of her personality and the
193 Glasheen, 90.
194 Giunta proposes that the letter from the Boston schoolgirls to Lewis Carroll (see footnote 5) is one
likely source for the Wake's 'letter from Boston, Mass.', noting that Joyce would have been aware of
Carroll's outrage over their 'irreverent joke' thanks to his reading of Collingwood's biography of Carroll
(and noting the Wakean assonance between 'irreverent' and the Wake letter's opening 'Dear Reverend').
This does indeed seem very plausible, and it is a little disappointing that Giunta leaves his findings at that,
without suggesting what they might signify beyond a casual link. He also wrongly identifies the girls'
'irreverent joke' as an 'anecdote on Washington's diary' instead of the Learesque deacon limerick we
now know it to have been (Giunta, op.cit., 489-90).
195 Driscoll, 'Felix Culptl- Sex, Sin, and Discourse in Joyce's Fiction' in Joyce on the Threshold, ed.
Anne Fogarty and Timothy Martin. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2005, 171-86 (180).
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white, dovelike counterpart. It is unusual to catch Joyce getting artistic mileage from
such tired Gothic tropes in such an unexamined way; it seems likely that it was simply
his way of extracting some use from the fraying experience of watching his daughter's
own psychological decline. When Lucia's descent into schizophrenia was beginning to
look irreversible, Joyce observed to Georgio that, 'Ella ha delle volte la sapienza del
serpent e l'innocenza del colombo.i" (Alice, too, is memorably called a 'serpent' in
one of her mushroom-induced growth spurts (Haughton, 47».
However garish its cliche though, it is this division between good and bad which
characterised the dissociative Christine Beauchamp's initial personality-split.'?"
Beauchamp's reaction to her own 'fall' (prompted by the sexual advances of a male
friend) was to divide herself into proxies, who would bear responsibility for her own
moral failures, for which she would then rebuke them. The most prominent of these was
Sally, who in tum would threaten Christine, writing letters to her mocking her for acting
the 'saint.'198 Issy, too, speaks frankly about her 'bad' other, who attracts scorn while
Issy herself prefers schoo I:
my linkingclass girl, she's a fright, poor old dutch [...] I call her Sosy
because she's society for me and she says sossy while I say sassy and
she says will you have some more scorns while I say won't you take a
few more schools and she talks about ithel dear while I simply never
talk about athel darling (FW, 459.4-14).
As with Alice, Issy's other self serves both as company ('she's society for me') and as
scapegoat. In all three cases, the punishment the 'bad' self receives from the 'good' is
both corporal and psychological: Alice boxes her other's ears; Sally makes Christine
'stay awake all night' and collects spiders, to which Christine has a 'nervous antipathy';
196 'She has sometimes the wisdom of the serpent and the innocence of the dove.' Letter to Georgio Joyce,
21 November 1934 (LIII, 330).
197 Glasheen describes the moment of Beauchamp's split thus: 'Miss Beauchamp was a cultivated New
England girl whose personality was rocked on its foundation one [also garishly cliched] stormy night
when she saw an old friend, one William Jones ("the embodiment of the spiritual") peeping from the top
ofa ladder into the hospital where Miss B. Was in nurses' training. Jones followed this up by attempting
to make love to her at the hospital door, whereupon the decisive split in her personality occurred'
(Glasheen, op.cit., 90-1).
198 Morton Prince, 1906. The Dissociation of a Personality. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co, 126.
Joyce picked up on this detail, referencing 'that self-penned letter to one's other' (FW, 489.33-4), and
Alice is not untouched by this dissociative impulse either, at one point addressing a letter to 'Alice's Right
Foot, Esq.' That Alice's foot is male is also interesting; both Issy and Beauchamp had male 'others'
among their cast, and one of Sally's threats to Christine was that she would cut off her hair to make her
'look like a guy" (Prince, p.169), a threat Issy repeats to her own other, Madge, saying that she will paint
'mudstuskers' on her 'to make her a man' (459.6).
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Issy makes Madge break her shoes in for her, and paints measles on her face to frighten
her (FW, 459.5-16).199
These personality splits, which are damaging if only for their physical cruelty,
are each a symptom of their owner's fallen state. Given that the Alice who falls into
Wonderland is a 'bad' Alice (her fall is the result of a prior fall into sleep during a
history lesson),2oo it stands to reason that her journey will mimic a kind of purgatory,
during which she must contend with some uniquely threatening and confusing
circumstances. This is, of course, the outline of the most basic of fall myths, in which,
as M.H. Abrams has written, the fall is understood to be:
[A] fall from primal unity into self-individuation, self-contradiction,
and self-conflict, [but also] an indispensable first step along the way
toward a higher unity which will justify the sufferings undergone en
route_2°1
This is the felix culpa which supplies Finnegans Wake with its physical structure, its
philosophical system, and its mythic power. For Carroll, although the idea of the fall is
troubling spiritually, it provides Alice's character with both psychological depth and
narrative impetus: her journey through Wonderland is saved from mere arbitrary
wandering, and she can follow the Gryphon's advice never to 'go anywhere without a
porpoise' in good faith (Haughton, 90).
As I have said, one of the stark and immediate consequences of Alice's fall is
the splintering of her sense of self; it occurs to her that she might have been 'changed in
the night,' and wonders: "'But if I'm not the same, the next question is 'Who in the
world am I?' Ah, that's the great puzzle!'" (Haughton, 17-18). The last sentence, with
its faux-sage tone which is implausible coming from a seven-year-old, is clearly an
authorial interruption, like the death jokes we find in the preceding chapter. For Alice as
she experiences it, her new-found ontological doubt is more of a sudden crisis than a
'great puzzle', and her reaction to it is accordingly pragmatic. Her ontological damage-
control is attempted not through existential wrangling, but by ticking off a checklist, as
she begins
199 Prince, The Dissociation of a Personality, 169.
200 Similarly, John Bishop has argued that the 'pancosmic collapse' we witness in the Wake (which
includes 'every conceivable standing structure on earth falling') is 'our hero's fall into sleep.' Bishop,
1993. Joyce's Book of the Dark. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 306.
201 M.H. Abrams, 1971:'Natural Supernaturalism. New York: Norton, 255.
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[...] thinking over all the children she knew that were of the same age
as herself, to see if she could have been changed for any of them.
"I'm sure I'm not Ada," she said, "for her hair goes in such long
ringlets, and mine doesn't go in ringlets at all; and I'm sure I ca'n't be
Mabel, I know all sorts of things, and she, oh, she knows such a very
little! (Haughton, 18).
This compare-and-contrast exercise IS on the same level as Issy's primitive
differentiation between herself and her other personalities: 'she says will you have some
more scorns while I say won't you take a few more schools,' and so on. Alice and Issy
are both fallen and so divided; but however philosophically complex their condition
might seem, they themselves experience it as a straightforward matter of fact, an
equation in search of a solution. The other is by turns described, addressed, punished,
played with, but its presence is never explained or accounted for; for Issy and Alice, this
is a necessary and self-preserving blindspot, a way of avoiding having to confront the
original lapse that triggered the split.
For Alice, the initial trigger was her failure to attend to her history lesson, her
fall into sleep; for Issy, as for Beauchamp, it was a sexual shock. Strangely though, it is
only Joyce who allows the moralistic undercurrent to assert itself with any force in his
writing, from Jaun's prurient preachifying to Issy and her classmates in Book 3.2 of the
Wake, to the ghoulish and histrionic hell sermon in A Portrait, which causes Stephen's
spiritual panic and makes him feel sharply the 'silent lapse of his soul, as it would be at
some instant to come, falling, falling, but not yet fallen, still unfallen, but about to fall'
(AP, 175). Conversely, Carroll's God-fearing approach to the Biblical fall means a tacit
refusal to engage creatively with the moral implications of the problem - at least not in
his nonsense writing. In the Alice books, the moralistic fall shares similar status with the
subject of sex in Christina Rossetti's 'Goblin Market': so omnipresent that it is never
once so much as mentioned. The reasons for this, given Carroll's blandishments to those
who wrote with insufficient gravity on religious matters, are clear: he was morbidly
sensitive to the prospect of blasphemy, which by his own stringent definition included
contaminating the religious with the humorous (like his father, Carroll 'was never
known to relate a story which included a jest upon words from the Bible' (Collingwood,
8». So, despite the ubiquity of lap sari an themes, of relentless references to pride, sloth,
sexual maturity, fatal curiosity, and that elusive rose-garden, Carroll demurs from
stating the whole case.
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One hint of a darker moral undertone is given in the poetic frontispiece to
Through the Looking-glass:
Come, hearken then, ere voice of dread,
With bitter tidings laden,
Shall summon to unwelcome bed
A melancholy maiden! (Haughton, 117).
As with almost all Carroll's poetry (excluding his comic verse, which has more bite),
'Life's Pleasance', as he titled this poem, falls victim to the mawkish side of Carroll's
imagination. All evidence of his parodic wit, logical acrobatics, and verbal exuberance
is flushed out of the poems, which are reserved instead for sub-Tennysonian swooning
and sentimentality. Interestingly, the same might be said of Joyce's poetry (again,
excluding his more caustic comic poems), which rarely rise above the level of Stephen
Dedalus's own fey and wilting villanelles in A Portrait and which, too, betray an oddly
cloying priggishness, and moments of sexual cringing: 'I have consorted with vulgarity /
And am indelibly marked with its fell kiss,.202Neither Joyce nor Carroll allow their
poetry to 'consort with vulgarity', and themselves seem to exhibit a literary personality-
split, siphoning their sentimental impulses from their major works and rerouting them
via minor, occasional, outwardly proper but artistically twee verse.
In any case, reading the fall moralistically is incompatible not just with the
spiritual squeamishness of Carroll's major writing, but with his general attitude towards
the moralising strain in nineteenth-century children's literature. The loudest lampooning
of this trend in Alice, after the brilliant poetic parodies, is found in the secondary
personality of the Duchess, who is obsessed with "'finding morals in things'"
(Haughton, 79). The Duchess, in line with other female nonsense characters, exhibits a
split personality which (unlike the pantomime duality we see in the nonsense male) is
stark, strange, and psychologically disruptive. When Alice first meets her, she is a
violent, abusive, chaotic character with Tourette's-like verbal tics and murderous
intentions; in their second meeting she is much changed, preaching love and kindness to
a disoriented Alice, while her creepily insistent attempts at physical intimacy render her
former self possibly the more likable of the two. Her fallenness is self-evident, yet to her
'good' personality, "'Every thing's got a moral, if only you can find it'" (Haughton, 78);
she barely utters a sentence without ending with the words, '''And the moral of that is
202 Joyce, 2001. Poems and Shorter Writings. London: Faber and Faber, 80.
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·..'" (79).203It is clear that Carroll is using the figure of the Duchess to send up the
morally instructive (that is, intrusive) tendency of children's literature of the period; he
repeats the move in his Preface to The Hunting of the Snark, whose 'strong moral
purpose', he writes, is equalled only by its 'noble teachings in Natural History' (CLC,
677) and to a child-friend writes, of a book he is sending as a gift, 'The book has got a
moral - so I need hardly say it is not by Lewis Carroll' (SLLC, 33). Carroll was
teasingly adamant in print and in his letters that his nonsense writing doesn't 'mean'
anything, and moralising is an especially suffocating category of meaning. The fall in
Carroll's nonsense, therefore, is far less moralistic than Joyce's; because Carroll is not
able to treat the moral lapse humorously, as Joyce can, he eschews it altogether - or at
least tries to.
We have established that Alice's (and Issy's) psychologically divided state is a
result of her fallenness, and that the moralistic framework to this narrative is both
everywhere and nowhere in the writing. It is worth considering an existential parallel to
this problem of the Alice's fallen state, which is both anti-moralistic and anchored in a
supremely moralistic doctrine. In The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake, Margot
Norris draws on Heidegger to elucidate a Wakean pun on 'Der Fall Adams' (FW, 70.5),
noting that 'Heidegger speaks of the condition of the fall, Verfallen, not as a traditional
moral lapse, but as a falling away from one's authentic self into a state of "otherness" or
inauthenticity.'204This seems a profitable way of reading Alice's condition; all the more
so because Heidegger's own denials about the conceptual overlap between his Verfallen
and the Biblical Fall seem, as with Carroll, to be masking something. Heidegger's
insistence that Verfall does not 'comport a moral value-judgement' loosely recalls
Carroll's coquettish insistence that his writing doesn't 'mean anything.'205As Cohen
writes on Carroll, 'Charles knew that most of his creative works bore currents of hidden
meaning' (Cohen, 408); and as George Steiner writes on Heidegger, 'pace [his] denial,
the theological model is [... ] obvious and imperative.,206
Alice's purpose in Wonderland is, vaguely, to reach the rose garden, her.
'wastohavebeen underground heaven' (FW, 76.33), which turns out in the end-to be-
like Eden - governed by an wrathful autocrat whose rules are bound to be broken. Her
203 Finnegans Wake occasionally mimics this style too, for example: 'Moral: if you can't point a lily get to
henna out of here!' (434.18); 'Moral: book to besure, see press' (550.3).
204 Norris, The Decentred Universe of Finnegans Wake, 84.
20S Carroll (ed. Roger Lancelyn Green), 1953. The Diaries a/Lewis Carroll. London: Cassell and
Company,351.
206 Steiner, 1979. Martin Heidegger, New York: Viking Press, 96.
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purpose in Through the Looking-glass is more defined: from her low status as pawn, she
must reach the end of the chessboard to become a queen (as the Wakean children recite
at the start of their games, seeming to describe Alice: 'Who are you? The eat's mother.
[...] What do you lack? The look ofa queen' (FW, 223.23-4». In terms of its structural
context as a game of chess, Alice's journey follows the heroic model, as her pawn's
route takes her directly into the path of danger in the name of securing not just personal
glory ("1 should like to be a Queen, best") but strategic advantage for her chosen side
(Haughton, 141).207As a straightforward case of social climbing though, Alice's great
expectations are cynical and humdrum (though firmly in line with Carroll's own
monarchism and snobbish social conservatism, as well as that of the Liddell family).208
In an essay on Alice as the fallen and corrupting force in Wonderland and Through the
Looking-glass, James Kincaid has even argued that her 'rude and tragic haste' to
achieve the status of queen itself marks 'the loss of Eden,.209There is certainly a
connection between her royal aspirations and her postlapsarian doubleness: in the
opening chapter of Through the Looking-glass, the narrator reminds us of Alice's many-
selved state:
She had had quite a long argument with her sister only the day before -
all because Alice had begun with "Let's pretend we're kings and
queens;" and her sister, who liked being very exact, had argued that
they couldn't, because there were only two of them, and Alice had been
reduced at last to say "Well you can be one of them, then, and I'll be all
the rest" (Haughton, 124).
Alice, lonely and frustrated thanks to the gap, in age and disposition, between herself
and her sister, is like 'the solitary child' in Beckett's Endgame, 'who turns himself into
children, two, three, so as to be together.,210Issy's isolation from the absorbing
twinhood of her brothers similarly encourages her own self-duplication:
207 It would seem, in this sense, to trespass into the territory of folklore and fairy tale, one unfortunate
consequence of which is Tim Burton's disastrous recent effort to reduce and deform the Alice books into
a crass and sub-Tolkeinian battle sequence in his film Alice in Wonderland (2010).
208 A choice example of Carroll's snobbish default setting can be found in a letter to his brother Edwin, in
whichhe describes seeing a play performed by working class children and lingering in the green-room
after the event: 'I did not try to make acquaintance with the children [...], thinking that, as they are only
poor children [...], they would not be the better for being noticed and made to think much of themselves'
(SLLC,37).
209 Kincaid, 'Alice's Invasion of Wonderland' inPMLA (vo1.88, no.I, Jan 1973,92-9).
210 Beckett, 1964. Endgame. London: Faber and Faber, 45. Beckett revisits this topic in a later play, That
Time, in which voice A\recalls talking to yourself who else out loud imaginary conversations there was
childhood for you [... ] making it up now one voice now another till you were hoarse and they all sounded
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Alone? Alone what? ... Pussy is never alone ... for she can always look
at Biddles and talk petnames with her little playfilly when she is sitting
downy on the ploshmat (FW, 561.33-532.1).
This 'playfilly' (playfellow) is her other, who conveniently appears whenever Issy is
bored or lonely. And, just as Alice prefers talking to herself than with the curly-haired
Ada or the unfortunate Mabel, for Issy, her imaginary 'self is far better company than
her real classmates:
She will blow ever so much more promisefuller, blee me, than all the
other common marygales that romp round brigidschool, charming Carry
Whambers or saucy Susy Maucepot of Merry Anna Patchbox or silly
Polly Flinders (FW, 562.11-4).
Madge, Issy's other, is far from 'common'; she is by all accounts a majesty herself - a
'Madges Tighe' (369.30), 'madjestky' (335.2), or 'midgetsy' (334.17). By playing with
her double Issy is - like Alice - escaping solitude, achieving social lift-off, playing
'kings and queens', and, on the level of her own fantasy, lighting out for the very kind
of power and status which triggered the fall of many a heresiarch before her.
One important figure whose fall shares this social climbing dimension is of
course Humpty Dumpty, whose story is memorably mythologised by Carroll and then,
through Carroll, by Joyce. This ill-starred egg, whose omnipresence in Finnegans Wake
as one of HCE's many fractured avatars is both a nod to Carroll and yet another
unsubtle lapsarian metaphor, is given a uniquely proud and precocious character by
Carroll in Through the Looking-glass, and it is no coincidence that his fall, just like
Alice's and Issy's, is owed to his own moral failings and social aspirations. His chief sin
is that of pride (the sin ascribed to Lucifer's fall and forcefully - if farcically -
reimagined in Father Arnall's hell sermon in A Portrait). Humpty Dumpty is showcased
in his Looking-glass chapter as a virtuosic literary critic, 'master' of the Babelian
confusion of words, and as a pompous social climber who boasts of his royal
connections: '''Now, take a good look at me! I'm one that has spoken to a King, I am:
mayhap you'll never see such another: and, to show you I'm not proud, you may shake
hands with me' (Haughton, 183). Of course, he is proud, and in deigning to shake
the same [...J making Up talk breaking up two or more talking to himself being together that way'
(Beckett, 1984. Collected Shorter Plays. London: Faber, 230-3),
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Alice's hand 'as nearly as possible fell of the wall.' Humpty's pride (and his
unselfconscious implication that Alice herself might be 'too proud') suggests, as Hugh
Haughton has noted, the well-known platitude 'pride comes before a fall' (Haughton,
344, n.6). Compounding his prideful nature is a determined sense of denial or delusion;
he refuses to accept both the possibility that he might fall - "'Why, if Iever did falloff
- which there's no chance of" and the irreversibility of a fall's consequences (he is, of
course, ignorant of the final line in his destiny, that 'all the King's horses and all the
King's men / couldn't put Humpty together again'). When Alice suggests the danger to
him, he stonewalls, even as he perches so precariously atop his stone wall; but by the
end of his chapter, he has fallen, silently and out-of-shot, and the King's men are sent
galloping past Alice on their rescue mission.
In both Through the Looking-glass and Finnegans Wake, Humpty Dumpty is
both already fallen and always about-to-fall (this is emphasised by the Wake's
grammatical and historical simultaneity, where 'Then's now with now's then in tense
continuant. Heard. Who having has he shall have had. Hear!' (FW, 598.28-9). In the
Wake,Humpty's 'great fall from the offwall' (FW, 3.18) is HCE's fall from grace; it is
also Lucifer's, Adam's, and Eve's, and many others besides:
Cleftfoot from Hempal must tumpel, Blamefool Gardener's bound to
fall;
Broken eggs willpoursuive bitten Applesfor where theirs is Will there's
his Wall (FW, 175.17-20).
The bold assertion of free will in the face of God is what leads to the fall of man. His
other chief hubris - his mastery over language - yokes the fall of personal pride with
another, more collective kind of fall, and it is this to which we shall now turn.
2. 'AND SHALL NOT BABEL BE WITH LEBAB?':
THE FALL INTO LANGUAGE
[Lebab: from the Hebrew, meaning 'inner man; heart; soul; will; understanding']
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In her dizzying encounter with the Red Queen after she has passed through the looking-
glass, Alice is reacquainted with the absurdities of the nonsense landscape, where left is
right, hills can be valleys, and '''[It] takes all the running you can do, to keep in the
same place'" (Haughton, 143). Before they part, the Red Queen arms Alice with a
gnomic piece of advice:
"Speak in French when you can't remember the English for a thing -
tum out your toes when you walk - and remember who you are!"
(Haughton, 144).
The Queen's counsel turns out to be tremendously useful in a country where the names
for things frequently vanish or switch allegiances; where a frightening Jabberwock
prowls through a sort-of-English poem at the margins of sense; where words have 'a
temper' and are summed up by Humpty Dumpty with the exclamation:
'Impenetrability!' (186). The twin feats of remembering English and remembering who
one is are connected, and we soon learn that failure to perform one task jeopardises
Alice's chances of success with the other. Her exchange with the Caterpillar in
Wonderland establishes the link: Alice's tongue-tied response to the question '''Who are
you?'" is concomitant with her garbled recitals and inability to 'explain' herself ("'I
ca'n't explain myself, I'm afraid, Sir," said Alice, "because I'm not myself, you see'"
(Haughton, 41)). Her words are '''wrong from beginning to end'" and she is afraid, she
confides to the Caterpillar, that she is 'changed' (45).
The schizophrenic potential of bilingualism has been described by the Welsh poet
Gwyneth Lewis as an 'existential nightmare' and is perhaps best demonstrated by
Nabokov, who made an obligatory transition from Russian to English near the beginning
of his career, and whose oeuvre is fittingly peopled with doppelgangers and split
personalities?)) Beckett, too, is a writer who, in adopting his secondary language as his
primary mode of artistic expression, found himself forsaking the dead-end solipsism of
his solitary English-language heroes (Murphy, Watt) for the stereophonic friction of his
bilingual double acts. The psychological bifurcation of literary bilingualism was hinted
at by T.S. Eliot in 'The Social Function of Poetry,' when he observed:
One of the reasons for learning at least one foreign language well is that
we acquire a kind of supplementary personality; one of the reasons for
211 Lewis, 2005. 'Preface to Keeping Mum' in Chaotic Angels: Poems in English. Tarset: Bloodaxe, 143.
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not acquiring a new language instead of our own is that most of us do
not want to become a different person.212
Neither Joyce nor Carroll shared the qualms of 'most of us' . Carroll relished the
freedom of writing as 'a different person' - the alter-ego of the Reverend Dodgson -
and in his letters to children sometimes affected a Clark Kent-esque masquerade ('Dear
Miss Dolly, / I have a message for you from a friend of mine, Mr. Lewis Carroll, who is
a queer sort of creature, rather too fond of talking nonsense' (SLLC, 38». He also
inscribed his work with versions of himself, most notably the White Knight in Through
the Looking-glass. The young Joyce had his fictional correlative Stephen Dedalus
(whose name he briefly adopted as a pseudonym), and wrote himself into the Wake as
'Sunny Sim' (FW, 305.5), the knowing homologue of Sunny Jim, the name his father
used to give him. Joyce would also have enjoyed the similarity between the shape-
shifting Bloom of 'Circe', HCE, the ever-morphing multi character who is 'more mob
than man' (FW, 261.21) and the continuously circulating rumours about him during
logomanic years of writing Ulysses.213 What is more (to return to Eliot's point), Joyce
and Carroll shared a keen commitment to linguistic scholarship. During the composition
of Finnegans Wake, Joyce plundered the dictionaries of a huge variety of different
languages; but before this later lucky-dip approach to foreign languages found the time
to master 'four or five languages fluently enough', including French, Italian, German,
and Latin (SLJ, 281). Carroll, too, was a dedicated language learner, drawing up endless
'reading schemes' in his diaries and resolving to:
Make an attempt at something like a system of reading. [...] The plan I
have resolved on is:
1st. Mon: and Thurs: Greek. Beginning with Thucydides - right
through.
2nd. Tu: and Fri: Latin. Beginning with Horace - right through.
In both books I shall take the rule 'at the end of a chapter review the
chapter: at the end of a book review the book' etc.214
212 Eliot, 1957. 'The Social Function of Poetry' in On Poetry and Poets. London: Faber and Faber, 19.
213 As he wrote to Harriet Shaw Weaver in 1921: 'A man from Liverpool told me he had heard that I was
the owner of several cinema theatres allover Switzerland. In America [there are] two versions: one that I
was almost blind, emaciated and consumptive, the other that I am an austere mixture of the Dalai Lama
and sir Rabindranath Tagore, Mr Pound described me as a dour Aberdeen minister. Mr Lewis told me he
was told that I was a crazy fellow who always carried four watches and rarely spoke except to ask my
neighbour what 0'clockit was. Mr Yeats [described me] as a kind of Dick Swiveller' (SLJ, 282).
214 Carroll, Diaries, 75-6 (5 February 1856).
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There are a great many entries like this, in which Dodgson exhorts himself to pay
proper attention to his language studies. As his interest in Classics lapsed, he made
efforts to improve his French, and to take up Italian and German, as well as to shore up
his Anglo-Saxon and even begin gathering 'books for learning Hebrew' .215These
entries are invariably followed by self-reproach and frustration: 'My reading scheme is
failing,' he writes in one_216 It is evident that Carroll's linguistic talents were
considerably weaker than Joyce's; as Robert Sutherland points out in Language and
Lewis Carroll, despite his 'dogged perseverance' in studying French and German 'for
the better part of thirty years,' Carroll made embarrassingly 'little progress,.217 In 1881,
a full twenty-five years after the first earnest 'reading schemes' in French were set out
in his diary, Carroll floats the idea of taking two French lessons a week, motivated by a
desire to 'if possible, learn talking it'; this, after decades of determined study_218
Despite his lack of natural facility though, Carroll's interest in language remained
earnest and constant, manifested not just in his gallant scholarly efforts, but in the
emphatically polylingual frames of reference of his oeuvre.
These frames of reference bring us back to the Red Queen's question: how, if we
agree with Eliot's observation, is Alice to replace her English with French and yet
remember who she is? Is it possible, given that Alice is already a 'different person',
suffering from her Beauchamp-esque split, that hers is a unique case? We might argue
that by adopting the language of a 'different person', Alice can avoid falling through the
loopholes (or rabbit holes) of her mother tongue and take refuge in the safely delineated
rules of a foreign one; this way, she can short-circuit the tendency of her language to
wrongfoot her and manage, as it were, to give her slips the slip. As we know, Alice's
English is often garbled, and subject to relentless criticisms by the other characters: the
Caterpillar rebukes her for her mangled recitations and self-contradictions; the Hatter
and the March Hare urge her in vain to 'say what you mean'; the Red Queen finds much
at fault with Alice's manner of speech, as do the Tweedles. Humpty Dumpty splits hairs
over her idiomatic conversation:
"They gave it to me," Humpty Dumpty continued thoughtfully, as he
crossed one knee over the other and clasped his hands round it, "they
215Ibid., 240 (3 February 1866).
216 lbid., 77.
211 Sutherland, 1970. La1tguage and Lewis Carroll. The Hague: Mouton, 40.
218 Carroll, Diaries, 399.
136
gave it to me - for an un-birthday present."
"I beg your pardon?"
"I'm not offended," said Humpty Dumpty.
"I mean, what is and un-birthday present?" (Haughton, 185).
And so, identically, does the White King:
"[...] I must have two, you know - to come and go. One to come
and one to go."
"I beg your pardon?"
"It isn't respectable to beg," said the King.
"I only meant that I didn't understand," said Alice (Haughton,
196).
These characters display, on the one hand, the fastidiousness of editors, perpetually
revising and tidying Alice's messy sentences, and on the other a hypersensitivity to the
absurdities contained within the everyday functions and forms of spoken language.
Their sentences test one another, looking for porousness and anything that is open to
dispute. As editors, characters like the White King and Humpty Dumpty are completely
alert to language's potential for misinterpretation, and they wilfully misinterpret
everything that is said to them in order to make their point. On an intuitive level, though,
the lexical and philosophical concerns of Carroll's characters are extensions of the
author's own instincts about language in its fallen state: the solecisms, ambiguities, and
double meanings on which our desire to be understood snags; the self-contradiction of
grammatical rules which, if followed too rigidly, create nonsense; the problem of proper
names, whose existence seems to impose order over chaos, but in doing so belies the
possibility of a perfect, unified order by standing for difference and discord.
This is where speaking French 'when you can't remember the English for a
thing' announces its great advantage. Jean-Jacques Lecercle has written that 'we do not
know the grammar of our own language [...] we apply linguistic rules we do not
remember having learnt', and this is true;219while Alice's English is everywhere booby-
trapped with the slips and vagaries that come with knowing it instinctively, and being
unable to remember ever having learned it, her foreign languages come with the basic
assurance of having been plucked straight from a textbook, and hence (unlike her
English) are undistinctive, unambiguous, grammatically basic and void of idiom.
Having already sensed this, Alice proleptically follows the Red Queen's advice in her
219 Lecercle, The Violence ojLanguage, 39.
137
very first verbal exchange with a Wonderland citizen, the Mouse, addressing him with
an arch apostrophe: "'0 mousel'" (Haughton, 21). She does so, we are told, because
'she remembered having seen, in her brother's Latin Grammar, "A mouse--of a
mouse--to a mouse--a mouse--O mouse!'" The mouse proves unresponsive, and so
Alice, presuming him to be French, recites 'the first sentence from her French lesson-
book', "'OU est ma chatte?'" 220 This proves an unwise question to ask a mouse, but at
least, unlike with her English, there is no question of the Mouse's having misunderstood
her, as he leaps out of the water and 'quiver[s] with fright' (Haughton, 21).
Alice's textbook speech is a comic reflection of the linguistic culture of Oxford,
where foreign languages tended to be studied dead on the page rather than alive on the
tongue, and forms a noticeable correlation with the type of bilingualism we find in
Dodgson's Oxford-themed prose squibs. These sketches, strangely Swiftian in flavour,
are peopled by mad professors and assorted philosophers and lunatics, all of whom
seem to find mental refuge and 'semantic succour', as Beckett would say, between the
covers of foreign lexicons.221 In 'The Vision of the Three T.s', the Professor speaks
German only after ascertaining that none of his company speaks that language, and the
Lunatic converses in Latin for the same reason; the motto of the Governing Body in
Christ Church is 'an example of a rule in Latin grammar'; the tutor bears 'upon his
head Hoffmann's Lexicon in four volumes folio', while elsewhere, the 'architect and
head of the House [...] conceived the beautiful and unique idea of representing, by
means of a new Belfry, a gigantic copy ofa Greek Lexicon' (CLC, 1027-48).
It is not hard to see why a lover of the reassuringly rigid rules of logic and
mathematics should harbour an affection for Greek Lexicons and grammatical drills, nor
why the paraphernalia of language-learning should feature so strongly in Carroll's
oeuvre. The work which has the most to say about Carroll's attitude to language is
perhaps 'The Hunting of the Snark', which might be read as a metaphor for linguistic
insecurity after the fall of Babel. Like Alice, the hero of 'The Snark' suffers from
ontological complications, the chief of which is that 'He had wholly forgotten his
name':
He would answer to "Hi!" or to any loud cry,
220 Both the Latin Grammar and the French lesson-book have been identified as The Comic Latin
Grammar (percival Leigh, 1840) and La bagatelle: Intended to introduce children of three or four years
old to some knowledge 'bfthe French language (1804). See Gardner, 26, n.8-9.
221 Beckett, 1970. Watt, London: Calder and Boyars, 79.
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Such as "Fry me!" or "Fritter my wig!"
To "What-you-may-call-urn!" or "What-was-his-name!"
But especially "Thing-um-a-jig!"
While, for those who preferred a more forcible word,
He had different names from these:
His intimate friends called him "Candle-ends,"
And his enemies "Toasted-cheese" (CLC, 681).222
None of these names is especially flattering; they bear resemblance to the 'abusive
names' given to HCE in the Wake, among which figure 'Lobsterpot Lardling',
'Peculiar Person', 'Artist', and 'Sways While Falling') (FW, 71.10 - 72.16). Taking
stock of his particulars, we learn that the one they call 'Toasted-cheese' is a Baker, but
one with woefully minimal baking skills, and is taken on board purely for his courage.
He has a some ominous information about the Snark - that it can also be a Boojum -
which is only discovered later, for a typically Babelian reason:
"I said it in Hebrew - I said it in Dutch -
I said it in German and Greek;
But I wholly forgot (and it vexes me much)
That English is what you speak!" (CLC, 688).223
This polylingualism is a fitting condition for the 'hero unnamed' of 'The Hunting of the
Snark', as it was for the frequently tongue-tied 'A liss in hunterland' before him (FW
276, fn.7). The failure to strike the right language recalls a passage in Finnegans Wake
when Mutt prepares to engage Jute in conversation:
You tollerday donsk? N. You tolkatiff scowegian? Nn. You spigotty
anglease? Nnn. You phonio saxo? Nnnn. (FW, 16.5-7).
Like Mutt and Jute, the Baker is a terminally post-Babelian character, whose mastery of
diverse tongues still cannot save him from his downfall. His desire to universalise the
message he has to impart - a message which has life-saving potential for himself and
mIt is-interesting that the Baker's friends call him 'candle-ends', given Alice's fear that she would cease
to exist by 'going out like a candle' , and that the Baker's eventual fate is to 'softly and suddenly vanish
away'.
223 This passage is amusingly glossed by Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller in his spoof reading of 'The
Snark' as a metaphor for the search of the Absolute: 'The accounts of the Absolute in German and Greek
are famous, while the Hebrew and Dutch probably both refer to Spinoza, who was a Dutch Jew, though
he wrote in bad Latin. The forgetting to speak (and write) English is a common symptom in the pursuit of
the Absolute' (Gardner (ed.), 1962. The Annotated Snark. New York: Simon and Schuster, 104).
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the crew - is the very thing that prevents it from being understood when, like Alice, he
'forgets the English'. His desire for unequivocal communication results in complete
communication breakdown, and points up the impossibility of making all things
understood to all people in a post-Babelian universe. The consequence for the Baker is
dire, and is witnessed by the entire crew:
They beheld him - their Baker - their hero unnamed -
On the top of a neighbouring crag,
Erect and sublime, for one moment oftime,
In the next, that wild figure they saw
(As if stung by a spasm) plunge into a chasm,
While they waited and listened in awe.
"It's a Snark!" was the sound that first came to their ears,
And seemed almost too good to be true.
Then followed a torrent oflaughter and cheers:
Then the ominous words, "It's a Boo-"
Then, silence.
The Baker's laughter, then his dramatic aposiopesis, is the haunting acoustic of his fall,
and sees him, in the act of vanishing, already reduced to a pre-verbal state. 'In the midst
of the word he was trying to say' he disappears, along with the word and the rest of his
language.
The Baker is a 'man without qualities' - he can't even bake - but the two most
important things about him make him the apotheopesis of the nonsense (and Modernist)
protagonist: he is nameless, yet answers to many names; he is multilingual, yet his
language rudely disowns him. These unfortunate contradictions mark the characters of
Finnegans Wake too, who flit between their many different names, are all 'diversed
tonguesed' (FW, 381.20) yet suffer from Carrollian stutters, are all chronically
misconstrued by one another, and are all simultaneously fallen and falling, 'pretumbling
forover' (FW, 13.18). The Baker bears especial resemblance to HCE, the Everyman
with multiple names to match, and to HCE's template Bloom who, as we learn in
'Ithaca' is at once 'Everyman or Noman' (U, 679). The language the Wakean characters
are written through is Joyce's philosophical answer to Babel, a 'root language' (FW,
424.17) or, as Seamus Deane nicely phrased it in his introduction to Finnegans Wake, 'a
kind of molten Ur-Ianguage' from which diverse languages will flow (FW, xxx).
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This is a defining element of Joyce's nonsense, but also what allows his
nonsense to take leave from the Victorian mould he inherited from Carroll; to go
beyond linguistic play, and reach instead for an entire linguistic system, outside of any
other language and yet striving to inhabit every one. It is what makes Joyce's nonsense
different from Carroll's: more cluttered, more ruthless, and far less willing to explain
itself. Despite these differences though, the Babelian shift from functional unity of
language to a state of friction, diversity and uncertainty is crucial to both authors.
Whatever problems Carroll might have had making artistic sense of the Fall of Man all
but evaporate when it comes to the Fall of Babel. For nonsense, the linguistic fall is the
real felix culpa: it created the conditions for nonsense, without which nonsense simply
could not operate.
In The Rhetoric of Religion, Kenneth Burke writes that:
Logologically, there is a 'fall' from a prior state of unity, whenever
some one term is broken into two or more terms, so that we have the
'divisiveness' of 'classification' where we formerly had a 'vision of
perfect oneness' .224
When Humpty Dumpty falls, he is broken into more than one piece; when Alice and
Issy fall, they become more than one personality; when the pre-Babelian perfect
language fell and broke into diverse languages, the first condition for nonsense literature
was met, for the simple reason that nonsense feeds on the idea of miscommunication,
misconstruction, ambiguity, and contradiction. These ideas would be virtually
inconceivable to the pre-Babelian mind, whose language is all unity, transparency, and
precision. To the speaker of a perfect, universal language, there could be no possibility
of a nonsense sentence, a verbal slip, a joke; such things could not even be framed in the
language (in the same way that Swift's Houyhnhnms cannot conceive of a lie, and can
only describe this speech-act abstractly and circuitously as saying 'the thing which was
not,).225 Polylingualism is, therefore, the key ingredient of nonsense, a fact of which
Joyce and Carron, with their lexicon-raiding registers and macaronic puns, are
instinctively aware.
Derek Attridge has written an interesting piece on 'The Wake's Confounded
Language' and Joyce's 'masterbuilder' (the Finnegan figure who is, like Ibsen's master
224 Burke, 1961. The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology. London: University of California Press,
175.
225 Swift, 2003. Gulliver's Travels. London: Penguin, 217.
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builder, forever building a tower, from which he is forever falling, which itself is
forever doomed to fall). In it, Attridge weighs up the various possible readings of these
Babelian falls - as a parable of humility; as a celebration of man's technological
mastery, capable of rousing God's jealousy; as a paean to the power of man's desires
and the loftiness of his ideas - before rejecting them on the grounds that they 'arise
from the same conception of language [which] cannot be made to cohere with the way
language works in practice.,226Attridge is rightly suspicious of those explicators of the
Wake who appear to view the Wake as:
[Joyce's] tower of anti-Babel, designed and built to counter the
destructive act of the jealous god who drove the nations apart, and to
bequeath to the world an artefact which, by making out of the
kaleidoscrope of languages a new tongue and a new name to hold
humanity together, will succeed where the sons of Noah failed. If much
of the Wake sounds to us as a Babelian confusion, this must be - so it is
assumed - because we are sti1llocked in our monoglot cultural prisons,
lacking the energy and enterprise to follow Joyce in his multilingual
architectural feat of total unification_227
Joyce was not interested in unification, with all its perfection and sterility; for him, the
sundering of languages is to be read as an immense artistic opportunity, a great
windfall. To travel from a post-Babelian state of linguistic diversity to unification would
involve a process of reduction, and could only tend towards a monotone Orwellian
Newspeak, or an alternative 'desperanto' (FW, 582.8) as Joyce sarcastically called the
artificial language, which has the paradoxical status of trying to reduce the diversity of
languages by adding another into the mix.
It is worth considering the politics of these two 'unifying' languages, in order to
emphasise just how misguided the idea of Finnegans Wake as an exercise in linguistic
unification really is. Esperanto has been credited (or charged) with partly inspiring
Orwell's Newspeak. While Newspeak is designed by 1984's totalitarian Party to censor
and eventually erase independent thought, Esperanto was treated as a threat by non-
fictional totalitarian regimes, in particular Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union.
These contradictions arise from a question of perspective: a totalitarian regime might
seek national unification by eradicating those who are different, while a unifying
226 Attridge, (ed. Morris Beja and Shari Benstock), 1989. 'The Wake's Confounded Language' in Coping
With Joyce. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 262-8 (265).
27:1 Ibid., 264.
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language seeks to eradicate the differences themselves. In one of his Circean
transmogrifications, Bloom seems convinced of the unifying potential of Esperanto:
I stand for the [...] Union of all, jew, moslem and gentile [...] Esperanto
the universal language with universal brotherhood (U, 462).
This is, however, Bloom at his most ridiculous, the Panglossian naif Hugh Kenner was
given to baiting as a nonpareil of liberal delusions. The humanitarian sympathies he
voiced so commendably - if disastrously - in Barney Kiernan's earlier that day have
returned only to make a louder mockery of him, one in which his author this time
participates.
Joyce's sarcastic treatment of artificial languages in the Wake (Esperanto, but
also Ido, Volapuk, and others) would indicate that he by no means desired Wakese to be
included in that group. While those languages aspire to a perfect verbal system in which
ambiguities are expunged and contradictions neutralised, Joyce knew that 'Perfection is
terrible, it cannot have children' (to steal a line from Sylvia Plath).228 Franz Kafka,
knowing this too, goes so far as to wonder how a Babel tower was constructed at all,
given the climate of drowsy verbal repletion in which pre-Babelian society must have
basked; he adds that, in any case, it did not take the sundering of language to incite
conflict between nationallties.P" Joyce's aspirations for the Wake were not to correct
the fractured post-Babelian linguistic condition, but to catalogue and celebrate it; we
could even read the Wake as an ambitious blueprint for the Borgesian 'Library of
Babel', striving to contain everything - including, impossibly, itself - and stretching to
accommodate all known (and forgotten) languages.23o
Joyce is not interested, then, in reducing the world's 'diverse tongues' to
Bloom's 'universal language' but in exploring what happens when they are combined
and extended, 'dismembered and reconstituted' (Ellmann, 716). This is why, as Attridge
points out, the Wake neither laments 'language's fall nor [tries] to secure its recovery';
rather, it:
finds its pleasures in the knowledge that language, by its very nature, is
unstable and ambiguous [...] Once the belief in a pure communicative
language has been abandoned, the sharp difference between monoglot
228 Plath, 1981. 'The Munich Mannequins' in Collected Poems. London: Faber, 262.
229 Kafka, 1992. 'The City Coat of Arms' in The Complete Short Stories. London: Minerva, 433-4.
230 See Borges, 2000. 'The Library of Babel' in Labyrinths. London: Penguin, 78-86.
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and polyglot discourse disappears; any language is many languages - a
Babel of registers, dialects, older and newer forms, slang and borrowed
items, accents and idiosyncracies - and all that the Wake does is to
extend this logic to its comic extreme?3l
Carroll's nonsense characters are scandalised by the 'Babel of registers'
operating within Alice's English, and so their reactions to it are uniformly hostile. As
logicians, 'pedantic to the tenth degree,' the Wonderland and Looking-glass creatures
are offended by Alice's organic and instinctive relationship to language; they feel they
must either correct it, or offer up other, safer languages in lieu of it.232However, any
replacement language is bound, in time, to acquire the idiomatic complications it was
introduced to suppress, and so allows meanings and misconstructions to proliferate all
the more, intensifying rather than overcoming the Babelian confusions of the original
language (in this case, Alice's English).
As the languages multiply, from French and Latin to Hebrew and Dutch, we
witness an acceleration and proliferation of meanings which is, for Carroll's characters,
counter-productive and close to chaotic. The alternative is to restrict the discourse to
English, but only so as to establish and enforce the limits of an unambiguous, perfectly
ordered form of English, ironing out its idioms and contradictions. This, too, is an
impossible and counter-productive task, as we clearly see from the Duchess's
maddening attempts at it in conversation with Alice. Here, she shows how the 'moral'
"'Be what you would seem to be'" can be '''put more simply''':
"Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear
to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than
what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise"
(Haughton,80).
Such sentences are the natural terminus for the Duchess's mania for precision and
transparency. Her need for control is the very thing that robs her language of control;
her rage for order tips it into disorder. As Lercerc1ehas noted, 'Exaggerated correctness
is on the frontier of incorrectness, where, as we know, nonsense is to be found'; this is
the last frontier of the Duchess's doomed verbal campaign.233The tautological result is,
231 Attridge, 'The Wake's Confounded Language', 267.
232 Carroll, "Alice" on tIle Stage', in Haughton, 296.
233 Lecerc1e, Philosophy of Nonsense, 59.
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as the Wake would put it, 'tootoological' (FW, 468.8), and bordering on pure nonsense.
There are versions of such sentences throughout Finnegans Wake; for example:
regarding to prussyates or quazzyverzing he wassand no better than he
would have been before he could have been better than what he warrant
after (FW, 359.6-9).
That attempts at clarification result in complication is on one level a typically nonsense
exercise in opposites: we are back in the territory where hills can be valleys, and
running is indistinguishable from standing still. But, of course, there is more to it than
that. That the excessive order on which nonsense is based finds itself tipping into
disorder - becoming not just its opposite but its enemy - is bound up in the self-
contradictory, even self-annihilating condition of nonsense itself.
In the second chapter of this thesis, I described how Joyce and Carroll use games
to illustrate the tension between order and chaos within nonsense, showing how
excessive organisation and order serves only to 'reintroduce the danger it deprecates,' as
Lecercle has written.234 I cast chaos as the ogre from a line by Joyce, describing his
Work in Progress, that bears repeating:
I know that it is no more than a game but it is a game that I have learned
to play in my own way. Children may just as well playas not. The ogre
will come in any case (LUI, 144).
It seems that Joyce is aware of the losses he is making in trying to keep the destructive
forces of chaos at bay by the obsessive and excessive organisation of his 'game.' His
description of the ogre reminds me of a line from St Augustine, which Wittgenstein
paraphrases when describing the condition of 'running up against the limits of
language':
What, you swine, you want not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk
nonsense, it does not matter! 235
234 Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 67
235 Wittgenstein (in imerview) in Friedrich Waismann, 1979. Ludwig Wittgenstetn and the Vienna Circle.
Oxford: Blackwell, 68-9.
145
'It does not matter'; 'the ogre will come in any case.' In one sense, it does not matter
that in over-reaching for order nonsense brings about chaos, because that chaos was on
its way regardless, thanks to the FalL The point lies in the tension between order and
chaos, a tension which could only exist after the Fall and which it is the fate of literary
nonsense to inhabit. Chaos is vividly present within nonsense, the shadow in its
chiaroscuro; and, just as Babel needs to fall before a joke can be cracked, the threat of
chaos must loom over nonsense, or else the tension on which literary nonsense is based
would evaporate. Nonsense without tension is failed nonsense: the babble of the
nursery, the palilalia of the madhouse, and the Artaudian scream are all lacking in
structural tension and are closer to gibberish than nonsense. By the same token, light
verse, sometimes confused with nonsense poetry, lacks the threat of chaos and with it
any tension or texture.
I began this chapter by invoking Adorno and the self-cancelling work of art. In
Minima Moralia, Adorno writes of 'the destruction of art which is its salvation,'
claiming that art must necessarily destroy itself if it is to access the 'single, true, and
liberated [...] Beauty' it strives to capture, since this Beauty can only be represented 'as
a physical reality' (this would seem to be the opposite of Mallarme's 'ideal flower',
which can only be achieved in art and not in reality).236Adorno's notion of the self-
destructive work of art, 'running up against the limits of language' and of what can be
expressed, as Wittgenstein would have it, holds a mirror to the relationship between
literary nonsense and the idea of order. While nonsense is 'on the side of order', as
Elizabeth Sewell writes, it cannot help but be drawn to the 'forces of disorder'; like an
insect 'flying into a candle', like Alice crawling towards the rabbit hole, nonsense edges
towards its own destruction in the very act of trying to guard against it. This activity,
which brings about disorder by obsessively trying to ensure order, I described in the
introduction to this chapter as being 'at once self-destructive and self-preserving,' and
this is worth considering alongside Adorno's 'destruction of art which is its salvation.'
The condition of literary nonsense is to be, like so many of its protagonists, 'fated for a
fall' (FW, 223.16) and yet already fallen; its rage for 'Order, order, order, order!' (FW,
337.35) might seem at first to be a corrective to this state of affairs, but in fact can only
ever be a confession of it.
236 Adorno, 1974. Minima Moralia. London: Verso, 75.
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My discussion of nonsense and order has now led me to the peculiar impasse
whereby maximal order coincides with maximal disorder in the looking-glass worlds of
Carroll and Joyce, and it seems a fitting conclusion to this chapter to invoke Adorno
once more, to help unpick this conceptual knot. In Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno
and Max Horkheimer ponder the mysterious complicity of enlightenment values in the
Nazi barbarism from which the authors had lately fled to the United States.
Conventional wisdom would place enlightenment values and barbarism on opposite
sides of the ring, but in a provocative reading of the Marquis de Sade (later picked up
by Jacques Lacan in his seminar Kant avec Sade) Adorno and Horkheimer diagnose
Sadean violence as a consequence of the logic of domination implicit all along in
Kantian reason. Reason targets the enemies of modernity for obsolescence, but having
achieved final victory over myth achieves mythological status in its own right. Ulysses
had his monsters and witches as relics of pre-modernity against which to test himself,
but, enlightenment having done away with these, enlightened man is in the position of
the newly crowned Alice, who "wants to deny something - only she doesn't know
what to deny!'" (Haughton, 221). Instead, man in the age of enlightenment achieves
selfhood by repressing the primitive drives identified by psychoanalysis - repressing but
never purging them entirely, as demonstrated by the persistence of violent neuroses
such as anti-Semitism. For Adorno and Horkheimer, this is more than an unfortunate
accident, but rather the darkly inevitable concomitant of a reason that has become
instrumentalised. If we are the arbiters of full and infallible reason, all that we do is
reasonable; but, they continue, there inevitably came a point when 'survival as affirmed
by reason [was] no longer to be distinguished from self-destruction. The two were now
indissolubly blended. Pure reason became unreason. ,237
This is a pessimistic reading of Enlightenment, which has not gone uncontested
(for example by Jiirgen Habermas), but one with obvious applications to the conflict of
order and chaos in Joyce and Carroll, not to mention the dark spectre of violence that
lurks omnipresently in literary nonsense. Alice's progress, in both Wonderland and
Through the Looking-Glass could easily be cast as a Ulyssean voyage past the relics or
snares of pre-modernity, otherwise childhood, from which she can emerge ready for
adulthood,otherwise reason; but all too many of the figures she encounters have
decided they are the heroes of the tale, imposing their order on the chaotic world and
237 Adorno and Horkheimer, 2008. Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso, 90.
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flibbertigibbets such as Alice (as the Red Queen imperiously pronounces: '''I don't
know what you mean about your way... [A]l1 the ways about here belong to me'"
(Haughton, 140)). Alice is equally tyrannical in her way, as we see her considering the
children she would like to turn into pigs, after leaving the Duchess's house, and is
according to Roger Sale 'transformed into a kind of Circe, turning all those she controls
into swine. ,238 Reason has been not just instrumentalised but privatised, causing
mayhem and violence, as one grand narrative of reason and entitlement clashes with
another.
Beckett observed, in his essay on Joyce's 'Work in Progress,' that:
The maxima and minima of particular contraries are one and indifferent
[...] Maximal speed is a state of rest. The maximum of corruption and
the minimum of generation are identical; in principle, corruption is
generation.F"
The disorder that would corrupt literary nonsense is what generates it, and the order that
would generate nonsense corrupts it. When the Red Queen (who seems the
personification of Adorno's and Horkheimer's theory of the barbarity of reason)
announces that "'[It] takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place'"
(Haughton, 143), she might as well be quoting Beckett's line that 'Maximal speed is a
state of rest.' This both/and condition of Carroll's nonsense forms the core of its
philosophical force, and is the one of the most persuasive reasons for Joyce enlisting
Carroll in order to write his great book about the Fall. When Alice worries that she
might '''go out like a candle,'" she is articulating something very close to the process of
self-annihilation we see in nonsense, in that nonsense is, by definition, self-annihilating.
Without the process of self-annihilation in which a candle engages while burning, it
would not function as a candle; equally, without the self-destructive chaos that nonsense
tends towards while engaging in order, it would not function as nonsense. The
simultaneous corruption and generation taking place within literary nonsense is
captured in the. Wake's inspired portmanteau word, 'abnihilisation' (353.23), yoking
destruction (annihilation) and creation (ab nihilo). As surely as any pseudocouple,
generation ..and corruption, order and disorder, will continue their squabbles until the
bitter end, with nonsense as their stage. As Beckett puts it in The Unnamable:
238 Sale, 1978. Fairy Tales and After: From Snow White to E. B. White. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, lIS.
239 Beckett, Disjecta, 21.
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From the unexceptionable order which has prevailed here to date may I
infer that such will always be the case? I may of course. But the mere
fact of asking myself such a question gives me to reflect. [...] If one
day a change were to take place, resultin~ from a principle of disorder
already present, or on its way, what then? 40
In that case, we might decide that order has been disorder and disorder order all along, in
the glorious 'chaosmos' of nonsense (FW, 118.21).
240 Beckett, 1975. The Unnamable. London: John Calder, 10-11.
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